(PC) Geray v. Morrison

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMay 27, 2020
Docket4:20-cv-02580
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Geray v. Morrison ((PC) Geray v. Morrison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Geray v. Morrison, (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JASON GERAY, Case No. 20-cv-02580-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v. 9 Re: ECF No. 10 ANTHONY MORRISON, Defendant. 11

12 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, California, has filed 14 a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is now before the Court for review 15 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate 16 order. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Standard of Review 19 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 22 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 24 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 25 Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 1 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 2 Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a 3 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 4 labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . 5 . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 7 proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 8 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 9 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 10 the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 11 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 12 B. Complaint 13 Plaintiff alleges that, on May 9, 2017, while housed at Salinas Valley State Prison 14 (“SVSP”), he was assisting a Spanish-speaking inmate prepare legal papers when SVSP officer 15 Morrison assaulted him. Plaintiff was handcuffed and although he did not resist the correctional 16 officers, Officer Morrison lost his temper and hit him with a closed fist at full force on the back of 17 his head while yelling foul language. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff argues that the assault caused him 18 “atypical and significant hardships of trauma.” Id. Liberally construed, the complaint states a 19 cognizable claim for use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.1 Whitley v. 20 Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and 21 1 However, it appears that plaintiff has not met the exhaustion requirement set forth in the Prison 22 Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (requiring prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to bring suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and/or the principles of 23 Younger abstention or O’Shea abstention compel the Court to abstain from considering this claim, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971) (under principles of comity and federalism, 24 federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief absent extraordinary circumstances); Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 25 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 1992) (O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), stands for general proposition that federal courts “should be very reluctant to grant relief that would entail heavy 26 federal interference in such sensitive state activities as administration of the judicial system.”). Plaintiff states that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to this claim 27 because the incident “is now at a pre-trial stage in Monterey County Superior Court [Case No.] 1 unusual punishment forbidden by Eighth Amendment); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 2 (1992) (core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in good-faith effort to maintain or 3 restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm). 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows. 6 1. Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim 7 against defendant SVSP Officer Morrison. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States 8 Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint (ECF No. 1), with all 9 attachments thereto, and a copy of this order upon defendant Officer Anthony Morrison at 10 Salinas Valley State Prison, 31625 Highway 101, Soledad CA 93960. A courtesy copy of the 11 complaint with attachments and this order shall also be mailed to the California Attorney 12 General’s Office. 13 2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows: 14 a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendant must file 15 and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendant is of the 16 opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, defendant must so inform the 17 Court prior to the date the motion is due. A motion for summary judgment also must be 18 accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely, and adequate notice of what 19 is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 20 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be 21 served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).2 22 b.

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Related

Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
O'Shea v. Littleton
414 U.S. 488 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Whitley v. Albers
475 U.S. 312 (Supreme Court, 1986)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Earnest Woods, II v. Tom Carey
684 F.3d 934 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Juan Albino v. Lee Baca
747 F.3d 1162 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Wyatt v. Terhune
315 F.3d 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Geray v. Morrison, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-geray-v-morrison-cand-2020.