(PC) Glass v. Youngblood

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMarch 9, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-01411
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Glass v. Youngblood ((PC) Glass v. Youngblood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Glass v. Youngblood, (E.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 JAMES GLASS, Case No. 1:22-cv-01411-SAB (PC) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 11 TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 12 DONNY YOUNGBLOOD, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 13 RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF Defendants. ACTION 14 (ECF No. 10) 15

16 17 Plaintiff James Glass is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate 19 Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff’s complaint in this 20 action was filed on October 26, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) 21 On January 6, 2023, the Court screened the complaint, found no cognizable claims, and 22 granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) 23 Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the Court’s January 24 6, 2023 order. Therefore, on February 14, 2023, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show 25 cause why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to 26 the order to show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal of the 27 action is warranted. /// 1 I. 2 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 4 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 5 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 6 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 7 that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 8 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 10 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 14 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 15 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 17 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 18 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 19 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 20 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 21 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 22 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 23 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 24 F.3d at 969. 25 II. 26 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 27 On or about August 23, 2022, as Plaintiff was attempting to shower in the administrative 1 linens. Plaintiff stopped his shower and notified an officer that the shower was hazardous to 2 Plaintiff’s health and disease prone. 3 Approximately one month later, as of September 23, 2022, there has been no real 4 improvement to the shower conditions. Sergeant Johnson has made it a common practice to 5 sweep the tiers but overlook the inhumane conditions. Plaintiff was told by an unknown deputy 6 and Johnson that they are aware of the issues but yet refuse to respond. The showers are the only 7 means to bathe. Plaintiff was unable to use the showers in the administrative segregation unit 8 upper tier due to the conditions. One unknown deputy commented, “damn that its bad in there” 9 and “wow it stinks my Sgt. is aware.” 10 III. 11 DISCUSSION 12 A. Conditions of Confinement 13 The rights of pretrial detainees are grounded in the Due Process Clause. Bell v. Wolfish, 14 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 15 2008). Detainees have a substantive due process right against restrictions that amount to 16 punishment. Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. 17 Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, 18 but neither does it permit inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 19 In assessing conditions of confinement conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees, 20 the Court considers whether the conditions amount to punishment, causing harm or disability 21 significantly exceeding or independent of the inherent discomforts of confinement, or whether 22 they merely result from some legitimate governmental purpose. See Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 710, 23 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court evaluates a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment claim 24 under an objective deliberate indifference standard. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 25 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying objective standard to medical care claims and 26 describing similar treatment afforded medical care and other conditions of confinement claims) 27 (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400-01 (2015), and Castro v. County of Los 1 defendant's acts or omissions were objectively unreasonable, and identify objective facts 2 indicating the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate 3 governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that objective. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 4 397-98. 5 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not plausibly allege any Defendant named in the 6 complaint was responsible for the conditions of the showers in the top tier of the administrative 7 segregation unit. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff 8 must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved 9 in the deprivation of his civil rights.”). Further, there are insufficient facts to demonstrate that 10 Plaintiff suffered any harm from the conditions of the showers.

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Related

Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
United States v. Salerno
481 U.S. 739 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Alpharma Inc v. Leavitt, Michael
460 F.3d 1 (D.C. Circuit, 2006)
Gregory Carey v. John E. King
856 F.2d 1439 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Moss v. U.S. Secret Service
572 F.3d 962 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
J. Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler
772 F.3d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson
576 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Pierce v. County of Orange
526 F.3d 1190 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Jane Doe v. John Kelly
878 F.3d 710 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)

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(PC) Glass v. Youngblood, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-glass-v-youngblood-caed-2023.