(PC) Garcia v. Perez

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD GARCIA, Case No. 1:17-cv-00865-NONE-JLT (PC)

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 13 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

14 R. PEREZ, et al., (Doc. 57)

15 Defendants. ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR MISCELLANEOUS RELIEF 16 (Docs. 60, 74, 77) 17 18 Defendants Crisanto and Mello move for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff 19 failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Doc. 57.) For the reasons set forth 20 below, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion be denied. 21 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 22 Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on February 6, 2020. (Doc. 57.) On 23 February 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed a document titled, “Exhaustion Motion.” (Doc. 58.) Upon 24 review, the Court found that the document was intended to serve as an opposition to Defendants’ 25 motion for summary judgment and construed it as such. (Doc. 59 at 1.) 26 On February 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed a document titled, “Motion to Provide a 27 Specification of the Particular Facts on which Discovery is to be had or the Issues on which Discovery is Necessary.” (Doc. 60.) The Court construed the filing as a motion to conduct 1 discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) and Local Rule 260(b). (Doc. 69 at 2 1.) Defendants construed it as an opposition and filed a reply on March 10, 2020. (Doc. 61.) 3 Per the Court’s order (Doc. 59), Plaintiff filed a supplemental opposition to Defendants’ 4 motion for summary judgment on March 30, 2020 (Docs. 64-66). Defendants filed a reply to the 5 supplemental opposition on April 2, 2020. (Doc. 67.) 6 In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants raised two arguments: (1) Plaintiff 7 failed to timely file his administrative grievance concerning the events underlying this case, and 8 (2) even if Plaintiff timely filed the grievance, it would not have exhausted Plaintiff’s 9 administrative remedies with respect to the claims in this action. (See Doc. 57.) On April 26, 10 2020, the Court set an evidentiary hearing to address Defendants’ first argument. (Doc. 69.) 11 On May 15, 2020, Defendants filed a notice of “partial withdrawal” of their motion for 12 summary judgment. (Doc. 73.) Defendants “withdr[ew] their argument that Plaintiff failed to 13 timely submit an administrative grievance related to his claims in this matter, and they 14 submit[ted] for ruling on the second argument in their motion for summary judgment.”1 (Id. at 2.) 15 Accordingly, the Court vacated the evidentiary hearing.2 (Doc. 76.) Defendants’ motion is ripe for 16 review. 17 II. SUMMARY OF FACTS 18 Plaintiff’s claims stem from events that occurred while he was incarcerated at Kern Valley 19 State Prison. (See Doc. 37.) In his operative complaint, Plaintiff contends that Defendants failed 20 to protect him from an attack by other inmates on July 16, 2015. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges that 21 Correctional Officer Perez, while assigned to a control both, electronically opened Plaintiff’s cell 22 door, allowing four inmates to enter Plaintiff’s cell and stab him multiple times. (Id. at 3.) 23 Plaintiff alleges that Correctional Officers Crisanto and Mello, while assigned to the “floor” 24 outside of Plaintiff’s cell, saw Plaintiff being attack but “did nothing” for several minutes. (Id. at 25 3, 6.) Eventually, Crisanto and Mello intervened to stop the inmates’ attack. (See id. at 3-4.) 26 1 Plaintiff filed a “motion” and response to Defendants’ notice of partial withdrawal on June 2, 2020. (Doc. 77.) The 27 Court disregards this filing as unnecessary. 2 On May 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to file an exhibits list for the evidentiary hearing. 1 Plaintiff states that, because he was on “orientation status,” his cell door should not have 2 been opened without correctional officers stationed outside. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges, the day 3 before the attack, he overheard Crisanto and Mello discussing Plaintiff’s murder of a prison guard 4 in New Mexico. (Id.) In part for this reason, Plaintiff believes that the attack on July 16, 2015, 5 was a “set up.” (Id.) 6 Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance regarding the incident in August 2015. Defs.’ 7 Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 2 (Doc. 57-3); Pl.s’ Decl. ¶ 2 (Doc. 66). In the 8 grievance, Plaintiff states the following: 9 On July 16, 2015 ‘I’ Inmate Garcia … was placed into administrative segregation because I was a victim of attempted murder. It is stated on my unit placement notice 10 that Facility A staff observed [four inmates] … run into my assigned cell in A5 cell 132 and attempt to murder me during afternoon … yard release…. My question is 11 this? Why did the Facility A staff up on the control open my cell door and allow[] these 4 inmates in and attempt to murder me. Further why didn’t the floor Facility 12 A staff say or do anything to warn the control to shut and close my cell door since 13 I was in orientation and it was to be shut and close[d] at all times. 14 Vasquez Decl. Ex. A (Doc. 57-4 at 14-17). 15 On September 23, 2015, prison staff cancelled Plaintiff’s grievance as time-barred at the 16 first level of review. Pl.s’ SUF ¶ 6 (Doc. 66). Plaintiff appealed the cancellation. Defs.’ SUF ¶ 7; 17 Pl.s’ Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9. At the third level of review, the CDCR Office of Appeals determined that 18 prison staff had appropriately cancelled the grievance. Vasquez Decl. ¶ 6. 19 Plaintiff filed suit on June 29, 2017 (Doc. 1) and his operative complaint on July 16, 2019 20 (Doc. 37). The operative claims in this case are for violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 21 right to be protected from physical harm. (See Doc. 36 at 2.) 