(PC) Gonzales v. Negrete

District Court, E.D. California·Decided November 9, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-01493·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL GONZALES, No. 1:20-cv-01493-EPG (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AS FRIVOLOUS 14 B. NEGRETE, et al., (ECF NO. 1) 15 Defendants. TWENTY-ONE DEADLINE 16 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 17 ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 18 Plaintiff Michael Gonzales (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 19 action. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on October 21, 2020. (ECF No. 1). 20 The Complaint claims that he is being involuntarily medicated through his food by multiple 21 defendants. The complaint is the same in substance to many other complaints Plaintiff has made 22 over the years against dozens of officers at difference facilities, all of which have been dismissed 23 at various stages in the proceedings. The Court finds that the Complaint is frivolous and 24 recommends dismissing the complaint without leave to amend. 25 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 26 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may screen the complaint under 28 27 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 28 1 the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to 2 state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 3 “Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) in 1996 in the wake 4 of a sharp rise in prisoner litigation in the federal courts.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 5 (2006) (citation omitted). “[T]he PLRA . . . was intended to deal with what was perceived as a 6 disruptive tide of frivolous prisoner litigation,” id. at 97, and requires courts to screen lawsuits 7 filed by prisoners “before docketing, if feasible,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), and dismiss them if 8 frivolous, id. § 1915A(b)(1). 9 A complaint will be considered frivolous, and therefore subject to dismissal under § 10 1915(e)(2)(B) or 1915A(b)(1), “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Nietzke 11 v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992). 12 A federal court cannot properly sua sponte dismiss an action commenced in forma pauperis if the 13 facts alleged in the complaint are merely “unlikely.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. Thus, a complaint 14 may be properly dismissed sua sponte if the allegations are found to be “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or 15 “delusional,” or if they “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Id. at 32–33. If 16 a case is classified as frivolous, “there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying action and so 17 no reason to grant leave to amend.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2000). 18 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 19 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 20 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 21 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 22 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 23 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 25 plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not 26 required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 27 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s legal 28 conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 1 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 2 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 3 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 4 II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT 5 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges as follows: 6 Defendants “have disgraced [Plaintiff] and ridiculed him in an attempt to force submission 7 to their demands.” They do this “in retaliation for the exercise of [Plaintiff’s] civil rights and to 8 force him to relin[q]uish his properties”—namely, his artwork. They have also done so “because 9 of [Plaintiff’s] negative history with officers while he was in the security housing units.” 10 Plaintiff then proceeds to list a number of dates that he alleges various officers served 11 Plaintiff with medicated meals. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 10 (“Officer B. Negrete medicated and 12 served the meal while verbally saying she did while intimidating me on 6-1-20/7-6-20/7-29- 13 20 . . . .”)). Elsewhere, Plaintiff alleges that it is “inmate porters who handle the distribution of 14 meals that are highly medicated[.]” 15 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nuckles strip searched Plaintiff and left him naked in a 16 holding cell for snitching on Defendant Nuckles’s staff. He told Plaintiff “no body is medicating 17 your meals.” He also stated he will not permit Plaintiff to file any more 602 appeals about 18 medicated meals. 19 Defendant Officer D. Rubio medicated Plaintiff’s meals on various days in September 20 2020. “He also said he was going to give me a little bit of every[]body[‘]s medication until I give 21 them and his porters free drawings.” Inmates have stopped any art purchases. “It[‘]s not even 22 allowed but the staff does know about this and has obviously ordered them not to buy any art. 23 They have also stolen it from inmates who have tried to send their purchases out. . . . I sell the art 24 for food.” 25 “All officers listed above et al have been medicating my meals since circa 3-1-18 and 26 these actions continue to this day.” 27 Plaintiff has tardive dyskinesia, which can lead to heart attack. 28 /// 1 III. PREVIOUS LAWSUITS 2 Plaintiff has a lengthy litigation history. 1 The Court was able to locate 27 other cases 3 Plaintiff filed in this district,2 twelve in the Northern District of California,3 and thirteen in the 4 Ninth Circuit filed by Plaintiff.4 Plaintiff has been declared a vexatious litigant in state courts.5 5 Many of Plaintiff’s past lawsuits allege, as does the present lawsuit, that prisoner officers 6 are putting medication in his food: 7 • Gonzales v. Cambra, 3:97-cv-00761-SI (PR), N.D. Cal.: Most of the records in this case have 8 not been digitized, so it is difficult to know the exact nature of this lawsuit. However, the 9 Court was able to locate the order dismissing this case. The court noted that Plaintiff “alleges 10 1 The Court takes judicial notice of the court records in this order. Fed. R. Evid.

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