(PC) Green v. Kersh

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedAugust 19, 2024
Docket2:22-cv-01053
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Green v. Kersh ((PC) Green v. Kersh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Green v. Kersh, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JARVON D. GREEN, Case No. 2:22-cv-01053-TLN-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL 14 R. KERSH, et al., ECF No. 52 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brought this action alleging that defendant Kersh 18 violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him, and that defendant 19 Alkire violated his due process rights. ECF No. 12. Now pending is plaintiff’s motion to 20 compel, ECF No. 52, to which defendants have filed an opposition, ECF No. 55. For the reasons 21 stated below, plaintiff’s motion to compel is granted in part. 22 I. Legal Standard 23 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 “[t]he party to whom [a request for production] 24 is directed must respond in writing within 30 days after being served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 34(b)(2)(A). The responding party may state an objection to any request, but must offer a 26 specific rationale for doing so. In responding to a request to produce documents, the responding 27 party must affirmatively state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of 28 the proffered objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C). 1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, “a party seeking discovery may move for an 2 order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). 3 The party seeking to compel discovery has the initial burden of establishing that its requests are 4 relevant, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), but “[t]he party who resists discovery has the burden to 5 show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and 6 supporting its objections.” See Blemaster v. Sabo, No. 2:16-CV-04557 JWS, 2017 U.S. Dist. 7 LEXIS 178498, 2017 WL 4843241, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2017) (quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v. 8 Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). 9 Analysis 10 There are four requests for production at issue. I will address them separately, in the order 11 presented by plaintiff. 12 A. Request for Production Number Seven 13 This request for production seeks: “The complete personnel file of all Defendant Officers 14 R. Kersh and R. Alkire including but not limited to, all documentation and records of 15 psychological evaluation, commendations, promotions, disciplinary reports, reports of 16 misconduct, investigations and dispositions of all citizens complaints and internal disciplining 17 investigations.” ECF No. 52 at 3-4. 18 Defendants objected to the request as: (1) vague and ambiguous as to the terms ‘complete 19 personnel file,’ ‘all documentation and records’ and ‘investigations and dispositions of all citizens 20 complaints’ causing Defendants to speculate as to the intended meaning; (2) the request is 21 compound as it seeks both Defendant’s personnel files; (3) it seeks documents that are protected 22 by the official information privilege, the deliberative process privilege, California Penal Code 23 sections 832.7 and 832.8, California Evidence Code sections 1040, 1041, and 1043, California 24 Code of Regulations, Title 15, section 3486.3 (Staff Misconduct Determination Notification), 25 Defendants’ common law right to privacy, and which may be protected by the California Code of 26 Regulations, Title 15, § 3321 (Confidential Material), the disclosure of which would create a 27 hazard to the safety and security of the institution, prison officials, and inmates, and violate 28 privacy rights afforded to prison officials and inmates; (4) it may seek documents that are not in 1 Defendants’ custody and control; (5) the demand is not limited as to time or as to the matters that 2 are relevant to any claim or defense in this action, so is unduly burdensome and not proportional 3 to the needs of the case; and (6) propensity evidence is generally not admissible in civil rights 4 cases, so Plaintiff’s request for documents unrelated to Defendants’ specific interactions with 5 Plaintiff is not within the scope of discovery since it is not relevant to his claims. ECF No. 55 at 6 3-4. 7 I find defendants’ objections unpersuasive. The terms “complete personnel file,” “all 8 documentation and records,” and “investigations and dispositions of all citizen complaints,” are 9 not so vague or ambiguous as to require defendants or their counsel to guess as to what relevant 10 documents are sought. The request is compound, but given plaintiff’s pro se status, that is not 11 sufficient reason to refuse production. Defendants’ assertions of numerous privileges are 12 inadequately supported. They make no attempt to link parts of the requested documents to the 13 privileges asserted, and broad, boilerplate assertions are insufficient to sustain their objections. 14 See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States Dist. Court, 408 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th 15 Cir. 2005) (“Rule 26 clarifies that a proper assertion of privilege must be more specific than a 16 generalized, boiler-plate objection.”). Further, there does not appear to be a proper privilege log 17 associated with the objections to request for production number seven. Defendants’ assertion that 18 the request seeks items that “may” not be in their custody or control is insufficient; if all or part of 19 a responsive document is not in their control, they must specify as much. It is true that the 20 request is not limited in scope to the time relevant to the claims at bar, but that is not an adequate 21 basis on which to refuse production entirely. Instead, defendants were obligated to articulate why 22 documents outside of that scope lack relevance, and to produce responsive documents falling 23 within the time period. See Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (the 24 party opposing discovery bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that the discovery should not 25 be permitted). Finally, defendants are correct that propensity evidence is not admissible in 26 section 1983 cases for the purpose of proving a person’s character in order to show that they acted 27 in accordance with that character on a particular occasion. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, the 28 rules recognize that the evidence may be admissible (and, thus, necessarily discoverable) for other 1 purposes, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, or lack of accident. Fed. R. Evid. 2 404(b)(2). 3 In light of the foregoing, plaintiff’s motion to compel is granted with respect to this 4 request for production, and defendants must produce the responsive documents in their 5 possession.1 I am not ignorant of the security risks of providing officers’ personal information to 6 an inmate, however, and within twenty-one days of this order’s entry the parties shall submit a 7 proposed stipulated protective order to which disclosure shall be subject.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
(PC) Green v. Kersh, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-green-v-kersh-caed-2024.