1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEVONTE B. HARRIS, No. 1:17-cv-01370-DAD-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, GRANTING IN 14 T. QUILLEN, et al., PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 15 Defendants. JUDGMENT 16 (Doc. Nos. 80, 84) 17 18 19 Plaintiff Devonte B. Harris is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 20 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge 21 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 22 BACKGROUND 23 On March 5, 2021, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations, 24 recommending that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 80) be denied in part 25 and granted in part. (Doc. No. 84.) Specifically, the pending findings and recommendations 26 recommended that defendants’ motion be granted as to plaintiff’s retaliation claim and as to 27 plaintiff’s excessive force claim against defendant Magana; but denied as to plaintiff’s excessive 28 use of force claim against the remaining defendants Alvarado, Carranza-Rico, Hurtado, Perez and 1 Quillen, and also denied as to defendants’ argument that this action is barred by the applicable 2 statute of limitations. (Id. at 17.) The findings and recommendations were served on the parties 3 and contained notice that objections were due within thirty (30) days. (Id. at 18.) After an 4 extension of time was requested and granted, defendants filed timely objections on June 21, 2021. 5 (Doc. No. 95.) Plaintiff did not file a reply thereto. 6 The pending findings and recommendations determined that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims 7 began to accrue on December 19, 2012.1 (Doc. No. 84 at 8.) However, plaintiff did not 8 commence this action until October 6, 2017. (Id.) The pending findings and recommendations 9 outlined that plaintiff’s claims were nonetheless timely because the statute of limitations period 10 was tolled: (1) during the time plaintiff pursued his administrative remedies (from December 19, 11 2012 until May 8, 2013 as to his excessive use of force claim and until June 26, 2013 as to his 12 retaliation claim); (2) for up to four years – two years due to plaintiff’s incarcerated status, plus 13 the two year statute of limitations period – (until May 8, 2017 for his excessive use of force claim 14 and June 26, 2017 for his retaliation claim); and (3) due to equitable tolling during the period of 15 time plaintiff pursued these claims in another action, which he commenced on May 4, 2017, 16 where those § 1983 claims were erroneously dismissed, rather than severed, because the court 17 neglected to conduct the required analysis to ensure there would be no loss of otherwise timely 18 claims since new suits would have been barred by the statute of limitations. (Id. at 5, 9–11.) 19 In their objections, defendants present two main arguments related to the assessment of 20 the running of the statute of limitations set forth in the pending findings and recommendations. 21 First, defendants argue that this action is barred by the statute of limitations and “cannot be timely 22 unless Plaintiff is found to be entitled to consecutive (versus concurrent) tolling on three separate 23 bases: statutory tolling for his prisoner status; equitable tolling for his time to exhaust 24 administrative remedies; and equitable tolling for the pending time of a prior action he filed 25 1 Unlike the length of the statute of limitations or tolling, federal courts apply federal law in 26 determining when a § 1983 cause of action accrues. Under federal law, a § 1983 action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the defendants’ alleged wrongful act or 27 omission causes damage(s). See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). In this regard, “a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of 28 the action.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). 1 involving the same claims and Defendants.” (Doc. No. 95 at 1–4.) Defendants assert that the 2 availability of consecutive tolling has not been “firmly settled,” however; they further note that 3 there is currently no governing Ninth Circuit authority prohibiting consecutive tolling of the 4 applicable statute of limitations. (Id. at 3.) However, defendants nonetheless ask this court to 5 follow “the appropriate district court decisions’ precedent” and dismiss this action as time-barred. 6 (Id.) Second, defendants argue that plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling under California 7 law and further that the pending findings and recommendations neglected to address two of the 8 required three factors in the analysis of plaintiff’s claim of entitlement to equitable tolling. (Id. at 9 5–6.) In doing so, defendants largely reiterate the arguments that they raised in their motion for 10 summary judgment—arguments that were already fully addressed by the findings and 11 recommendations. 