(PC) Eastman v. Tuolumne County Jail

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 7, 2020
• Docket: 1:20-cv-01303
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSEPH CLARENCE EASTMAN, Case No. 1:20-cv-1303-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED 13 v. COMPLAINT 14 TUOLUMNE COUNTY JAIL, et al., ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR A COPY OF THE COMPLAINT 15 Defendants. THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 16 17 18 Plaintiff Joseph Clarence Eastman (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 19 forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on 20 September 14, 2020, is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) 21 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 23 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 25 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 26 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 27 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 1 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 2 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 3 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 4 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken 5 as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 6 Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 8 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 9 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. 10 Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted 11 unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 12 plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 13 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 14 Plaintiff is currently housed at Tuolumne County Jail in Sonora, California where the 15 events in the complaint allegedly arose. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Tuolumne 16 County Jail; (2) Dr. Sun, medical doctor; and (3) Dr. B, unnamed psychiatric doctor. 17 Plaintiff alleges that the Tuolumne County Jail custody staff denied Plaintiff’s right to a 18 second opinion and refused his right to adequate medical care and rushing his recovery after 19 surgery. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Sun neglected proper medical care. 20 Plaintiff alleges he has P.T.S.D., anxiety and night errors. The psychiatrist, Dr. B., video 21 chatted with Plaintiff. He prescribed “prazosin” or “mini press” for night terrors. He did not 22 counsel Plaintiff regarding any of the side effects. On June 23, 2020, Plaintiff woke up to pain in 23 his penis and had an erection. This was one of many, but this one lasted longer than 12 hours. 24 Plaintiff put in medical requests and when he saw the nurses, they said Plaintiff had to wait for 25 the doctor to arrive as he had limited hours. When Plaintiff saw the doctor, he said the erection 26 would go down. Plaintiff asked if it was due to the medication or Plaintiff’s prostrate. Doctor did 27 tests on Plaintiff’s prostrate, which turned out fine. 28 Plaintiff saw nurse Debbie who recommended that Plaintiff go to the E.R. at Adventist 1 Health. Plaintiff went to the hospital. He was put in a dirty holding cell with a camera on him to 2 make sure he was not touching himself to keep the erection. Plaintiff was in the holding cell for 3 2.5 hours, which was 44.5 hours with an erection. He was transported to the E.R. by a deputy and 4 at the hospital, the staff was helpful. The M.D. at the ER said it was because of the “mini press” 5 medication. Plaintiff was told that they had to drain some of blood in the penis with a syringe. 6 They tried 2 times without success. 7 Plaintiff was transported to San Jose Regional Medical Center for surgery. The surgeon, 8 James Hwong, M.D. told Plaintiff that he would most likely never get an erection again naturally. 9 Surgery was performed – debridement and repair and penile shunt – for a total of 53 hours erect, 10 with damage to the tissue in his penis. 11 Plaintiff was transported back to jail, immediately after waking from anesthesia, and 12 placed in a dirty single cell. Medical staff at the jail examined him and when Plaintiff returned to 13 his single cell, he was bleeding from his penis. 14 A deputy saw the blood and escorted Plaintiff to medical, then to the ER at Adventist 15 Health. The suture had come apart and the M.D. at the ER repaired the suture. Plaintiff was 16 transported back to jail. The bandages were changed, but were stopped and when Plaintiff 17 continued to bleed, the bandages were put back on. 18 The surgeon had said that Plaintiff was to return for follow up 24-48 hours after surgery, 19 but it was not until 3-4 weeks for the jail to take Plaintiff back for his follow up. Plaintiff has 20 been told that he suffers from erectile dysfunction for life. He as a scar and pain in his penis. 21 Plaintiff alleges he is 37 years old and will have a lifetime of pain and suffering and requests 22 compensatory damages. 23 Plaintiff asks for a copy of his complaint because the jail will not make copies for him. 24 III. Discussion 25 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to 26 state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In an abundance of caution, and because he is 27 proceeding pro se, Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his complaint to the extent that he can 28 do so in good faith. To assist Plaintiff, the Court provides the pleading and legal standards that 1 appear relevant to his claims. 2 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 4 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed 5 factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 6 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 7 omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 8 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 9 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; 10 see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557. 11 Although Plaintiff's complaint is short, it is not a plain statement of his claims. As a basic 12 matter, the complaint does not clearly state what happened, when it happened or who was 13 involved. It is unclear which doctor he is referring to at various times in the complaint and which 14 doctor Plaintiff contends violated his constitutional rights. It is unclear if he is trying to name 15 individual jail staff or medical personnel at the hospital If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it 16 should be a short and plain statement of his claims, and must include factual allegations 17 identifying what happened, when it happened and who was involved. