(PC) Gaines v. Brown

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 7, 2020
Docket1:16-cv-01666
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Gaines v. Brown ((PC) Gaines v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Gaines v. Brown, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARY LEE GAINES, Case No. 1:16-cv-01666-NONE-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL, WITHOUT PREJUDICE 13 v. (ECF No. 64)

14 BROWN, et al., ORDER STRIKING IMPROPERLY FILED DOCUMENTS 15 Defendants. (ECF Nos. 66, 67, 69)

16 ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO 17 FILE OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO POST 18 SECURITY (ECF No. 65) 19 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO MODIFY 20 DISCOVERY AND SCHEDULING ORDER (ECF No. 70) 21 TWENTY-ONE (21) DAY DEADLINE 22 23 I. Introduction 24 Plaintiff Mary Lee Gaines (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 25 pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on 26 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint against Defendants Mirelez and Hoehing for deliberate 27 indifference to medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 28 /// 1 Discovery was opened in this action on March 5, 2019. (ECF No. 59.) Pursuant to the 2 Court’s Discovery and Scheduling Order, dispositive motions were due on January 13, 2020. 3 (Id.) On May 1, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for order requiring Plaintiff to post security 4 under Local Rule 151(b). (ECF No. 60.) 5 On June 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 64.) On June 6, 6 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for a 30-day extension of time to file an opposition to Defendants’ 7 motion for order requiring Plaintiff to post security. (ECF No. 65.) On June 21, 2019, Plaintiff 8 filed a second motion for a 60-day extension of time to file her opposition, together with her late- 9 filed opposition. (ECF No. 66.) On June 24, 2019, Plaintiff filed a second opposition to 10 Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 67.) 11 On July 1, 2019, Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s June 24, 2019 opposition. (ECF 12 No. 68.) It is unclear whether Defendants were also replying to Plaintiff’s opposition filed on 13 June 21, 2019. 14 On July 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a request for the Court and all parties to disregard the 15 opposition filed on June 24, 2019. (ECF No. 69.) 16 On January 7, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to modify the discovery and scheduling 17 order. (ECF No. 70.) Plaintiff has not yet filed an opposition, but the Court finds a response 18 unnecessary, and the motion is deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l). 19 II. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel 20 In her motion to appoint counsel, Plaintiff states that this case has become complicated 21 and complex for her to litigate on her own due to her chronic medical conditions, hospitalizations, 22 and the storage of her legal property away from her. Plaintiff argues that she suffers from chronic 23 COPD, seizures, unconsciousness blackouts that all interfere with her litigation of this case, and 24 she is not able to continue representing herself due to her illness at this time. Plaintiff therefore 25 requests that the Court appoint counsel from the pro bono program to represent her in this action. 26 (ECF No. 64.) 27 Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. 28 Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952, 954 1 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), and the court cannot require an attorney to represent plaintiff pursuant to 28 2 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 3 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the court may request the voluntary 4 assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 5 Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek 6 volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether 7 “exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on 8 the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 9 complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 10 The Court has considered Plaintiff’s request, but does not find the required exceptional 11 circumstances. Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that she has 12 made serious allegations which, if proved, would entitle her to relief, her case is not exceptional. 13 This Court is faced with similar cases filed by prisoners suffering from various medical 14 conditions who are proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis almost daily. These prisoners also 15 must conduct legal research and prosecute claims without the assistance of counsel. 16 Furthermore, at this stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot make a determination that 17 Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. Although the Court has determined Plaintiff has stated 18 some claims which may proceed in litigation, it has not determined that those claims have a 19 likelihood of ultimately being successful. Also, based on a review of the record in this case, the 20 Court does not find that Plaintiff cannot adequately articulate her claims. To the extent Plaintiff 21 requires additional time to comply with relevant deadlines and court orders due to her health or 22 other circumstances, she has previously demonstrated the ability to seek extensions of time and to 23 articulate the reasons for her request, and she may continue to do so when appropriate. 24 III. Improperly Filed Documents 25 As noted above, Plaintiff filed two separate oppositions to Defendants’ pending motion, 26 (ECF Nos. 66, 67), followed by a request for the Court to disregard the second opposition, (ECF 27 No. 69). 28 /// 1 Upon review of the docket and the specified documents, the Court notes certain 2 irregularities in filing. The first opposition, filed June 21, 2019, though filed by Plaintiff in pro 3 per and including Plaintiff’s handwritten signature, was submitted electronically through the 4 Court’s CM/ECF system by a user named Christine Starkie. (ECF No. 66.) The second 5 opposition, filed June 24, 2019, was submitted in paper, was also filed by Plaintiff in pro per, and 6 included Plaintiff’s handwritten signature. (ECF No. 67.) 7 The July 2, 2019 filing, though submitted by Plaintiff in pro per, was again electronically 8 filed by Christine Starkie, and only includes Plaintiff’s electronic signature. (ECF No. 69.) This 9 document requests that the Court and the parties disregard the second opposition, filed June 24, 10 2019, and claims that it was mistakenly filed by another inmate who submitted the document 11 prior to receiving communication from Plaintiff asking him to no longer file anything in her 12 name. (Id.) 13 Pursuant to Local Rule 133, “[a]ny person appearing pro se may not utilize electronic 14 filing except with the permission of the assigned Judge or Magistrate Judge.” L.R. 133(b)(2) 15 (emphasis in original). The rule also requires that all pro se parties file and serve paper 16 documents. Id. As to signatures, all pleadings and non-evidentiary documents are required to be 17 signed by the individual attorney for the party presenting them, or by the party involved if that 18 party is appearing in propia persona, or pro se. Local Rule 133(b); Fed. R. Civ. P.

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(PC) Gaines v. Brown, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-gaines-v-brown-caed-2020.