(PC) Dotson v. Chandler

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 18, 2020
• Docket: 2:20-cv-00710
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TRACY LEE DOTSON, No. 2:20-cv-0710 KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 OFFICER CHANDLER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 I. Introduction 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 19 § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This 20 proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 21 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 22 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 23 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 24 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in 25 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 26 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 27 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments 28 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These 1 payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the 2 amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1915(b)(2). 4 As discussed below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 5 II. Screening Standards 6 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 7 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 8 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 9 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 10 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 11 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 12 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 13 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 14 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 15 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 16 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 17 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 18 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 19 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 20 1227. 21 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 22 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 23 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 24 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 25 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 26 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 27 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 28 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 1 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 2 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 3 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 4 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 5 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 6 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 7 III. Plaintiff’s Complaint 8 Plaintiff names two individuals as defendants: Officer Chandler and Lt. Z. Osborne, both 9 employed at California State Prison, Solano (“CSP”SOL”). In his first claim, plaintiff alleges his 10 mail was tampered with and cites “obstruction of justice.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) In support, he 11 alleges that Officer Chandler made threatening statements and was unprofessional in his duties at 12 CSP-SOL. Plaintiff states that he was “put up for transfer by Lt. Osborne and was denied by Lt. 13 Osborne,” and “now [his] 602 appeals keep coming up missing.” (Id.) 14 In his second claim, plaintiff alleges retaliation by Lt. Osborne, but in his supporting facts, 15 alleges that Osborne violated plaintiff’s due process rights. Plaintiff states that Lt. Osborne told 16 plaintiff he should not have filed with internal affairs, but plaintiff did so because his 602 appeals 17 kept coming up missing. Plaintiff also claims that Lt. Osborne granted plaintiff’s transfer out of 18 CSP-SOL, and “not to come back,” but plaintiff was “sent back anyway to be put up for transfer.” 19 (ECF No. 1 at 4.) 20 In his third claim, plaintiff claims his due process rights were violated by “staff” at CSP- 21 SOL, but also marked the box “threat to safety.” (ECF No. 11 at 5.) He claims “staff” knew 22 plaintiff had safety issues at CSP-SOL, and claims that Lt. Osborne lied to plaintiff and then 23 denied plaintiff’s transfer away from CSP-SOL. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) 24 As injuries, plaintiff states that he was unable to go home on time because his writ was 25 denied due to missing paperwork. (ECF No. 1 at 3-5.) Plaintiff asks the court to grant him relief 26 so he can go home. “I am late to go home now.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) 27 //// 28 //// 1 IV. Discussion 2 As discussed below, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed, 3 but plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint. 4 Habeas or Civil Rights Claims 5 Initially, it is important to remind plaintiff that he cannot obtain release from prison 6 through a civil rights action. As plaintiff was informed on August 5, 2014, 7 federal courts offer two main avenues to relief on complaints related to one’s imprisonment – a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 8 U.S.C. § 2254, and a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Challenges to the validity of one’s confinement or the duration 9 of one’s confinement are properly brought in a habeas action, whereas requests for relief turning on the circumstances of one’s 10 confinement are properly brought in a § 1983 action. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 11 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (“[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 12 behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 13 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. 14 15 Dotson v. Warden, No. 2:14-cv-1508 KJM EFB P (E.D. Cal.) (ECF No. 8 at 1-2). Thus, if 16 plaintiff seeks release from prison, he must seek such relief through a petition for writ of habeas 17 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 In addition, to the extent plaintiff intends to challenge a 18 conviction sustained in San Bernardino or Los Angeles Counties, plaintiff must file such habeas 19 petition in the Central District of California. (ECF No. 11 at 8.) 20 To state a civil rights claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a 21 federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person 22 acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. 23 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil 24 rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional

