(PC) Ekene v. Broussard

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 23, 2022
• Docket: 2:20-cv-01255
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LINUS EKENE, Case No. 2:20-cv-01255-KJM-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 13 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO STAY 14 E. BROUSSARD & TILLERY, AND FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BE DENIED 15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS DUE IN 14 DAYS 16 ECF Nos. 35, 54, 56, 60, & 61 17 ORDER GRANTING THE PARTIES’ 18 MOTIONS FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO MODIFY 19 THE SCHEDULING ORDER AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO 20 COMPEL AND TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULING ORDER 21 ECF Nos. 30, 46, 47, 52, 57, 59, & 63 22 23 Plaintiff Linus Ekene, a state prisoner without counsel, filed this section 1983 action, 24 alleging that defendants E. Broussard and Tillery violated his First Amendment rights by 25 retaliating against him for engaging in protective conduct and denying him access to the courts. 26 Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s allegations, taken 27 as true, do not establish a First Amendment violation as to either claim. ECF No. 54. I agree and 28 recommend that the motion be granted. 1 Miscellaneous Motions 2 Before addressing the motion for summary judgment, I will address the numerous 3 ancillary motions pending on the docket. 4 Plaintiff’s motions for an extension of time to respond to the motion for summary 5 judgment, ECF Nos. 57 & 59, and defendant’s motion for an extension of time to reply to 6 plaintiff’s opposition, ECF No. 63, are granted. The opposition and reply have now been 7 submitted and are deemed timely. 8 Defendant’s motion to modify the scheduling order, ECF No. 52, is granted, and the 9 current motion for summary judgment is deemed timely filed. 10 Plaintiff’s motions to stay this action, ECF Nos. 56, 60, & 61, should be denied. All 11 requested a stay to allow plaintiff to respond to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, which 12 he has now done by way of a lengthy opposition. 13 Plaintiff’s request for an order pursuant to Rule 184, ECF No. 46, is denied. Therein, he 14 argues that the court should take action to stop defendants’ attorney from sending him mail 15 without a return address. Id. at 1-2. There is no indication that this remains an issue, and I 16 decline to admonish or sanction defendants’ counsel at this time. 17 Plaintiff’s motion to compel, ECF No. 30, is denied because it is based on discovery 18 requests that were not timely served. All discovery requests were to be served by January 21, 19 2021. ECF No. 18 at 4. Plaintiff did not serve the discovery requests at issue until February 3, 20 2021. ECF No. 38-1 at 5. Plaintiff’s motion to modify the scheduling order, ECF No. 47, is 21 denied for want of good cause. He claims that he was taken to administrative segregation on 22 September 8, 2020, and, without his legal materials, was unaware of the cut-off date for serving 23 discovery requests. ECF No. 47 at 2-3. Plaintiff admits that his legal property was returned to 24 him on January 29, 2021. However, he waited until June 28, 2021, to file his motion to modify 25 the scheduling order. Such delay shows a lack a lack of diligence. In any event, plaintiff’s 26 opposition to the motion for summary judgment makes no mention of lacking discovery 27 materials. 28 1 Motion for Summary Judgment 2 I. Legal Standards 3 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 4 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington 5 Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine 6 only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find for the non-moving party, 7 while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 8 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 9 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 10 Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials 11 in the record, including but not limited to portions of depositions, documents, declarations, or 12 discovery; or (2) argument showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or 13 absence of a genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible 14 evidence to support its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The 15 court may consider material in the record beyond that cited by the parties, but it is not required to 16 do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 17 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 18 2010). Given the liberal standard afforded pro se litigants and the prohibition against granting 19 summary judgment by default, I will take the whole record into consideration in evaluating 20 whether defendants are entitled to summary judgment.1 21 “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of

