(PC) Franks v. Giddings

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 18, 2020·No. 2:17-cv-01056·Unknown

Opinion

TOM MARK FRANKS, No. 2:17-cv-1056 KJM CKD P Plaintiff, v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS J. CLARK KELSO, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with an action for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983. On October 18, 2017, the court screened plaintiff’s complaint, as the court is required to do under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), and found that plaintiff may proceed on two claims arising under the Eighth Amendment against defendant Giddings (defendant).1 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, renewed on May 23, 2019, is before the court. I. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed must support the assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 1 On November 14, 2017, the district court judge assigned to the case at the time dismissed all other claims and defendants. electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials. . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of their pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists or show that the materials cited by the movant do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). In resolving the summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). II. Plaintiff’s Allegations In his complaint, which is signed under the penalty of perjury, plaintiff alleges in relevant part as follows: 1. Claim II On January 25, 2017, defendant, a dentist at High Desert State Prison (High Desert), attempted to fit plaintiff with new dentures. At some point prior to the fitting, plaintiff complained that he had been waiting for the dentures for over a year. Also, at some point during the examination, defendant “jammed his thumbs into [plaintiff’s] jaw causing tears to fall from [plaintiff’s] eyes, and pain that lasted several days.” Defendant returned the dentures because they did not fit. Plaintiff alleges defendant violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by “maliciously and sadistically” causing plaintiff pain. 2. Claim III Plaintiff did not have teeth or dentures for approximately 18 months. During that time, defendant tried to block plaintiff’s pain medication or “Boost” meal replacement drinks on several occasions. Plaintiff could not eat most foods without dentures. Plaintiff alleges that because of defendant’s actions or inaction, plaintiff had to “endure pain, hunger and countless missed edible meals.” III. Applicable Eighth Amendment Standards The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners from force used maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). Denial of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when injury results from deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id. IV. Arguments and Analysis 1. Claim II With respect to plaintiff’s claim that defendant “jammed his thumbs into [plaintiff’s] jaw causing tears to fall from [his] eyes, and pain that lasted several days,” the question for purposes of defendant’s motion for summary judgment is whether there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant u

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
457 U.S. 800 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Jeffers v. Gomez
267 F.3d 895 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines
602 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D. California, 1985)