12 ANALYSIS 13 A. The Availability of Consecutive Tolling 14 As discussed at length in the pending findings and recommendations, because § 1983 does 15 not contain a specific statute of limitations, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of 16 limitations applicable to personal injury actions. Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 631 17 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). California’s 18 statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. 19 Federal courts also apply the forum state’s laws with respect to tolling of the statute of 20 limitations insofar as state law is not inconsistent with federal law. Jones, 393 F.3d at 297. 21 Under California law, the statute of limitations is tolled for up to two years where the cause of 22 action accrues while the plaintiff is in prison. See Cal. Civ. P. Code § 352.1. As such, plaintiff 23 had up to four years (the two-year limitations period plus the two-year statutory tolling due to 24 plaintiff’s incarceration) to file his § 1983 action in this court. See, e.g., Watkins v. Singh, No. 25 2:12-cv-1343-GEB-DAD, 2014 WL 2930536, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2014), aff’d sub 26 nom. Watkins v. Spears, 627 F. App’x 631 (9th Cir. 2015). The statute of limitations is also tolled 27 during the period of time a prisoner is required to exhaust his administrative remedies. Brown v. 28 Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005). Finally, California law also recognizes that equitable 1 tolling is permissible after an erroneous dismissal of a timely filed action or when the absence of 2 a forum for resolution of a claim was due to forces outside of the plaintiff’s control. Bollinger v. 3 Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 25 Cal. 2d 399 (1944). 4 California’s general provision for equitable tolling of a statute of limitations “operates 5 independently . . . of the Code of Civil Procedure to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as 6 necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.” Jones, 393 F.3d at 928 (internal 7 quotation marks and citations omitted).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEVONTE B. HARRIS, No. 1:17-cv-01370-DAD-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, GRANTING IN 14 T. QUILLEN, et al., PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 15 Defendants. JUDGMENT 16 (Doc. Nos. 80, 84) 17 18 19 Plaintiff Devonte B. Harris is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 20 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge 21 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 22 BACKGROUND 23 On March 5, 2021, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations, 24 recommending that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 80) be denied in part 25 and granted in part. (Doc. No. 84.) Specifically, the pending findings and recommendations 26 recommended that defendants’ motion be granted as to plaintiff’s retaliation claim and as to 27 plaintiff’s excessive force claim against defendant Magana; but denied as to plaintiff’s excessive 28 use of force claim against the remaining defendants Alvarado, Carranza-Rico, Hurtado, Perez and 1 Quillen, and also denied as to defendants’ argument that this action is barred by the applicable 2 statute of limitations. (Id. at 17.) The findings and recommendations were served on the parties 3 and contained notice that objections were due within thirty (30) days. (Id. at 18.) After an 4 extension of time was requested and granted, defendants filed timely objections on June 21, 2021. 5 (Doc. No. 95.) Plaintiff did not file a reply thereto. 6 The pending findings and recommendations determined that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims 7 began to accrue on December 19, 2012.1 (Doc. No. 84 at 8.) However, plaintiff did not 8 commence this action until October 6, 2017. (Id.) The pending findings and recommendations 9 outlined that plaintiff’s claims were nonetheless timely because the statute of limitations period 10 was tolled: (1) during the time plaintiff pursued his administrative remedies (from December 19, 11 2012 until May 8, 2013 as to his excessive use of force claim and until June 26, 2013 as to his 12 retaliation claim); (2) for up to four years – two years due to plaintiff’s incarcerated status, plus 13 the two year statute of limitations period – (until May 8, 2017 for his excessive use of force claim 14 and June 26, 2017 for his retaliation claim); and (3) due to equitable tolling during the period of 15 time plaintiff pursued these claims in another action, which he commenced on May 4, 2017, 16 where those § 1983 claims were erroneously dismissed, rather than severed, because the court 17 neglected to conduct the required analysis to ensure there would be no loss of otherwise timely 18 claims since new suits would have been barred by the statute of limitations. (Id. at 5, 9–11.) 19 In their objections, defendants present two main arguments related to the assessment of 20 the running of the statute of limitations set forth in the pending findings and recommendations. 