(PC) Epps v. Archie

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 12, 2023·No. 2:23-cv-00135·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 ROBERT EPPS, No. 2:23-cv-00135-DAD-EFB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 ARCHIE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is confined to a state hospital and proceeds without counsel in an action brought 18 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 In addition to filing a complaint (ECF No. 1) and an amended 19 complaint (ECF No. 11), plaintiff has filed two motions for appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 6 20 & 10) and an “attachment to amended complaint” (ECF No. 12). 21 Requests for Appointment of Counsel 22 District courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in section 23 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional 24 circumstances, the court may request an attorney to voluntarily to represent such a plaintiff. See 25 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. 26 1 Findings and Recommendations were issued on February 16, 2023 (ECF No. 9), 27 recommending that plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis be denied and that he be ordered to pay the filing fee. Plaintiff has now paid the filing fee (docket entry on 28 March 13, 2023) and the matter is now moot. 1 Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). When determining whether “exceptional 2 circumstances” exist, the court must consider the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the 3 ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 4 involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). Having considered those factors, 5 the court finds there are no exceptional circumstances in this case. 6 Screening Standards 7 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 8 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 10 of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 11 relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 12 relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 13 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 15 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 16 defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 17 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 18 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, 19 its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 20 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 21 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 22 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 23 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 24 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 25 678. 26 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 27 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 28 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 1 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 2 claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. 3 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 4 plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 5 Screening Order 6 The court screens plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 11) because it supercedes the 7 original complaint (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s claim arose while plaintiff was confined to California 8 State Prison, Sacramento. On October 15, 2021, plaintiff informed defendant correctional officer 9 Archie that his cellmate had stopped taking his medication and was harassing him because he is a 10 sex offender. ECF No. 11 at 3. Plaintiff asked Archie for a new cell and Archie denied his 11 request. Id. Two days later, on October 17, 2021, plaintiff’s cellmate hit him. The bone around 12 plaintiff’s left eye was broken in three places and he had fractured vertebrae near his neck. 13 Plaintiff also names the Warden as a defendant, alleging that the “incident occurred on the 14 warden’s watch.” Id. As discussed below, plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that any defendant 15 violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from an assault. See Wilson v. 16 Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (concluding that failure to protect claim must be measured under 17 deliberate indifference standard). 18 A showing of deliberate indifference requires that a prison official “be aware of facts from 19 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must 20 also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Liability arises only 21 where a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards 22 that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. Plaintiff alleges only that 23 he informed Archie that his cellmate was “harassing” him. Without more, plaintiff’s vague 24 complaint about his cellmate would be insufficient to alert Archie that plaintiff faced a substantial 25 risk of serious harm. In any amended complaint, plaintiff must allege specific facts 26 demonstrating that he informed Archie that his cellmate posed a specific and substantial risk of 27 harm to him and that Archie reacted with deliberate indifference. 28 ///// 1 Further, plaintiff’s claim against the Warden cannot survive screening. Plaintiff does not 2 allege that the Warden knew that plaintiff’s cellmate posed a safety threat to plaintiff, nor does he 3 allege that the Warden acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s safety. Rather, plaintiff has 4 named the Warden as a defendant simply because of his supervisory role, which is not a proper 5 basis for liability. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Wilson v. Seiter
501 U.S. 294 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Richard E. Loux v. B. J. Rhay, Warden
375 F.2d 55 (Ninth Circuit, 1967)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Palmer v. Valdez
560 F.3d 965 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Johnson v. Duffy
588 F.2d 740 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)
Taylor v. List
880 F.2d 1040 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)