(PC) Hill v. J. Beltran

Opinion

CYMEYON HILL, Case No. 20-cv-06557-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE v. TO AMEND E. PEREZ, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff, a civil detainee currently in custody at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted in a separate order. Plaintiff has named as Defendants in this action the following SVSP prison officials: Property Officer E. Perez; Correctional Officer T. Beltran; and Sergeants E. Black and O. Aragon.2 Dkt. 1 at 2.3 Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the claims are alleged to have occurred at SVSP, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Plaintiff seeks monetary and punitive damages. Id. at 4.

1 Petitioner had initially filed the instant civil rights action in the Eastern District of California. See Dkt. 1. Thereafter, the Eastern District ordered the case transferred to the Northern District. Dkt. 4. The case was then transferred from the Eastern District to this Court. Dkt. 5.

2 Plaintiff spelled Defendant Aragon’s last name incorrectly as “Argon.” See Dkt. 1 at 1- 2. However, the Court directs the Clerk of the Court to correct the spelling of this Defendant’s last name from “O. Argon” to “O. Aragon.” See id. at 5. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Although a plaintiff is not required to plead “specific factual details not ascertainable in advance of discovery,” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986), he does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the allegations in the complaint are mere conclusions, Kennedy v. H & M Landing, Inc., 529 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1976); Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979). A complaint must contain sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). A complaint that fails to state the specific acts of the defendant which violated the plaintiff’s rights fails to meet the notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Hutchinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover, there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Said differently, it is not enough that the supervisor merely has a supervisory relationship over the defendants; the plaintiff must show that the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. Furthermore, supervisor defendants are entitled to qualified immunity where the allegations against them are simply “bald” or “conclusory” because such allegations do not “plausibly” establish the supervisors’ personal involvement in their subordinates’ constitutional wrong. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. B. Legal Claims Plaintiff, who was civilly committed in 1997 following a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, alleges that on August 4, 2020, he was “brutally assaulted” during a cell extraction.4 Dkt. 1 at 2. Thereafter, on that same date, Defendants Perez, Beltran, and Black “destroyed Plaintiff’s personal property, [including] legal books[,] CD player[,] canteen items[,] federal legal materials from [the] court[,] books of stamps[,] personal headphones[,] and personal library books from family.” Id. at 2 (brackets added). He claims the destruction of his property was done “for retaliation,” but he does not further elaborate. Id. at 4. First, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claim alleges that prison officials wrongly destroyed his

4 The Court notes that Plaintiff has not raised any claims in the instant action against the property is not actionable under § 1983. Allegations that a plaintiff has been deprived of his property negligently or intentionally without a pre-deprivation hearing do not state a due process claim under § 1983 if the deprivation was random and unauthorized, see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-44 (1981) (state employee negligently lost prisoner’s hobby kit), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate’s property), because California provides an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128-29 (1990) (where state cannot foresee and therefore provide meaningful hearing prior to deprivation, statutory provision for post-deprivation hearing or common law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation satisfies due process). Plaintiff’s allegations show random and unauthorized property deprivations that are not actionable under section 1983. If the federal court otherwise has no jurisdiction over the case, the claims of random and unauthorized deprivations of property must be pursued in state court. Second, it seems that Plaintiff has named Defendant Aragon because this Defendant was the sergeant in charge of conducting interviews relating to Plaintiff’s grievance about the property destruction. Dkt. 1 at 5. “[B]ased on the interviews conducted by [Defendant] Aragon,” Plaintiff’s grievance was denied. Id. However, the Court finds that the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant Aragon for his involvement in the alleged improper denial of the aforementioned grievance. The failure to grant an inmate’s appeal in the prison administrative appeal system does not amount to a due process violation. There is no federal constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system for California inmates. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). The denial of an inmate appeal is not so severe a change in condition as to implicate the Due Process Clause itself and the State of California has not created a protected interest in an administrative appeal system in its prison. Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations §§ 1073 and 3084 grant prisoners in the county jails and state prisons a purely procedural right: the right to have a prison appeal. The regulations simply require the substantive standards; instead, they provide for flexible appeal time limits, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8, and, at most, that “[n]o reprisal shall be taken against an inmate or parolee for filing an appeal,” id. at § 3084.1(d). A provision that merely provides procedural requirements, even if mandatory, cannot form the basis of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. See Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1430 (prison grievance procedure is procedural right that does not give rise to protected liberty interest requiring procedural protections of Due Process Clause). Thus, Plaintiff had no federal constitutional right to a properly functioning appeal system. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Aragon relating to this Defendant’s involvement in an allegedly incorrect decision on an administrative appeal or failure to process the appeal in a particular way because it does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. Plaintiff may, however, file an amended complaint if he can in good faith allege facts, subject to proof, that cure the pleading deficiencies noted above. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Perez, Beltran, and Black retaliated against him by destroying his property. “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable claim for retaliation as he has failed to allege facts that show the alleged retaliatory actions of which he complains were taken because of his protected conduct. Specifically, Plaintiff states in conclusory fashion that Defendants destroyed his property “for retaliation,” see Dkt. 1 at 4, but he does not elaborate by describing the nature of his protected conduct, or how each of the named prison officials knew about Plaintiff’s conduct. Without allegations of protected conduct and knowledge of such conduct by Defendants, no claim for retaliation is stated. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint if III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in order to give him the opportunity to correct the deficiencies outlined above by filing a simple, concise and direct amended complaint which: a. States clearly and simply each claim he seeks to bring in federal court as required under Rule 8, and he should: i. Set forth each claim in a separate numbered paragraph;

ii. Identify each Defendant and the specific action or actions each Defendant took, or failed to take, that allegedly caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and

iii. Identify the injury resulting from each claim; b. Explains how he has exhausted his administrative remedies as to each claim as against each Defendant before he filed this action as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), or whether such remedies were “unavailable” to him within the meaning of the statute; c. Only alleges those claims that are properly joined under Rule 20(a) (concerning joinder of claims and Defendants) or, stated differently, the amended complaint may only allege claims that:

i. Arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and

ii. Present questions of law or fact common to all Defendants; d. Does not make conclusory allegations linking each Defendant by listing them as having direct involvement to his claims without specifying how each Defendant was linked through their actions; and e. Does not name any Defendant who did not act but is linked solely in his or her respondent superior capacity or against whom Plaintiff cannot allege facts that would establish either supervisorial or municipal liability. 2. Within twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall file his 1 case number for this action—Case No. C 20-6557 YGR (PR)—on the form, clearly label the 2 complaint “Amended Complaint,” and complete all sections of the form. Because the amended 3 complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he 4 wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 5 } 915 (1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. If Plaintiff 6 wishes to attach any additional pages to the civil rights form, he shall maintain the same format as 7 the form, i.e., answer only the questions asked in the “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies” 8 section without including a narrative explanation of each grievance filed. Plaintiffs failure to 9 file his amended complaint by the twenty-eight-day deadline or to correct the 10 aforementioned deficiencies outlined above will result in the dismissal of this action without 11 prejudice. 12 3. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 13 || informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 14 Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11, a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 15 while an action is pending must file a notice of change of address promptly, specifying the new 16 address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 3 17 directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and S 18 (2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 19 se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 20 4. The Clerk is directed to correct the spelling of Defendant Aragon’s last name from 21 “O. Argon” to “O. Aragon.” See Dkt. | at 5. 22 5. The Clerk shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form along with his 23 copy of this Order. 25 Dated: April 13, 2021 26 Loveet Hgcelflecs— J E YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 27 United States District Judge 28