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 18 B. Linkage Requirement 19 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 20 Every person who, under color of [state law] ...subjects, or causes to be subjected, 21 any citizen of the United States...to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 22 immunities secured by the Constitution...shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 23 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 24 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See 25 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The 26 Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional 27 right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's 28 1 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 2 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 3 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to adequately link the defendants to alleged constitutional 4 violation. The court cannot determine which of the doctors is Dr. Sun and which doctors allegedly 5 violated his constitutional rights. Further, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to name individual 6 jail staff, he must list the individuals as defendants and include allegations of how each person 7 violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 8 C. Tuolumne County Jail 9 Defendant names Tuolumne County Jail as a defendant. 10 Under section 1983 a local government unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its 11 employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Department of Social 12 Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, a local government unit may only be held liable if it 13 inflicts the injury complained of through a policy or custom. Waggy v. Spokane County 14 Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). 15 To state a claim, “[i]t is not sufficient for a plaintiff to identify a custom or policy, 16 attributable to the municipality, that caused his injury. A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the 17 custom or policy was adhered to with ‘deliberate indifference’ ” to his constitutional rights. 18 Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom., Los 19 Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Castro, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017). The deliberate indifference standard is 20 satisfied where a plaintiff alleges facts available to the municipality’s policymakers that “put 21 them on actual or constructive notice that the particular omission is substantially certain to result 22 in the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1076. 23 Here, Plaintiff has not linked any alleged violation of his rights to a policy or practice 24 attributable to the Tuolumne County Jail, nor has he provided facts to support that Tuolumne 25 County Jail knew of, and blatantly ignored, the alleged violations committed by its employees. 26 Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against the Tuolumne County Jail. 27 D. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments - Medical Care 28 It is unclear whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner during the 1 relevant time period. To the extent that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the relevant time 2 period, his claims concerning his medical care arise under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 3 Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 4 (1979) (noting that “the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment” is relied on in 5 considering claims of pretrial detainees because “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only 6 after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with 7 criminal prosecutions”); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (“We have said 8 that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that 9 amounts to punishment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 10 The Ninth Circuit has held that “the proper standard of review” for claims of inadequate 11 medical care for pretrial detainees is “objective indifference.” Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 12 1118, 1120, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018) (extending the “objective deliberate indifference standard” 13 articulated in Castro to inadequate medical care); see also Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 14 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that Gordon “recognized that Castro’s objective deliberate 15 indifference standard extends to Fourteenth Amendment claims by pretrial detainees for 16 violations of the right to adequate medical care”). 17 Accordingly, in order to state a claim against any defendant for denial of medical care 18 while a pretrial detainee, plaintiff must allege that the defendant: (1) “made an intentional 19 decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined”; (2) the 20 “conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm”; (3) the “defendant did 21 not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the 22 circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the 23 consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious”; and (4) “by not taking such measures, the 24 defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. 25 Plaintiff alleges that Dr. B prescribed medications which caused prolonged erections. 26 Plaintiff alleges he had multiple prolonged erections but there is no allegation that Dr. B. “did not 27 take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the 28 circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the 1 consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious” or that “by not taking such measures, the 2 defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.” Plaintiff does not allege Dr. B knew of the side effects 3 to Plaintiff and failed to take reasonable measures to able that risk. 4 As to Dr. Sun, assuming he is the doctor who Plaintiff saw Plaintiff at the jail before 5 surgery, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claims. When Plaintiff complained about the erection, 6 this doctor did tests on Plaintiff’s prostrate, to rule out prostrate medical issue. Plaintiff does not 7 allege this conduct was objectively unreasonable. The defendant’s conduct must be objectively 8 unreasonable, a test that will necessarily “turn[ ] on the facts and circumstances of each particular 9 case.” