1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DARYL ANTHONY HICKS, Case No. 2:20-cv-02303-DC-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 GOSAI, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner at the time of filing and since released, filed this action in 18 November 2020, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Now pending is 19 defendants’ motion for terminating sanctions, ECF No. 89, wherein they allege that plaintiff’s 20 repeated failure to comply with his discovery obligations merits termination of this action. I 21 agree and recommend that this action be dismissed. 22 Procedural History 23 Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to comply with his discovery obligations. I denied previous 24 a motion for terminating sanctions from defendants in November 2024, after they alleged that 25 plaintiff had failed to answer discovery requests propounded in October 2023. ECF Nos. 72, 79. 26 Although I found then that terminating sanctions were unwarranted, I have ordered plaintiff to 27 comply with his outstanding discovery obligations. On April 29, 2025, I granted defendants’ 28 motion to compel, finding that the answers plaintiff had submitted were wholly inadequate. ECF 1 No. 87. I directed him to file supplemental responses within twenty-one days. In their renewed 2 motion, defendants state that, to date, plaintiff has failed to comply. ECF No. 89 at 3. 3 Analysis 4 I now find terminating sanctions appropriate. I must weigh five factors in determining 5 whether this heavy sanction is warranted: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 6 litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking 7 sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the 8 availability of less drastic sanctions.” Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of 9 Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007). Additionally, only willfulness, bad faith, and 10 fault will justify terminating sanctions. Id. There is no question that plaintiff is willfully refusing 11 to engage fully in discovery. Defendants propounded their discovery in October 2023, and, to 12 date, plaintiff has failed to answer it despite a court order directing him to do so. 13 The first factor, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation, weighs in favor 14 of terminating sanctions. Plaintiff’s refusal to timely and willingly comply with his discovery 15 obligations has delayed resolution. This case is nearly five years old but has not advanced toward 16 resolution because of plaintiff’s unwillingness to answer defendants’ discovery. More broadly, 17 “[t]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Yourish v. 18 Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). 19 The second factor, the court’s need to manage its dockets, also favors dismissal. 20 Plaintiff’s failure to comply with his discovery obligations has caused the case to be delayed, 21 required the court to expend judicial resources on issues not related to the substance of plaintiff’s 22 claims, and injected a substantial degree of uncertainty into the course of this litigation. See 23 Patagalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Arguably, Pagtalunan’s petition has 24 consumed some of the court’s time that could have been devoted to other cases on the docket. It is 25 incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine noncompliance 26 of litigants such as Pagtalunan.”). 27 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also favors dismissal. “In determining 28 whether a defendant has been prejudiced, we examine whether the plaintiff’s actions impair the 1 defendant’s ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” 2 Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987). That is undoubtedly the 3 case here, where plaintiff’s failure to comply with his discovery obligations has impaired 4 defendants’ ability to prepare for trial and to prepare dispositive motions. See, e.g., Chism v. 5 National Heritage Life Insurance Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1981) (overruled on other 6 grounds in Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“Disregard of the 7 discovery process deprived the defendant of needed information, increased its litigation expenses 8 and forestalled its preparation for trial.”). 9 The fourth factor, public policy favoring disposition on the merits, cuts, as always, against 10 terminating sanctions. It lends little support, however, to a litigant who, by his or her own 11 behavior, has impeded disposition on the merits. See In re: Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. 12 Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Thus, we have also recognized that this factor 13 lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the 14 merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.”) (internal quotation marks 15 omitted). That is, as noted above, the case here. 16 Finally, the fifth factor, the availability of lesser sanctions, also weighs in favor of 17 dismissal. Monetary sanctions would be ineffective where, as here, plaintiff is already 18 proceeding in forma pauperis. And no form of evidentiary sanction appears sufficient to deter 19 plaintiff’s continued intransigence. Most importantly, plaintiff was previously and explicitly 20 warned that continued shirking of his discovery obligations could result in this outcome. ECF 21 No. 87 at 5. 22 In his response to the motion for terminating sanctions, plaintiff argues that, since his 23 release, he is homeless and indigent, and that his mental health has hindered his ability to 24 “operate at full capacity.” ECF No. 93 at 1. I am not unsympathetic to his plight, but he makes 25 no suggestion that his circumstances are likely to change or that going forward he will fulfill his 26 obligations as a litigant. The court can give pro se litigants leeway and additional time, but it 27 cannot allow them to shrug off the burdens of litigation entirely. To do so would hinder the 28 court’s ability to manage its docket and resolve other cases and would subject defendants to an in- 1 | limbo status, in which the case against them persists but never advances. I note that, attached to 2 | his response, defendant has appended several pages of uncontextualized prison records, including 3 | grievance forms. /d. at 3-14. Unsurprisingly, defendants state that these documents are 4 | unresponsive to their discovery requests. ECF No. 96 at 3. 5 Accordingly, I recommend that defendants’ renewed motion for terminating sanctions, 6 | ECF No. 89, be GRANTED and that this action be dismissed as sanction for plaintiffs failure to 7 | comply with his discovery obligations. 8 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 9 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DARYL ANTHONY HICKS, Case No. 2:20-cv-02303-DC-JDP (P) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 GOSAI, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner at the time of filing and since released, filed this action in 18 November 2020, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Now pending is 19 defendants’ motion for terminating sanctions, ECF No. 89, wherein they allege that plaintiff’s 20 repeated failure to comply with his discovery obligations merits termination of this action. I 21 agree and recommend that this action be dismissed. 