21 First, defendants argue that this action is barred by the statute of limitations and “cannot be timely 22 unless Plaintiff is found to be entitled to consecutive (versus concurrent) tolling on three separate 23 bases: statutory tolling for his prisoner status; equitable tolling for his time to exhaust 24 administrative remedies; and equitable tolling for the pending time of a prior action he filed 25 1 Unlike the length of the statute of limitations or tolling, federal courts apply federal law in 26 determining when a § 1983 cause of action accrues. Under federal law, a § 1983 action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the defendants’ alleged wrongful act or 27 omission causes damage(s). See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). In this regard, “a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of 28 the action.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). 1 involving the same claims and Defendants.” (Doc. No. 95 at 1–4.) Defendants assert that the 2 availability of consecutive tolling has not been “firmly settled,” however; they further note that 3 there is currently no governing Ninth Circuit authority prohibiting consecutive tolling of the 4 applicable statute of limitations. (Id. at 3.) However, defendants nonetheless ask this court to 5 follow “the appropriate district court decisions’ precedent” and dismiss this action as time-barred. 6 (Id.) Second, defendants argue that plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling under California 7 law and further that the pending findings and recommendations neglected to address two of the 8 required three factors in the analysis of plaintiff’s claim of entitlement to equitable tolling. (Id. at 9 5–6.) In doing so, defendants largely reiterate the arguments that they raised in their motion for 10 summary judgment—arguments that were already fully addressed by the findings and 11 recommendations. 12 ANALYSIS 13 A. The Availability of Consecutive Tolling 14 As discussed at length in the pending findings and recommendations, because § 1983 does 15 not contain a specific statute of limitations, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of 16 limitations applicable to personal injury actions. Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 631 17 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). California’s 18 statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. 19 Federal courts also apply the forum state’s laws with respect to tolling of the statute of 20 limitations insofar as state law is not inconsistent with federal law. Jones, 393 F.3d at 297. 21 Under California law, the statute of limitations is tolled for up to two years where the cause of 22 action accrues while the plaintiff is in prison. See Cal. Civ. P. Code § 352.1. As such, plaintiff 23 had up to four years (the two-year limitations period plus the two-year statutory tolling due to 24 plaintiff’s incarceration) to file his § 1983 action in this court. See, e.g., Watkins v. Singh, No. 25 2:12-cv-1343-GEB-DAD, 2014 WL 2930536, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2014), aff’d sub 26 nom. Watkins v. Spears, 627 F. App’x 631 (9th Cir. 2015). The statute of limitations is also tolled 27 during the period of time a prisoner is required to exhaust his administrative remedies. Brown v. 28 Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005). Finally, California law also recognizes that equitable 1 tolling is permissible after an erroneous dismissal of a timely filed action or when the absence of 2 a forum for resolution of a claim was due to forces outside of the plaintiff’s control. Bollinger v. 3 Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 25 Cal. 2d 399 (1944). 4 California’s general provision for equitable tolling of a statute of limitations “operates 5 independently . . . of the Code of Civil Procedure to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as 6 necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.” Jones, 393 F.3d at 928 (internal 7 quotation marks and citations omitted). While the Ninth Circuit has yet to address this precise 8 question—as noted in the pending findings and recommendations—many courts have found that 9 allowing for consecutive tolling is “most consistent with Ninth Circuit authority on tolling 10 pending exhaustion of administrative relief” and “more consistent with the mandate of [the 11 California Supreme Court] to tack time to the end of the limitations period for equitable tolling.” 2 12 Valoff, 422 F.3d at 943; see also Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 370–71 (2003), as 13 modified (Aug. 27, 2003) 3; Stevenson v. Holland, No. 1:16-cv-01831-AWI-SKO, 2017 WL 14 2958731, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2017); Elmore v. Arong, No. CIV S-07-1463 WBS EFB P, 15 2010 WL 366628, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2010); Carranza v. Lewis, No. 15-cv-00682-YGR 16 2 In Lantzy, the California Supreme Court advocated for consecutive tolling through its 17 discussion of tacking the tolled periods onto the end of the limitations period: 18 As these cases illustrate, the effect of equitable tolling is that the limitations period stops running during the tolling event, and begins 19 to run again only when the tolling event has concluded. As a consequence, the tolled interval, no matter when it took place, is 20 tacked onto the end of the limitations period, thus extending the deadline for suit by the entire length of time during which the 21 tolling event previously occurred. 22 Lantzy, 31 Cal. 4th at 370–71 (emphasis added).