22 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 23 A. Summary Judgment 24 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 25 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 26 Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party “initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine 27 issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by 1 “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 2 electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations …, admissions, 3 interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the 4 absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible 5 evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the non-moving party bears 6 the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of 7 evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 8 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 9 Summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make a showing 10 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 11 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of 12 proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other 13 facts immaterial.” Id. at 322–23. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, 14 “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 15 summary judgment … is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 16 B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 17 The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect 18 to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 19 any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available 20 are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory and 21 “unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). 22 Inmates are required to “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the 23 applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal 24 court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The exhaustion requirement applies to all 25 inmate suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), regardless of the 26 relief sought by the prisoner or offered by the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 27 731, 741 (2001). 1 The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the 2 defendant must plead and prove. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 216. The defendant bears the burden of 3 producing evidence that proves a failure to exhaust; and, summary judgment is appropriate only if 4 the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows the plaintiff 5 failed to exhaust. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). On a motion for summary 6 judgment, the defendant must prove (1) the existence of an available administrative remedy and 7 (2) that Plaintiff failed to exhaust that remedy. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 8 2015) (citations omitted). If the defendant meets this burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff, 9 who must show that there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally 10 available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him….” Id. If the plaintiff fails to 11 meet this burden, the court must dismiss the unexhausted claims or action without prejudice. See 12 Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175 (9th Cir. 2005). 13 C. CDCR Grievance Process 14 The CDCR has an administrative grievance system for prisoners to appeal a policy, 15 decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or staff if it has an adverse effect on 16 prisoner health, safety, or welfare. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). Compliance with 42 17 U.S.C. section 1997e(a) requires California state prisoners to use CDCR’s grievance process to 18 exhaust their claims before filing suit in court. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 19 2010); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85-86. Administrative appeals are generally subject to 20 three levels of review before the remedy is deemed exhausted. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 21 3084.1(b); see also Sapp, 623 F.3d at 818. 22 IV. DISCUSSION 23 Inmates must exhaust only those administrative remedies that are “available;” they “need 24 not exhaust unavailable ones.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). The Ninth Circuit has 25 held “that improper screening of an inmate’s administrative grievances renders administrative 26 remedies ‘effectively unavailable’ such that exhaustion is not required under the PLRA.” Sapp, 27 623 F.3d at 823. To qualify for this exception to the exhaustion requirement, a prisoner “must 1 administrative appeals, would have sufficed to exhaust the claim that he seeks to pursue in federal 2 court, and (2) that prison officials screened his grievance … for reasons inconsistent with or 3 unsupported by applicable regulations.” Id. at 823-24. 4 A. The Court assumes that officials improperly screened Plaintiff’s grievance 5 Prison staff screened Plaintiff’s grievance on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to submit it 6 within the time constraints imposed by California regulations. Pl.s’ SUF ¶ 6. However, as noted 7 in section I, supra, Defendants abandoned the argument that Plaintiff failed to meet the applicable 8 time constraints. (See Doc. 73 at 2.) Accordingly, for purposes of this summary judgment motion, 9 the Court assumes that prison officials improperly screened Plaintiff’s grievance as time-barred. 