22 Procedural History 23 Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to comply with his discovery obligations. I denied previous 24 a motion for terminating sanctions from defendants in November 2024, after they alleged that 25 plaintiff had failed to answer discovery requests propounded in October 2023. ECF Nos. 72, 79. 26 Although I found then that terminating sanctions were unwarranted, I have ordered plaintiff to 27 comply with his outstanding discovery obligations. On April 29, 2025, I granted defendants’ 28 motion to compel, finding that the answers plaintiff had submitted were wholly inadequate. ECF 1 No. 87. I directed him to file supplemental responses within twenty-one days. In their renewed 2 motion, defendants state that, to date, plaintiff has failed to comply. ECF No. 89 at 3. 3 Analysis 4 I now find terminating sanctions appropriate. I must weigh five factors in determining 5 whether this heavy sanction is warranted: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 6 litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking 7 sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the 8 availability of less drastic sanctions.” Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of 9 Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007). Additionally, only willfulness, bad faith, and 10 fault will justify terminating sanctions. Id. There is no question that plaintiff is willfully refusing 11 to engage fully in discovery. Defendants propounded their discovery in October 2023, and, to 12 date, plaintiff has failed to answer it despite a court order directing him to do so. 13 The first factor, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation, weighs in favor 14 of terminating sanctions. Plaintiff’s refusal to timely and willingly comply with his discovery 15 obligations has delayed resolution. This case is nearly five years old but has not advanced toward 16 resolution because of plaintiff’s unwillingness to answer defendants’ discovery. More broadly, 17 “[t]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Yourish v. 18 Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). 19 The second factor, the court’s need to manage its dockets, also favors dismissal. 20 Plaintiff’s failure to comply with his discovery obligations has caused the case to be delayed, 21 required the court to expend judicial resources on issues not related to the substance of plaintiff’s 22 claims, and injected a substantial degree of uncertainty into the course of this litigation. See 23 Patagalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Arguably, Pagtalunan’s petition has 24 consumed some of the court’s time that could have been devoted to other cases on the docket. It is 25 incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine noncompliance 26 of litigants such as Pagtalunan.”). 27 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also favors dismissal. “In determining 28 whether a defendant has been prejudiced, we examine whether the plaintiff’s actions impair the 1 defendant’s ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” 2 Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987). That is undoubtedly the 3 case here, where plaintiff’s failure to comply with his discovery obligations has impaired 4 defendants’ ability to prepare for trial and to prepare dispositive motions. See, e.g., Chism v. 5 National Heritage Life Insurance Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1981) (overruled on other 6 grounds in Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“Disregard of the 7 discovery process deprived the defendant of needed information, increased its litigation expenses 8 and forestalled its preparation for trial.”). 9 The fourth factor, public policy favoring disposition on the merits, cuts, as always, against 10 terminating sanctions. It lends little support, however, to a litigant who, by his or her own 11 behavior, has impeded disposition on the merits. See In re: Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. 12 Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Thus, we have also recognized that this factor 13 lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the 14 merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.”) (internal quotation marks 15 omitted). That is, as noted above, the case here. 16 Finally, the fifth factor, the availability of lesser sanctions, also weighs in favor of 17 dismissal. Monetary sanctions would be ineffective where, as here, plaintiff is already 18 proceeding in forma pauperis. And no form of evidentiary sanction appears sufficient to deter 19 plaintiff’s continued intransigence. Most importantly, plaintiff was previously and explicitly 20 warned that continued shirking of his discovery obligations could result in this outcome. ECF 21 No. 87 at 5. 22 In his response to the motion for terminating sanctions, plaintiff argues that, since his 23 release, he is homeless and indigent, and that his mental health has hindered his ability to 24 “operate at full capacity.” ECF No. 93 at 1. I am not unsympathetic to his plight, but he makes 25 no suggestion that his circumstances are likely to change or that going forward he will fulfill his 26 obligations as a litigant. The court can give pro se litigants leeway and additional time, but it 27 cannot allow them to shrug off the burdens of litigation entirely. To do so would hinder the 28 court’s ability to manage its docket and resolve other cases and would subject defendants to an in- 1 | limbo status, in which the case against them persists but never advances. I note that, attached to 2 | his response, defendant has appended several pages of uncontextualized prison records, including 3 | grievance forms. /d. at 3-14. Unsurprisingly, defendants state that these documents are 4 | unresponsive to their discovery requests. ECF No. 96 at 3. 5 Accordingly, I recommend that defendants’ renewed motion for terminating sanctions, 6 | ECF No. 89, be GRANTED and that this action be dismissed as sanction for plaintiffs failure to 7 | comply with his discovery obligations. 8 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 9 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of 10 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 11 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 12 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 13 | within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 14 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 15 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 16 1991). 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 ( q Sty — Dated: _ August 18, 2025 q——— 20 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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