(PC) Franklin v. Tate

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedDecember 2, 2022
Docket1:19-cv-01170
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Franklin v. Tate ((PC) Franklin v. Tate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Franklin v. Tate, (E.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 JEFFREY FRANKLIN, ) Case No. 1:19-cv-01170-AWI-SAB (PC) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 13 v. ) RELIEF FROM THE JUDGMENT

) 14 HAROLD TATE, et al., (Doc. No. 44) ) 15 Defendants. ) ) 16 )

17 Plaintiff Jeffrey Franklin is appearing pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 18 1983. 19 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the Court’s final judgment, filed 20 August 15, 2022. Defendant filed an opposition on August 29, 2022. (ECF No. 45.) 21 22 DISCUSSION 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the 24 district court. Rule 60(b) permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on 25 grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 26 ...; (3) fraud ... of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied ... or 27 (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 28 1 Reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary remedy “to be used sparingly in the 2 interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 3 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th 4 Cir. 2008) (addressing reconsideration under Rule 60(b)). 5 In seeking reconsideration under Rule 60, the moving party “must demonstrate both injury and 6 circumstances beyond his control.” Harvest, 531 F.3d at 749 (internal quotation marks and citation 7 omitted). “A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, 8 unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there 9 is an intervening change in the controlling law,” and it “may not be used to raise arguments or present 10 evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” 11 Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) 12 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Further, Local Rule 230(j) 13 requires, in relevant part, that a movant show “what new or different facts or circumstances are 14 claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown” previously, “what other grounds exist for the 15 motion,” and “why the facts or circumstances were not shown” at the time the substance of the order 16 which is objected to was considered. 17 A Rule 60(b)(1) motion “must be made within a reasonable time,” and “no more than a year 18 after entry of the judgment or order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). However, a court may deny a motion, 19 even if it was filed within the one-year period, if the moving party “was guilty of laches or 20 unreasonable delay.” Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1987); Hidais 21 v. Porter, 2010 WL 760561, at *1 (N.D. Cal. March 4, 2010). What constitutes “ ‘reasonable time’ 22 depends upon the facts of each case,” and courts should take into consideration (1) “the interest in 23 finality;” (2) “the reason for delay;” (3) “the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the 24 grounds relied upon;” and (4) “prejudice to the other parties.” Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 25 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981) (per 26 curiam)). 27 28 1 In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff contends that the court’s August 10, 2021 final 2 ruling in this matter did not consider the fact that Plaintiff complied with Defendant’s discovery 3 requests on May 20, 2021. (ECF No. 44.) 4 As background, on March 12, 2021, Defendant filed a motion to compel discovery. (ECF No. 5 36.) On April 21, 2021, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to compel. (ECF No. 37.) On June 7, 6 2021, Defendant filed a motion to terminate the action as a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to comply 7 with his discovery obligation and court order. (ECF No. 40.) Plaintiff failed to file a response. On 8 July 15, 2021, the Court issued Findings and Recommendations recommending that Defendant’s 9 motion to dismiss the action as a discovery sanction be granted. (ECF No. 41.) The Findings and 10 Recommendations were served on the parties and contained notice that objections were due within 11 fourteen days. (Id.) Plaintiff did not file objections. On August 10, 2021, the Findings and 12 Recommendations were adopted in full and judgment was entered. (ECF Nos. 42, 43.) 13 In the instant motion, Plaintiff acknowledges that he received the July 15, 2021 Findings and 14 Recommendations on August 6, 2021. (ECF No. 44 at 4.) However, he contends that he complied 15 with the Court’s April 21, 2021 order granting Defendant’s motion to compel and timely served his 16 discovery responses on May 20, 2021. (ECF No. 44 at 5-6.) Plaintiff claims he was not aware that 17 Defendant did not receive the responses. (ECF No. 44 at 5.) 18 A. Interest in Finality of Judgment 19 “Rule 60(b)(1) guides the balance between the overriding judicial goal of deciding cases 20 correctly, on the basis of their legal and factual merits, with the interest of both litigants and the courts 21 in the finality of judgments.” TCI Group Life Ins. v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 2001) 22 (quoting Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985)), overruled on other 23 grounds, Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). “[E]ven though FRCP 60(b) 24 motions are liberally construed, ‘there is a compelling interest in the finality of judgments which 25 should not lightly be disregarded.’” In re Williams, 287 B.R. 787, 793 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) 26 (quoting Pena, 770 F.2d at 814). Accordingly, where “the time for filing an appeal to the underlying 27 judgment has expired, the interest in the finality of judgments is to be given great weight in 28 1 determining whether a FRCP 60(b)(1) motion is filed within a ‘reasonable time.’ ” Williams, 287 B.R. 2 at 793 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) (citing Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981)).

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