22 1 The advisory committee notes to the 2010 amendments to Rule 56(e) state that 23 “summary judgment cannot be granted by default even if there is a complete failure to respond to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (advisory committee notes to 2010 amendments). Instead, 24 courts are permitted to consider a fact undisputed if it is not properly addressed or to grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials show that the movant is entitled to it. 25 See id. This discretion is particularly apposite in cases with prisoner litigants proceeding pro se, since an unrepresented prisoner’s choice to proceed without counsel is often “less than 26 voluntary,” and prisoners are subject to the “handicaps . . . [that] detention necessarily imposes 27 upon a litigant,” such as “limited access to legal materials . . . [and] sources of proof.” Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-65, n.4 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 28 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that courts have an “obligation to give a liberal construction 1 material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the 2 moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 3 party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 4 essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 5 Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this 6 initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts 7 demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 8 376, 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). While the non-moving party is not required to 9 establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, it must at least produce “evidence from 10 which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in [its] favor.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 11 252). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party” and “all 12 justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Orr v. Bank of America, 13 NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002). 14 II. Background 15 Plaintiff alleges that in September 2018, while he was incarcerated at California Men’s 16 Colony (“CMC”), a correctional officer named Vasquez engaged in sexual misconduct toward 17 him. ECF No. 54-6 at 10. Plaintiff filed a grievance and Prison Rape Elimination Act complaint 18 against Vasquez. Id. at 12-14, ECF No. 54-8 at 5. Thereafter, in May 2019, plaintiff was 19 transferred to Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). ECF No. 54-6 at 7. 20 Plaintiff claims that, upon arrival at MCSP, he went to collect his legal materials and 21 encountered defendant Broussard. ECF No. 1 at 4. Broussard confiscated plaintiff’s grievances 22 and a completed, but not yet filed, civil rights complaint against Vasquez. Id. Broussard 23 allegedly told plaintiff that he would not allow any litigation to proceed against Vasquez. Id. 24 Plaintiff alleges that Broussard also broke his typewriter by striking it with a baton. Id. 25 Plaintiff alleges that defendant Tillery conspired with Broussard to retaliate against him. 26 Together, the two officers allegedly confiscated several of plaintiff’s personal items, including the 27

28 to the filings of pro se litigants”). 1 typewriter, a hot pot, a pair of headphones, a coaxial cable, two boxes of his legal materials, and a 2 reading lamp. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff claims that he told both officers that he needed his legal 3 materials to file a lawsuit. Id. at 5. 4 III. Analysis 5 Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on both claims. 6 A. Retaliation Claim 7 In the prison context, a successful First Amendment retaliation claim must contain five 8 elements: “(1) [a]n assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 9 because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 10 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 11 correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-568 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth 12 Circuit has held that “mere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient” 13 and that specific evidence of retaliation is required to defeat summary judgment. Wood v. Yordy, 14 753 F.3d 899, 904-905 (9th Cir. 2014). 15 As an initial matter, plaintiff has failed to point to any specific evidence showing that 16 defendants confiscated his grievances and civil rights complaint. In his deposition testimony, he 17 admitted that he did not see either defendant take his documents. ECF No. 54-8 at 13 (Dep. pg. 18 96). Similarly, he was not present when his belongings were inventoried and packed for transfer 19 from CMC to MCSP. Id. at 8 (Dep. pgs. 62-63). Plaintiff admits that his property boxes were 20 opened in his absence, and that he does not know when they were opened. Id. at 14 (Dep. Pg. 21 97). Neither defendant told plaintiff that they were responsible for opening his boxes; plaintiff 22 assumed that the officers were responsible because they were present when he arrived to pick up 23 his belongings and they failed to give him an explanation for why the boxes were open. Id. 24 More broadly, plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence that defendants harbored any 25 retaliatory intent against him based on his dealings with Vasquez. Neither defendant ever worked 26 at CMC. ECF No. 54-5 at 2, ¶ 4; ECF No. 54-7 at 2, ¶ 5. Both defendants state, by way of their 27 declarations, that they did not know Vasquez or anyone else employed at CMC. ECF No. 54-5 at 28 2, ¶ 5; ECF No. 54-7 at 