10 Therefore, the only matter to address is whether Plaintiff’s grievance, if pursued through all levels 11 of review, would have sufficed to exhaust the claims at issue in this case. 12 B. Plaintiff’s grievance would have sufficed to exhaust the claims in this action 13 The PLRA requires “proper exhaustion,” which means that “the prisoner must complete 14 the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules … as a 15 precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88, 93. The rules that must 16 be followed, in other words, “are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process 17 itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the 18 grievance procedures will vary from system to system …, but it is the prison’s requirements, and 19 not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. 20 Prior to 2011, state grievance procedures only required inmates to “describe the problem 21 and the action requested.” Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 22 former Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2). The regulations were amended in 2010. See Cal. Code 23 Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2 (History Notes 11-12). In 2015, the regulations required the following: 24 The inmate … shall list all staff member(s) involved and shall describe their involvement in the issue…. [T]he inmate … shall include the staff member’s last 25 name, first initial, title or position, if known, and the dates of the staff member’s involvement in the issue under appeal. If the inmate … does not have the requested 26 identifying information about the staff member(s), he or she shall provide any other available information that would assist the appeals coordinator in making a 27 reasonable attempt to identify the staff member(s) in question. 1 Defendants Crisanto and Mello argue that Plaintiff’s grievance, even if pursued through 2 all levels of review, would have failed to exhaust the claims against them in this case because (1) 3 the grievance did not identify them by name, and (2) it did not allege that they failed to intervene 4 for several minutes to stop the attack against Plaintiff. (See Doc. 57-2 at 8-9.) Defendants contend 5 that Plaintiff thus failed to provide prison officials with sufficient information to identify them 6 and to alert the officials to the nature of the wrong alleged. (See id.) 7 The Court disagrees. In his grievance, Plaintiff stated that, on July 16, 2015, Facility A 8 staff observed four inmates enter his cell and stab him. (Doc. 57-4 at 14, 16.) Plaintiff provided 9 his cell number and the approximate time of day (“afternoon yard release”). (Id. at 16.) He 10 alleged that control staff opened his cell door, allowing the inmates to enter. (Id.) And he alleged 11 that floor staff failed to “say or do anything” to warn the control staff. (Id.) 12 Plaintiff thus provided information available to him to assist the appeals coordinator in 13 identifying the defendants, as required by state regulations. Plaintiff was not required to provide 14 the names of individuals he did not know. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). In response 15 to the prison’s rejection notice, Plaintiff indicated that he did not know the names of the staff 16 members. Pl.s’ SUF ¶ 5. Plaintiff states that he had been in the pod where he was attacked for 17 only three days. See Pl.s’ Decl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff provided sufficient information—the date and time 18 of day of the incident, the prison facility, his cell number, the staff members’ assignments—to 19 allow prison officials to make a reasonable attempt to identify the staff members. 20 Plaintiff’s grievance also placed prison officials on notice of the nature of the wrong 21 alleged in this lawsuit: failure to protect him from physical harm by other inmates. A grievance is 22 not required to provide all facts alleged in a future complaint or “necessary to prove each element 23 of an eventual legal claim. The primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison to a problem 24 and facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 25 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under the PLRA, a grievance ‘suffices if it alerts the prison to the 26 nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.’” Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 27 2016) (citations omitted). In other words, “[t]he grievance process is only required to ‘alert prison 1 Like Reyes, this case is distinguishable from “Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1118-21, in which an 2 inmate submitted a grievance requesting a ladder to access his top bunk, and later filed a lawsuit 3 asserting that prison staff had disregarded an order assigning him to a lower bunk.” 810 F.3d at 4 659. In this case, Plaintiff filed a grievance alerting prison officials to an alleged failure of staff to 5 protect him from an attack by four inmates—the same claim raised in this lawsuit. Thus, “[p]rison 6 officials had full notice of the alleged deprivation and ample opportunity to resolve it.” Id. The 7 grievance therefore sufficed to exhaust Plaintiff’s administrative remedies with respect to the 8 claims in this action. 9 V. CONCLUSION 10 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion for 11 summary judgment (Doc. 57) be DENIED. Additionally, the Court ORDERS: 12 1. Plaintiff’s motion to conduct discovery (Doc. 60) is DENIED as moot; 13 2. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time (Doc. 74) is DENIED as moot; and, 14 3. Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ notice of partial withdrawal of their motion for 15 summary judgment (Doc. 77) is DISREGARDED as unnecessary. 16 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 17 Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 21 days of 18 the date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, Defendants may file written 19 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 20 Findings and Recommendations.” Defendants’ failure to file objections within the specified time 21 may result in waiver of their rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 22 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24

25 Dated: June 11, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26