1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALDEUNTE GREEN, No. 2:20-CV-0923-JAM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 R. McFARLANE, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s first amended complaint. See ECF No. 19 11. 20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 23 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 24 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 25 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 26 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 27 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 28 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 1 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 2 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 3 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 4 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 5 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 6 and conclusory. 7 8 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 9 The plaintiff, Aldeunte Green, is a prisoner at Folsom State Prison who was 10 previously incarcerated at Sierra Conservation Center. Plaintiff names the following defendant: 11 Officer R. McFarlane, a corrections officer department employee at Sierra Conservation Center. 12 Plaintiff alleges that Officer McFarlane violated his Eighth Amendment rights by threatening his 13 safety and using excessive force. 14 Plaintiff alleges that he got into an argument with Officer McFarlane on the 15 morning of June 7, 2019. Plaintiff claims that a few hours later Officer McFarlane nudged 16 plaintiff to move faster while escorting plaintiff to the recreation yard. Plaintiff claims that the 17 nudge caused plaintiff to fall down the flight of stairs. Plaintiff sustained a sprained ankle and 18 abrasions to his knee and left shoulder due to the fall. 19 20 II. DISCUSSION 21 The Court finds that plaintiff’s claim suffers two defects. First, plaintiff has failed 22 to allege claims that support a finding of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 23 Second, plaintiff’s allegation that Officer McFarlane nudged him near a staircase cannot establish 24 the conditions necessary for an Eighth Amendment threat to safety claim. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim 2 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 3 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 4 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 5 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 6 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 7 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 8 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 9 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 10 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 11 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 12 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 13 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 14 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 15 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 16 When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial 17 inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 18 or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); 19 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as 20 opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims, 21 is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect 22 on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 23 U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following 24 factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship 25 between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably 26 perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 27 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force 28 was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 1 1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally, 2 because the use of force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining 3 security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 4 475 U.S. at 321-22. 5 Plaintiff fails to establish that Officer McFarlane acted with the malicious mental 6 state necessary for an excessive force claim. Plaintiff argues that Officer McFarlane’s nudge is 7 sufficient to establish an excessive force claim because he purposefully made contact with 8 plaintiff’s body. See ECF No. 1, pg. 3. However, a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive 9 force claim requires that the defendant intended to maliciously and sadistically cause harm. See 10 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALDEUNTE GREEN, No. 2:20-CV-0923-JAM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 R. McFARLANE, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s first amended complaint. See ECF No. 19 11. 20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 23 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 24 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 25 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 26 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 27 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 28 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 1 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 2 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 3 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 4 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 5 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 6 and conclusory. 7 8 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 9 The plaintiff, Aldeunte Green, is a prisoner at Folsom State Prison who was 10 previously incarcerated at Sierra Conservation Center. Plaintiff names the following defendant: 11 Officer R. McFarlane, a corrections officer department employee at Sierra Conservation Center. 12 Plaintiff alleges that Officer McFarlane violated his Eighth Amendment rights by threatening his 13 safety and using excessive force. 14 Plaintiff alleges that he got into an argument with Officer McFarlane on the 15 morning of June 7, 2019. Plaintiff claims that a few hours later Officer McFarlane nudged 16 plaintiff to move faster while escorting plaintiff to the recreation yard. Plaintiff claims that the 17 nudge caused plaintiff to fall down the flight of stairs. Plaintiff sustained a sprained ankle and 18 abrasions to his knee and left shoulder due to the fall. 19 20 II. DISCUSSION 21 The Court finds that plaintiff’s claim suffers two defects. First, plaintiff has failed 22 to allege claims that support a finding of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 23 Second, plaintiff’s allegation that Officer McFarlane nudged him near a staircase cannot establish 24 the conditions necessary for an Eighth Amendment threat to safety claim. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim 2 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 3 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 4 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 5 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 6 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 7 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 8 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 9 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 10 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 11 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 12 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 13 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 14 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 15 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 16 When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial 17 inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 18 or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); 19 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as 20 opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims, 21 is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect 22 on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 23 U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following 24 factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship 25 between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably 26 perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 27 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force 28 was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 1 1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally, 2 because the use of force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining 3 security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 4 475 U.S. at 321-22. 5 Plaintiff fails to establish that Officer McFarlane acted with the malicious mental 6 state necessary for an excessive force claim. Plaintiff argues that Officer McFarlane’s nudge is 7 sufficient to establish an excessive force claim because he purposefully made contact with 8 plaintiff’s body. See ECF No. 1, pg. 3. However, a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive 9 force claim requires that the defendant intended to maliciously and sadistically cause harm. See 10 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Plaintiff’s allegation that Officer McFarlane nudged plaintiff to move 11 faster does not establish that McFarlane intended to maliciously and sadistically harm plaintiff. 12 Because plaintiff has not established that Officer McFarlane acted to maliciously and sadistically 13 harm him, plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. 14 B. Eighth Amendment Threat to Safety Claim 15 Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from 16 physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. 17 at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the prisoner was 18 incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) subjectively, 19 prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The very 20 obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element. See Wallis v. Baldwin, 21 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable, however, if evidence is 22 presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. The 23 knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials know for a 24 certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a mere suspicion 25 of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the plaintiff must 26 show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually knew of a 27 substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk, even if 28 harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 1 The Court recognizes that plaintiff attempts to bring an Eighth Amendment threat 2 to safety claim. However, plaintiff’s allegations do not support this claim. Prison officials have 3 threat to safety liability when the prisoner is incarcerated under conditions that present a 4 substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Here, plaintiff alleges a single 5 negative altercation between himself and Officer McFarlane. See ECF No. 1, pg. 5. Plaintiff does 6 not allege that similar occurrences have occurred during his incarceration or that the altercation 7 occurred as a result of some other condition within the prison. An isolated occurrence cannot 8 establish that plaintiff is being subjected to conditions that present a serious risk of harm. Thus, a 9 threat to safety claim is not an appropriate vehicle for relief and any further amendment would be 10 futile. 11 12 III. CONCLUSION 13 Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be 14 cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the 15 entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff 16 is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 17 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 18 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 19 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 20 plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 21 plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 22 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 23 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the 24 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 25 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 26 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 27 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 28 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). MAIS 2 EUV YOUU EAINT RAIVINSG UOC Le POO eT OY VV
1 Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by 2 | amendment, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now 3 | has the following choices: (1) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the 4 || claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and 5 | the court will address the remaining claims; or (2) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which 6 | continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the court will issue findings and 7 || recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders 8 | and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims. 9 Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 10 | time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 11 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 12 | with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 13 | See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 16 2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date 17 | of service of this order. 18 19 | Dated: July 29, 2020 20 DENNIS M. COTA 21 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28