2, ¶ 6. And approximately six months lapsed between plaintiff’s 1 encounter with defendants and his lodging of a formal complaint against Vasquez. Plaintiff 2 alleges that defendants acted against him because his name appeared on a “list” that singles out 3 inmates for retaliation, but he fails to allege any specific facts about it. In his deposition, plaintiff 4 admitted that he had no knowledge of where the “list” is kept, or the name of the individual who 5 told him about its existence. ECF No. 54-8 at 12-13 (Dep. pgs. 92-93). When asked who 6 maintains the “list,” he could not identify any officer by name. Id. at 13 (Dep. pg. 93). Plaintiff 7 admitted that he has no evidence that the “list” exists. Id. What remains is the self-serving 8 allegation that defendant Broussard told plaintiff that his lawsuit against Vasquez would not 9 proceed. In the face of defendants’ substantial evidence that they had no way of knowing about 10 plaintiff’s complaints against Vasquez, this allegation cannot stave off summary judgment.2 See 11 Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 631 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The party opposing summary judgment may 12 not rest on conclusory allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 13 issue for trial.”). 14 B. Access to Courts Claim 15 To succeed on a denial of access to courts claim, a prisoner must show that the defendant 16 hindered his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous criminal appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights 17 lawsuit. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Here, plaintiff alleges that the confiscation of 18 his typewriter and legal materials prevented him from filing a lawsuit against Vasquez. ECF No. 19 1 at 9. As an initial matter, inmates have no right to a typewriter and possession of one is not a 20 prerequisite to filing a lawsuit. Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 21 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The existence or condition of the library’s typewriters is irrelevant, as the 22 Constitution does not require that they be made available to inmates.”). And plaintiff has not, as 23 noted above, produced any evidence that either defendant was responsible for taking his 24 complaint. Even if he could show that defendants confiscated his complaint, plaintiff has not 25 established that re-drafting the complaint was impossible. Records show that, since the alleged 26 2 In light of plaintiff’s failure to provide evidence of retaliatory motive, I find it 27 unnecessary to discuss whether the confiscation or destruction of plaintiff’s personal property was, as defendants argue, penologically justified. Even assuming defendants confiscated his 28 property because of some unrelated animus, it would have no bearing on the success of this claim. 1 incident in May 2019, he has filed three other lawsuits. See ECF No. 54-3 at 5.3 Thus, plaintiff 2 cannot show that defendants prevented him from accessing the courts and pursuing his claims 3 against Vasquez. 4 Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that: 5 1. The motions for extension of time at ECF Nos. 57, 59, & 63, are GRANTED, and 6 plaintiff’s opposition, ECF No. 62, and defendants’ reply brief, ECF No. 64, are deemed timely. 7 2. Plaintiff’s request for an order pursuant to Rule 184, ECF No. 46, is DENIED. 8 3. Plaintiff’s motion to compel, ECF No. 30, is DENIED. 9 4. Plaintiff’s motion to modify the scheduling order, ECF No. 47, is DENIED. 10 5. Defendants’ motion to modify the scheduling order, ECF No. 52, is GRANTED. 11 Further, it is RECOMMENDED that: 12 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 54, be GRANTED. 13 2. Judgment be entered in their favor and against plaintiff 14 3. I necessarily recommend that plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 35, 15 and his motions to stay this action, ECF Nos. 56, 60, & 61, be DENIED. 16 4. The Clerk of Court be directed to close the case. 17 I submit these findings and recommendations to the district judge under 28 U.S.C. 18 § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, 19 Eastern District of California. Within 14 days of the service of the findings and 20 recommendations, any party may file written objections to the findings and recommendations 21 with the court and serve a copy on all parties. That document should be captioned “Objections to 22 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge will review the findings 23 and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the 24 specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. See Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 25

3 Defendants ask that I take judicial notice of the PACER case search document at this 26 page number. ECF No. 54-3 at 1-2. I will do so. Judicial notice is appropriate where a document 27 is publicly available and capable of accurate and ready determination. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988). The PACER search results meet these 28 requirements. 1 | 834, 839 (Oth Cir. 2014). 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ( | { Dated: _ February 22, 2022 Q_——. 5 JEREMY D. PETERSON 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28