23 3 The pending findings and recommendations cite this section of Brown in a lengthy block quotation and discussion of the district court’s decision in Stevenson. (Doc. No. 84 at 8–10.) In 24 their objections, defendants confusingly argue that by relying on this citation to Valoff, the court in Stevenson erred because, they assert, the Ninth Circuit in Valoff did not explicitly address 25 whether tolling due to exhaustion of administrative remedies and the incarceration status of a prisoner, run consecutively or concurrently. (Doc. No. 95 at 3.) While it is true the court in 26 Valoff did not address this precise question, defendants misinterpret what the district court in Stevenson stated in citing Valoff. In the Stevenson opinion, the district court stated only that the 27 Ninth Circuit in Valoff tolled the limitations period for a prisoner “during the administrative exhaustion process without regard to statutory tolling.” This is an accurate characterization of the 28 Ninth Circuit’s decision. 1 (PR), 2017 WL 1050538, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017; Beard v. Pennington, No. 14-cv- 2 03128-YGR (PR), 2015 WL 7293652, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2015); Burns v. Crook, No. 3 07-cv-1984-JLS (WMc), 2008 WL 5103183, *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008). 4 Thus, defendants do not provide a basis upon which to reject the pending findings and 5 recommendations with regard to the recommendation to apply consecutive tolling under the 6 circumstances presented here. Because the Ninth Circuit has not spoken on the issue, the cases 7 cited by defendants to support their arguments in this regard are unavailing because they are not 8 binding on this court. The undersign agrees that under the facts of this case, it is appropriate to 9 apply consecutive tolling in accordance with guidance provided by the California Supreme Court 10 in Lantzy and in keeping with the logic of many other California district courts cited above. 11 B. The Availability of Equitable Tolling 12 Defendants’ second argument advanced in their objections challenges the availability of 13 equitable tolling during the period of time that plaintiff pursued the § 1983 claims that form the 14 basis for this action in another complaint he filed in this court. (Doc. No. 95 at 5–6.) Under 15 California law, three conditions must be met in order to equitably toll a statute of limitations: 16 “(1) defendant must have had timely notice of the claim; (2) defendant must not be prejudiced by 17 being required to defend the otherwise barred claim; and (3) plaintiff’s conduct must have been 18 reasonable and in good faith.” Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal 19 quotation marks and citation omitted.) While the pending findings and recommendations 20 arguably conflated the analysis of the three required conditions, defendants are incorrect in 21 suggesting that those findings and recommendations failed to address any of those required 22 conditions.4 (Doc. No. 95 at 5.) 23 As noted above, plaintiff Harris commenced a prior lawsuit, Harris v. Gipson, No. 1:17- 24 cv-00640- LJO-SAB (PC) (E.D. Cal.) on May 4, 2017. (Doc. No. 84 at 5.) “The complaint 25 named as Defendants nine of the ten Defendants in the present action (all except G. Thomas) as 26
27 4 Moreover, defendants challenge only plaintiff’s ability to meet two of the three conditions: defendants do not contest that the first condition related to notice was met here. (Doc. No. 95 at 5 28 n.3.) 1 well as other persons who are not Defendants in the present action.” (Id.) On September 18, 2 2017, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the nine defendants named in the present action from the 3 Harris v. Gipson action, terminating them from that case. (Id.) As detailed in the pending 4 findings and recommendations, those claims were mistakenly dismissed rather than severed 5 without the proper prejudice analysis: 6 Because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claims against the Defendants from the prior action, the Court did not have occasion 7 to consider the potential prejudice of dismissal versus severance. The Court concludes that if it had performed the requisite prejudice 8 analysis, it would have concluded that severance, rather than dismissal, was warranted. It is clear that Plaintiff is prejudiced by 9 the fact that the claims against Defendants were dismissed instead of severed because the statute of limitations ran prior to filing the 10 instant action. Accordingly, under the rationale set forth in Rush, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling to allow 11 relation back to the timely May 2017 filing date rendering the instant action timely. See Rush v. Sport Chalet, Inc., [779 F.3d 973, 12 975 (9th Cir. 2015)]. 