(PC) Head v. County of Sacramento

District Court, E.D. California·Decided September 16, 2021·No. 2:19-cv-01663·Unknown

Opinion

CHARLES HEAD, No. 2: 19-cv-1663 TLN KJN P Plaintiff, v. ORDER COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a federal prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with this civil action. Pending before the court are plaintiff’s motions to compel addressed to defendant Shelton. (ECF Nos. 28, 42, 46.) Legal Standard for Motion to Compel The scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) is broad. Discovery may be obtained as to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. The court, however, may limit discovery if it is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;” or if the party who seeks discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery;” or if “the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Generally, if the responding party objects to a discovery request, the party moving to compel bears the burden of demonstrating why the objections are not justified. E.g., Grabek v. Dickinson, 2012 WL 113799, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012); Ellis v. Cambra, 2008 WL 860523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008). This requires the moving party to inform the court which discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel, and, for each disputed response, why the information sought is relevant and why the responding party's objections are not meritorious. Grabek, 2012 WL 113799, at *1. Background This action proceeds on plaintiff’s first amended complaint filed October 15, 2020 against defendants Sacramento County Deputy Sheriff Shelton and Assistant United States Attorney Endrizzi. (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff alleges that in 2009, defendant Shelton provided defendant Endrizzi with recordings of privileged telephone calls between plaintiff and his lawyer, Scott Tedmon, while plaintiff was housed at the Sacramento County Jail during criminal proceedings. (Id. at 2, 4-5.) Plaintiff alleges that the purpose of these disclosures was to give defendant Endrizzi an unfair advantage in the prosecution of plaintiff in two criminal trials held in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he filed multiple grievances to Captain Maness concerning his belief that defendant Shelton may be sending among other things, recordings of telephone calls between plaintiff and his criminal attorney, i.e., Scott Tedmon, to the government prosecutors or the FBI. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff alleges that in response to his numerous grievances, defendant Shelton stated that none of his privileged information was being disclosed to any third party including the government prosecutors and the FBI. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Captain Maness confirmed this fact as well. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that in response to discovery requests made during his criminal prosecution, defendant Endrizzi did not disclose that she possessed recorded phone calls between plaintiff and his lawyer, given to her by defendant Shelton. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff alleges that in July of 2019, in response to his request for records, he received information showing defendant Shelton delivered to defendant Endrizzi recordings of telephone calls between plaintiff and his criminal lawyer while plaintiff was housed at the Sacramento County Jail in 2009. (Id. at 14-15.) Following resolution of defendant Shelton’s motion to dismiss, this action proceeds on plaintiff’s claim that defendant Shelton violated the Wiretap Act. This action proceeds against defendant Endrizzi on claims that she violated the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, the California Invasion of Privacy Act and plaintiff’s right to privacy under the California Constitution. Motion to Compel filed September 14, 2020 (ECF No. 28) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Shelton failed to respond to a request for production of documents and interrogatories served on August 13, 2020. (ECF No. 28.) In the opposition, for the reasons set forth herein, defendant argues that plaintiff’s motion to compel is premature. Defendant states that on July 29, 2020, he filed a waiver of summons. (ECF No. 26.) On August 5, 2020, the court issued a scheduling order. (ECF No. 27.) Pursuant to the scheduling order, responses to written discovery are due forty-five days after service. (Id.) Defendant Shelton had not appeared in this case at the time the court issued the scheduling order. On August 28, 2020, counsel for defendant Shelton, employed by the law firm Longyear & Lavra, LLP, received via email discovery requests from plaintiff that were received by the Sacramento County Board of Supervisors on August 20, 2020. (ECF 32-1 at 1.) On September 2, 2020, defense received via email more discovery requests that were received by the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department on August 21, 2020. (Id.) This email included a copy of the envelope, which directed the requests to defendant Shelton. (Id.) On September 11, 2020, defense counsel sent plaintiff a letter indicating that she received his requests but they were not properly served because they were not served on her office. (ECF No. 32-2.) The letter notified plaintiff to please serve all documents regarding this case to her office in the future. (Id.) The letter also stated that instead of requesting that plaintiff re-serve the discovery requests, defense counsel would deem them served based on the date they were received by her office, i.e., August 28, 2020. (Id.) The letter also stated that pursuant to the scheduling order, defendant Shelton had 45 days to respond to the discovery requests, i.e., until October 12, 2020. (Id.) The letter asked plaintiff to promptly advise if he disagreed with the calendaring of the responses to these requests. (Id.) In the opposition to the pending motion, defendant argues that plaintiff’s motion to compel is premature because he filed it on September 14, 2020, prior to the expiration of the 45 days period from which they were received by defense counsel after improper service on Sacramento County and the Sheriff’s Department. Based on the improper service of the discovery requests, the undersigned finds that defendant reasonably calculated October 12, 2020 as the deadline for serving responses to plaintiff’s discovery requests. Accordingly, plaintiff’s September 14, 2020 motion to compel is denied as premature. Motion to Compel filed November 2, 2020 (ECF No. 42) Plaintiff’s Motion Plaintiff alleges that he served defendant Shelton with a request for production of documents, set one, no. 5 seeking, “Any and all of Charles Head’s phone call recordings (transcriptions, audio or otherwise recorded) which were released to the United States Attorneys’ Office and/or AUSA Ellen V. Endrizzi.” (ECF No. 42 at 12.) Defendant Shelton responded, “Defendant objects to this request as overbroad with respect to time and scope. This request seeks all recorded conversations, regardless of relevancy or timeframe.” (Id.) In the motion to compel, plaintiff does not address defendant’s objections to request no. 5. Instead, plaintiff alleges that he attempted to informally resolve the dispute regarding this request but defense counsel failed to respond to his communications. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff alleges that he sent defense counsel two letters via U.S. mail in an attempt to resolve the discovery dispute. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that on October 24, 2020, he made several

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