(PC) Herrera v. Lynch

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJune 24, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-01660
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Herrera v. Lynch ((PC) Herrera v. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Herrera v. Lynch, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY M. HERRERA, No. 2:24-cv-1660 CSK P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 JEFF LYNCH, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 18 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction 19 and temporary restraining order filed June 17, 2024. (ECF No. 4.) For the reasons stated herein, 20 this Court recommends that plaintiff’s motion be denied. 21 I. Legal Standards 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs injunctions and restraining orders, and 23 requires that a motion for temporary restraining order include “specific facts in an affidavit or a 24 verified complaint [that] clearly show that immediate, and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 25 result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” as well as written 26 certification from the movant’s attorney stating “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons 27 why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 28 /// 1 Temporary restraining orders are generally governed by the same standard applicable to 2 preliminary injunctions, except that preliminary injunctions require notice to the adverse party. 3 See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 4 (E.D. Cal. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). Eastern District of California Local Rule 231, however, 5 requires notice for temporary restraining orders as well, “[e]xcept in the most extraordinary of 6 circumstances,” and the court considers whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion 7 for preliminary injunction at an earlier date. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 231(a)-(b). A temporary 8 restraining order “should be restricted to serving [its] underlying purpose of preserving the status 9 quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” 10 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 11 423, 439 (1974). 12 A temporary restraining order is “an extraordinary remedy” and may be issued only if 13 plaintiff establishes: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in 14 the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his/her favor; and (4) that 15 an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 16 (2008). Plaintiff bears the burden of clearly satisfying all four prongs. Alliance for the Wild 17 Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A temporary restraining order will not 18 issue if plaintiff merely shows irreparable harm is possible – a showing of likelihood is required. 19 Id. at 1131. 20 The injunctive relief an applicant requests must relate to the claims brought in the 21 complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 22 2015) (“When a Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the complaint, the 23 court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.”). Absent a nexus between the injury 24 claimed in the motion and the underlying complaint, the court lacks the authority to grant plaintiff 25 any relief. Id. at 636; see also Beaton v. Miller, 2020 WL 5847014, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020) 26 (the court’s jurisdiction is “limited to the parties in this action” and the pendency of an action 27 “does not give the Court jurisdiction over prison officials in general or over the conditions of an 28 inmate’s confinement unrelated to the claims before it.”). 1 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes additional requirements on prisoner 2 litigants seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. In such cases, 3 “[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to 4 correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means 5 necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); Villery v. California Dep’t of Corr., 6 2016 WL 70326, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016). As the Ninth Circuit has observed, the PLRA 7 places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to inmates, 8 and “operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the 9 bargaining power of prison administrators—no longer may courts grant or approve relief that 10 binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” Gilmore v. People of 11 the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2000). 12 II. Background 13 Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 10, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) On June 14, 2024, this Court 14 granted plaintiff thirty days to file an in forma pauperis affidavit or pay the filing fee. (ECF No. 15 3.) The Court has not screened plaintiff’s complaint because it is awaiting plaintiff’s response to 16 the June 14, 2024 Order. 17 Named as defendants in the complaint are California State Prison-Sacramento (“CSP- 18 Sac”) Sergeant Akins, CSP-Sac Correctional Officers Mayfield and Rowberg, CSP-Sac Warden 19 Lynch and CSP-Sac Captain Gomez. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4, 8.) Plaintiff alleges that on October 4, 20 2023, plaintiff was called out of his cell and told that the Sergeant wanted to speak with him. (Id. 21 at 5.) When plaintiff got to the office, defendant Akins had handcuffs out. (Id.) Defendant 22 Akins told plaintiff that he was taking plaintiff’s cell and that plaintiff had to cuff up because he 23 was sending plaintiff to administrative segregation (“ad seg”). (Id.) Plaintiff asked if this was 24 due to plaintiff’s numerous complaints on officials at CSP-Sac. (Id.) Defendant Akins placed 25 handcuffs on plaintiff and put plaintiff in the B-Facility holding cage at around 7:30 a.m. (Id.) 26 Plaintiff kept calling out to correctional officers and defendant Akins that he needed to use the 27 restroom. (Id.) Plaintiff’s back and legs hurt because he had to stand up the whole time. (Id.) 28 Right before dinner, plaintiff saw defendants Mayfield and Rowberg. (Id.) Plaintiff told 1 defendant Mayfield that he was in a lot of pain (Id) Plaintiff stated that he had been in the cage 2 for over 12 hours without water or his mental health medication. (Id. at 6.) Defendant Mayfield 3 laughed. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Captain Gomez had full knowledge of the 4 violations and was “acting as the person controlling these incidents I was placed in.” (Id. at 8.) 5 Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by making plaintiff stand in the 6 holding cell for over 12 hours. (Id. at 6-8.) 7 III. Claims in Pending Motion for Injunctive Relief 8 In the pending motion, plaintiff requests an emergency transfer out of CSP-Sac. (ECF No.

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(PC) Herrera v. Lynch, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-herrera-v-lynch-caed-2024.