13 (Doc. No. 84 at 11.) 14 In Rush, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court opinion because the 15 court erred in dismissing, rather than severing, the claims of misjoined parties without conducting 16 a prejudice analysis to ensure there was no “loss of otherwise timely claims if new suits are 17 blocked by statutes of limitations.” Rush, 779 F.3d at 975. Accordingly, pursuant to the directive 18 of the Ninth Circuit in Rush, plaintiff’s § 1983 claims should not have been dismissed, but instead 19 should have been severed. Defendants’ argument that they are prejudiced by being required to 20 defend against the otherwise-barred claims misses the mark in this regard. (Doc. No. 95 at 5) 21 (“[T]he Findings and Recommendations do not address the other required condition for applying 22 equitable tolling—that Defendants must not be prejudiced by having to defend the otherwise 23 barred claims.”) In the discussion of this issue, the pending findings and recommendations 24 focused on the second prong (prejudice) of the equitable tolling test because that analysis 25 addressed why the claim was not “otherwise barred.” (Doc. No. 84 at 10–11.) Furthermore, 26 defendants’ arguments as to how they are prejudiced by the granting of equitable tolling here are 27 based on nothing more than the normal difficulties of litigation and do not provide a basis upon 28 which to reject the conclusion reached in the pending findings and recommendations. 1 Defendants also suggest that plaintiff is unable to meet the third prong of the test to 2 establish his entitlement to equitable tolling, which requires a plaintiff to act reasonably and in 3 good faith, because here plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims presented in Harris v. Gipson. 4 (Doc. No. 95 at 5.) This objection, too, is unpersuasive. In the prior action, plaintiff’s complaint 5 was screened, and the court determined that he had brought “several separate claims for relief 6 against several different individuals, some of which are unrelated and improperly joined in a 7 single action.” Order (Aug. 9, 2017), Harris v. Gipson, No. 1:17-cv-00640- LJO-SAB (PC), 8 (Doc. No. 8 at 6–7.) Plaintiff was given the option only to proceed on related claims as required 9 by Rules 18 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and was explicitly admonished by the 10 court that “[a]ny attempt to join claims that are not permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil 11 Procedure will result in those claims being dismissed and/or severed as improperly joined.” (Id. 12 at 7.) Accordingly, plaintiff reasonably followed the directives of the magistrate judge assigned 13 to that action and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of certain of his claims. Notice of 14 Voluntary Dismissal, Harris v. Gipson, No. 1:17-cv-00640- LJO-SAB (PC), (Doc. No. 11.) 15 Defendants’ argument on this issue is also unpersuasive because it was the duty of the 16 court—not the plaintiff—to conduct a proper prejudice analysis and to sever plaintiffs’ claims. 17 The undersigned otherwise agrees with the magistrate judge’s determination and finds no error 18 with the analysis set forth in the pending findings and recommendations regarding plaintiff’s 19 entitlement to equitable tolling here. (Doc. No. 84 at 10–11.) 20 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, this 21 court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, 22 including defendants’ objections, the court finds the findings and recommendations to be 23 supported by the record and by proper analysis. 24 CONCLUSION 25 Accordingly, 26 1. The findings and recommendations issued on March 5, 2021 (Doc. No. 84) are 27 adopted; 28 ///// 1 2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part 2 (Doc. No. 80) as follows: 3 a. The motion is granted as to plaintiffs retaliation claim brought against 4 defendants Sandor, Thomas, Molina and Bugarin; 5 b. The motion is granted as to plaintiff's excessive use of force claim brought 6 against defendant Magana; 7 c. The motion is denied as to plaintiff's excessive use of force claim brought 8 against defendants Alvarado, Carranza-Rico, Hurtado, Perez and Quillen; and 9 d. The motion is denied as to defendants’ argument that this action is barred by 10 the applicable statute of limitations; and 11 3. The matter is referred back to the magistrate judge for further proceedings. 12 | IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: _ September 15, 2021 Yel A. 7, yt 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28