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 10 (9th Cir. 2016).) “ ‘[M]ere lack of due care by a state official’ does not deprive an individual of 11 life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. Therefore, 12 the plaintiff must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to 13 reckless disregard.” Id. 14 There is nothing to suggest that any individual defendant made an intentional decision that 15 put Plaintiff at substantial risk for suffering any harm. In an amended complaint, in order to state 16 a cognizable medical deliberate indifference claim, plaintiff must specifically and plausibly “link” 17 these legal standards with the challenged conduct of each defendant. 18 E. Doe Defendants 19 Plaintiff is informed if he does not know the name of Defendant “Dr. B,” he may name the 20 defendant as John Doe. But, the use of John Does in pleading practice is generally disfavored. 21 See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980); Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 22 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999); Lopes v. Viera, 543 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Plaintiff 23 is hereby advised that the court cannot order service of a Doe defendant because the United States 24 Marshal cannot serve a Doe defendant. Plaintiff will be required to identify him or her with 25 enough information to locate the defendant for service of process. For service to be successful, 26 the Marshal must be able to identify and locate defendants. Once the identify of a Doe defendant 27 is ascertained, plaintiff must file a motion to amend his complaint only to identify the identified 28 Doe defendant so that service by the United States Marshal can be attempted 1 F. State Law Claims 2 Plaintiff appears to allege a state law tort claim for medical malpractice. Under 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original jurisdiction, the “district 4 courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the 5 action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under 6 Article III of the United States Constitution,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). The 7 Supreme Court has stated that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, ...the state claims 8 should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 9 Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff 10 must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. As Plaintiff has 11 not stated a cognizable claim for relief under federal law, it is recommended that the Court 12 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. 13 Further, the Government Claims Act requires exhaustion of Plaintiff's state law tort claims 14 with the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, and Plaintiff is required 15 to specifically allege compliance in his complaint. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 16 201, 208–09 (Cal. 2007); State v. Superior Court of Kings Cty. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 17 (Cal. 2004); Mabe v. San Bernardino Cty. Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th 18 Cir. 2001); Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995); 19 Karim– Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has 20 failed to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act. 21 IV. Motion for Copies 22 Plaintiff has requested a copy of his complaint because the jail will not make copies. 23 Plaintiff’s complaint is 11 pages. In light of the relatively minimal expense involved and 24 to avoid undue delay in this litigation, the Court will make a one-time exception here and grant 25 Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff is warned that although the Court has granted leave for him to 26 proceed in forma pauperis, this generally does not entitle him to free copies of documents from 27 the Court. E.g., Hullom v. Kent, 262 F.2d 862, 863 (6th Cir. 1959). The Clerk charges $.50 per 28 page for copies of documents. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(b). In the future, copies of up to twenty 1 pages may be made by the Clerk’s Office at this Court upon written request, prepayment of the 2 copy fees, and submission of a large, self-addressed stamped envelope. Plaintiff is also advised 3 that he may make a handwritten copy of a document he submits to court for his own records. 4 V. Conclusion and Order 5 For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 6 Procedure 8 and fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the 7 Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the above-identified 8 deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 9 (9th Cir. 2000). 10 Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 11 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 12 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must 13 be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 14 555 (citations omitted). 15 Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 16 claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 17 “buckshot” complaints). 18 Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 19 Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended 20 complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” 21 Local Rule 220. 22 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 23 1. Plaintiff’s motion for a copy of his complaint is GRANTED. The Clerk of the 24 Court is directed to send one copy of the complaint, filed on September 14, 2020, to Plaintiff; 25 2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank complaint form; 26 3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 27 amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order or file a notice of 28 voluntary dismissal; and 1 4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 2 Court will recommend dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order 3 and for failure to state a claim. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

6 Dated: October 7, 2020 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7

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