(PC) Hammer v. Ola

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 22, 2021·No. 1:20-cv-01828·Unknown

Opinion

JEFFREY HAMMER, ) Case No.: 1:20-cv-01828-SAB (PC) ) Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO v. ) RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS ACTION AKINWUMI OLA, et al., ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION Defendants. ) RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE ) ACTION ) ) (ECF Nos. 7, 8) )

Plaintiff Jeffrey Hammer is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on December 29, 2020. On February 19, 2021, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, found that no cognizable claims were stated, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise communicate with the Court. Therefore, on March 30, 2021, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause within fourteen days why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order to show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Therefore, dismissal is warranted. /// I. The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). /// A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. II. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff contends officials at Avenal State Prison refuse to provide him an MRI for both his shoulders and his right knee. Plaintiff’s left shoulder was dislocated, but he never received an MRI and found out that his rotator cuff could only be repaired with a complete shoulder replacement. Plaintiff had to write an administrative appeal before he received an MRI on his right shoulder, and the result was 50/50 chance to repair the very torn rotator cuff. All of the damage and pain and suffering could have been avoided if he had been given an MRI, but officials refused to do anything besides shots in his shoulders and right knee. Plaintiff’s left could have been repaired without major surgery, and he has now received an MRI or any treatment for his right knee. A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz, 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Negligence or medical malpractice do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106). “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). Additionally, a prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, a “difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between medical professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel,

(PC) Hammer v. Ola, (E.D. Cal. 2021).

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
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609 F.3d 1011 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Gregory Carey v. John E. King
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Eric Sanchez v. Duane R. Vild
891 F.2d 240 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
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Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung
391 F.3d 1051 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Wilhelm v. Rotman
680 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
John Snow v. E.K. McDaniel
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