(PC) Foust v. Consumer Attorney Marketing Service

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 4, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-02553·Unknown

Opinion

CARL FOUST, Case No. 2:20-cv-02553-WBS-JDP (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS v. GRANTED

CONSUMER ATTORNEY ECF No. 7 MARKETING SERVICE, SCREENING ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF: Defendant. (1) FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT; OR (2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT HE COMPLAINT, SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL CONSISTENT WITH THIS ORDER. ECF No. 1 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BE DENIED AS MOOT

ECF No. 10 Plaintiff Carl Foust is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names Consumer Attorney Marketing Service (“CAMS”) as the lone defendant. Plaintiff does not allege, as best I can tell, that this entity has violated any of his federal or constitutional rights. ECF No. 1 at 3. I will give him an opportunity to amend his complaint. Plaintiff has also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No 7. It makes the required showing and is granted.1 Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction—which he styles as a “request”—complains that prison officials are refusing to sign his “trust withdraw[al] slips.” ECF No. 10 at 2. He claims that their refusal to do so is frustrating his attempts to send money to the court. Id. Given that I have granted his IFP application, officials’ alleged refusal to sign the withdrawal slips should no longer be an issue. Funds will automatically be withdrawn from his prison trust account to satisfy the filing fee. I will recommend that his motion for preliminary injunction be denied as moot. Screening and Pleading Requirements A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it

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