(PC) Gleason v. Lynch

District Court, E.D. California·Decided October 23, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-01971·Unknown

Opinion

STANLEY GLEASON, No. 2:20-cv-1971-EFB P Plaintiff, v. ORDER JEFF LYNCH, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to filing a complaint (ECF No. 1), he has also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and a request for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 7). Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). Screening Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Screening Order Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) includes unrelated claims that cannot be properly joined in a single lawsuit. The first claim alleges that defendant Lindquist, a librarian, violated plaintiff’s right to access the courts when on January 28, 2020, she asked plaintiff to pick up his legal paperwork at a later time and then suspended plaintiff from the library altogether. Id. at 6. The remaining three claims – against three separate defendants – are not supported by any factual allegations. There is a claim that defendant A. Marshall somehow infringed upon plaintiff’s freedom of speech. Id. at 8. There is a claim that defendant J. Polich, a correctional captain, somehow violated plaintiff’s freedom of speech and rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Id. at 9. Lastly, there is a claim that on December 11, 2019, a “doe” defendant handcuffed plaintiff behind his back while he was wearing his mobility impairment vest.1 Id. at 10. As relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at 13. It is well settled that a claimant may not proceed with various unrelated claims against separate defendants: “The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross- claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff asserts four separate claims, each against a different defendant. There are no allegations linking the claims by common questions of law or fact. Thus, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the claims are well-suited for proceeding in a single suit. Moreover, plaintiff’s allegations lack sufficient detail to establish a claim at all. To state a viable First Amendment claim based on denial of access to the courts, plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that Lindquist actually injured his litigation efforts, in that her alleged

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