(PC) Haywood v. Reed

Opinion

CAMERON LEE HAYWOOD, No. 2:23-cv-0078 DB P Plaintiff, v. ORDER Defendant. Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him. Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and his complaint (ECF No. 1) for screening. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and give plaintiff the option to proceed immediately with his cognizable claim or to amend the complaint. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). SCREENING I. Legal Standards The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell AtlanticCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). II. Allegations in the Complaint Plaintiff states the events giving rise to the claim occurred while he was incarcerated at California State Prison, Sacramento (“SAC”). (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff has identified SAC correctional officer Reed along with a “John Doe” correctional officer and a “John Doe” correctional sergeant. (Id. at 1, 2.) //// Plaintiff alleges that on an unknown date, officer Reed assigned plaintiff to a cell in the general population even though plaintiff is a documented administrative segregation inmate with safety concerns. (Id. at 3.) He further states Reed placed him in a cell with a known enemy. (Id.) Plaintiff next states, “Reed slammed [him] to the ground then shoved his fingers inside of [his] rectum after he punched and kicked me several times.” (Id.) However, he also states that he was assaulted by his cellmate. (see id., id. at 4, 5.) Plaintiff states that officer Doe escorted him and placed him in a general population cell even after plaintiff told him that he is an administrative segregation inmate. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges sergeant Doe “approved” his placement onto the general population yard even though he is documented as administrative segregation status in the computer and plaintiff verbally told him the same. (Id.) Plaintiff further states sergeant Doe placed him in a cell with a known enemy. III. Does Plaintiff State a Claim under § 1983? The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 1. Excessive Force “When prison officials use excessive force against prisoners, they violate the inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish a claim for excessive force, the plaintiff must show that the officer applied the force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm rather than in a good- faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). However, “[not] every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). That is, “[n]ot every push or shove . . . violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Id. (citation omitted). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (citation and quotation omitted). Furthermore, “prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id. at 6 (ellipses in original) (citation omitted). The allegations in the complaint are conflicting with regard to whether correctional officer Reed was the individual who assaulted plaintiff, or whether it was plaintiff’s cellmate. (ECF No. 1 at 3-5.) If officer Reed was the individual plaintiff alleges slammed him to the ground, punched, kicked, and shoved his fingers inside plaintiff’s rectum, then plaintiff has also alleged facts sufficient to state a cognizable excessive force claim against officer Reed. Because it is not clear whether it was officer Reed or plaintiff’s cellmate who took such action, the undersigned declines to find that the complaint states an excessive force claim. However, plaintiff may file an amended complaint clarifying whether officer Reed or his cellmate assaulted him in the cell. 2. Failure to Protect A failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment requires a showing that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842 (citations omitted). The duty to protect a prisoner from serious harm requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety and well-being of the prisoner. Id. at 832-33; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1998). Because “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment,” plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citations omitted). //// Here, plaintiff has alleged that officer Reed and the two Doe defendants knowingly placed him in the general population, where he had a known enemy, even though plaintiff should have been housed in administrative segregation. (ECF No. 1 at 3-5.) Such allegations are sufficient to state a failure to protect claim. The use of John Does in pleading practice is generally disfavored – but it is not prohibited. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980); Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999); Lopes v. Viera, 543 F. Supp.2d 1149, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2008). However, the court cannot serve Doe defendants because the United States Marshal cannot initiate service of process on unknown defendants. Should plaintiff elect to proceed immediately on his failure to protect claim he may be afforded the opportunity for limited, preliminary discovery to identify the names of the John Does. See Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1163 (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642) (plaintiff should be given the opportunity through discovery to identify unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover their identities and only after the court is satisfied that plaintiff has exhausted other possibilities of finding their names). Once the identity of a Doe defendant is ascertained, plaintiff must file a motion to amend his complaint only to identify the name of the Doe defendant so that service by the United States Marshal can be attempted. Plaintiff is advised that should he fail to identify either Doe defendant during the course of discovery, the court will recommend that they be dismissed from this action. In the event plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he should use the time given to amend to do everything he can to supply the names of the Doe defendants without further assistance from the court. He may seek extensions of time for the filing of an amended complaint for that purpose if necessary. As set forth above, plaintiff has alleged a potentially cognizable failure to protect claim, but has failed to state a potentially cognizable excessive force claim. Accordingly, plaintiff may, but is not required, to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff is advised that in an amended complaint he must clearly identify each defendant and the action that defendant took that violated his constitutional rights. The court is not required to review exhibits to determine what plaintiff’s charging allegations are as to each named defendant. The charging allegations must be set forth in the amended complaint, so defendants have fair notice of the claims plaintiff is presenting. That said, plaintiff need not provide every detailed fact in support of his claims. Rather, plaintiff should provide a short, plain statement of each claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. E.D. Cal. R. 220. Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, all prior pleadings are superseded. Any amended complaint should contain all of the allegations related to his claim in this action. If plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against the defendant, they must be set forth in the amended complaint. By signing an amended complaint, plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry and has evidentiary support for his allegations, and for violation of this rule the court may impose sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 3. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) states potentially cognizable failure to protect claim as set forth in Section HI above. The complaint does not contain any additional cognizable claims. Accordingly, plaintiff will have the option to proceed with the complaint as screened or amend the complaint. 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall fill out and return the attached form indicating how he would like to proceed in this action. 3. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. Dated: June 20, 2023

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE pB:12 38 DB/DB Prisoner Inbox/Civil Rights/S/hayw0078.scrn

CAMERON LEE HAYWOOD, No. 2:23-cv-0078 DB P Plaintiff, v. NOTICE OF ELECTION Defendant

Check one: _____ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on his failure to protect claim against defendant Reed. Plaintiff understands that by going forward without amending the complaint he is voluntarily dismissing all other claims. _____ Plaintiff wants to amend the complaint. DATED:_______________________

Cameron Lee Haywood Plaintiff pro se