(PC) Harris v. Pleshchuck

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 7, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-01751
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Harris v. Pleshchuck ((PC) Harris v. Pleshchuck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Harris v. Pleshchuck, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TEVIN LEE HARRIS, No. 2: 19-cv-1751 KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 R. VALENCIA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Introduction 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se, with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 19 U.S.C.§ 1983. On September 5, 2019, this action was transferred to this court from the Fresno 20 Division of the United States District Court of the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 16.) 21 In the transfer order, the Fresno Court addressed plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (Id.) The 22 Fresno Court dismissed the claims arising at California State Prison-Corcoran (“Corcoran”) 23 without leave to amend. (Id.) The Fresno Court transferred the claims arising at California State 24 Prison-Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”) to this court. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges violations of his Eighth 25 Amendment right to adequate medical and mental health care at CSP-Sac. 26 On August 29, 2019, plaintiff filed a notice of change of address stating that he was 27 temporarily housed at the Los Angeles County Jail. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff requested that this 28 action be stayed because he had to return to the Los Angeles County Jail on October 25, 2019, for 1 a Franklin hearing.1 Plaintiff requested that this action be stayed pending resolution of the 2 Franklin hearing. 3 On December 30, 2019, plaintiff filed a notice stating that he was still housed at the Los 4 Angeles County Jail. (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff also states that he no longer wishes to stay this 5 action. (Id.) Accordingly, the undersigned herein screens plaintiff’s second amended complaint. 6 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 7 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 8 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 9 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 10 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 11 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 12 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 13 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 14 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 15 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 16 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 17 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 18 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 19 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 20 1227. 21 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 22 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 23 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 24 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 25 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 26

27 1 It appears that plaintiff is referring to a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), under which a prisoner may make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth 28 offender parole hearing. 1 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 2 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. However, “[s]pecific 3 facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 4 the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 5 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 6 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 7 complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most 8 favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other 9 grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 10 Legal Standard for Eighth Amendment Claim 11 The Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate 12 indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th 13 Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th 14 Cir. 2014); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim a plaintiff “must 15 show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition could result 16 in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the 17 defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 18 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal 19 standard,” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown by “(a) a 20 purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm 21 caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The 22 requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of 23 due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 24 Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of 25 action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle v. 26 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). 27 Further, “[a] difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between 28 medical professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to 1 deliberate indifference.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 987 (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th 2 Cir. 1989)).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Davis v. Scherer
468 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 1984)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
In Re Ellen Brogna
589 F.2d 24 (First Circuit, 1978)
Fayle v. Stapley
607 F.2d 858 (Ninth Circuit, 1979)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Eric Sanchez v. Duane R. Vild
891 F.2d 240 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung
391 F.3d 1051 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
(PC) Harris v. Pleshchuck, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-harris-v-pleshchuck-caed-2020.