25 1 Plaintiff is cautioned that the habeas corpus statute imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing non-capital habeas corpus petitions in federal court. In most cases, the one year period will 26 start to run on the date on which the state court judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 27 review or the expiration of time for seeking direct review, although the statute of limitations is tolled while a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is 28 pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 1 deprivation or a causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged 2 constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. 3 Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the 4 theory that the official is liable for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. 5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 6 In sum, plaintiff must identify the particular person or persons who violated his rights, set 7 forth specific factual allegations as to how such person violated plaintiff’s rights, and identify the 8 relief he seeks that is available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9 Due Process Claims 10 Plaintiff cannot state a due process claim based on defendants’ roles in handling plaintiff’s 11 administrative appeals. The Due Process Clause protects plaintiff against the deprivation of 12 liberty without the procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. 13 Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). However, plaintiff has no stand-alone due process rights 14 related to the administrative grievance process itself. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th 15 Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). A prison official’s denial of a 16 grievance does not itself violate the constitution. Evans v. Skolnik, 637 F. App’x 285, 288 (9th 17 Cir. 2015). Thus, the denial, rejection, or cancellation of a grievance does not constitute a due 18 process violation. See, e.g., Wright v. Shannon, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 19 (plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a 20 cognizable claim under the First Amendment); Towner v. Knowles, 2009 WL 4281999 at *2 21 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (plaintiff’s allegations that prison officials screened out his inmate appeals 22 without any basis failed to indicate a deprivation of federal rights). “Because there is no right to 23 any particular grievance process, it is impossible for due process to have been violated by 24 ignoring or failing to properly process prison grievances.” Daniels v. Aguillera, 2018 WL 25 1763311 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2018). While the court does not condone the alleged mishandling of 26 plaintiff’s administrative appeals, plaintiff cannot state a due process claim based solely on such 27 mishandling. 28 //// 1 Likewise, plaintiff cannot state a due process claim based on the alleged denial of his 2 request for transfer to a different prison. Inmates do not have a constitutional right to be housed 3 at a particular facility or institution or to be transferred, or not transferred, from one facility or 4 institution to another. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 5 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 6 Also, an inmate does not have a constitutional right to any particular classification. Moody v. 7 Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) 8 (holding that inmate had no protectable liberty interest in a classification status, such as “violent” 9 or “non-violent.”). Alleged deprivations of rights arising from prison officials’ housing and 10 classification decisions do not give rise to a federal constitutional claim encompassed by the 11 Fourteenth Amendment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). 12 Because plaintiff cannot amend his complaint to state due process claims under the above 13 standards, plaintiff is not granted leave to include such due process claims in any amended 14 complaint. 15 Verbal Threats 16 Similarly, allegations of harassment, embarrassment, and defamation are not cognizable 17 under section 1983. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir.1981), 18 aff’d sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983); see also Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 19 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1982) (allegations of harassment with regards to medical problems not 20 cognizable); Ellingburg v. Lucas, 518 F.2d 1196, 1197 (8th Cir. 1975) (Arkansas state prisoner 21 does not have cause of action under § 1983 for being called obscene name by prison employee); 22 Batton v. North Carolina, 501 F.Supp. 1173, 1180 (E.D. N.C. 1980) (mere verbal abuse by prison 23 officials does not state claim under § 1983). Allegations of mere threats are also not cognizable. 24 See Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (mere threat does not constitute 25 constitutional wrong, nor do allegations that naked threat was for purpose of denying access to 26 courts compel contrary result). Thus, plaintiff’s allegations that defendant Chandler made verbal 27 threats fail to state a cognizable civil rights claim. Plaintiff includes no factual allegations to 28 support a claim for mail tampering or obstruction of justice in connection with plaintiff’s claims 1 that defendant Chandler made such verbal threats. Thus, the court is unable to determine whether 2 plaintiff can amend to state cognizable civil rights claims against defendant Chandler. 3 Retaliation Claim 4 As for plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Lt. Osborne, it is unclear whether plaintiff can 5 state a cognizable claim because plaintiff did not allege facts meeting all of the elements of a 6 retaliation claim. “Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison 7 officials and to be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 8 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). To state a viable First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner 9 must allege five elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 10 inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the 11 inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 12 legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 13 Conduct protected by the First Amendment includes communications that are “part of the 14 grievance process.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). If plaintiff 15 intends to assert a retaliation claim in his amended complaint, he must specifically identify the 16 protected conduct at issue, name the defendant who took adverse action against him, and plead 17 that the allegedly adverse action2 was taken “because of” plaintiff’s protected conduct.3 18 The Ninth Circuit has found that preserving institutional order, discipline and security are 19 legitimate penological goals which, if they provide the motivation for an official act taken, will 20 defeat a claim of retaliation. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.1994); Rizzo v. 21 Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.1985) (“Challenges to restrictions of first amendment rights 22 must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the correctional institution in the 23 2 For purposes of evaluating a retaliation claim, an adverse action is action that “could chill a 24 person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity[ ].” Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006). See also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 25 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000).

26 3 Prisoners have a constitutional right to file prison grievances and pursue civil rights litigation in 27 the courts. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. Prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for exercising these rights. Id. at 568; see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997); 28 Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.2d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). 1 preservation of internal order and discipline, maintenance of institutional security, and 2 rehabilitation of prisoners.”). The burden is thus on plaintiff to allege and demonstrate that 3 legitimate correctional purposes did not motivate the actions by prison officials about which he 4 complains. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[Plaintiff] must show that 5 there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions he complains of.”). 6 Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to attempt to state a retaliation claim against defendant 7 Lt. Osborne. 8 Potential Eighth Amendment Claim 9 In his third claim, plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated by unidentified 10 CSP-SOL staff because the staff knew plaintiff had safety issues at CSP-SOL. Plaintiff has 11 identified no factual allegations demonstrating a violation of his due process rights in connection 12 with this third claim, and plaintiff fails to adequately identify the nature of the “safety issues” he 13 faced. This makes it difficult to evaluate plaintiff’s claim. That said, under the Eighth 14 Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 15 833 (1994). To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials 16 were deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmate's safety. Id. at 834. 17 “‘Deliberate indifference’ has both subjective and objective components.” Labatad v. 18 Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). The prisoner must show that “the 19 official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must both 20 be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 21 exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “Liability may 22 follow only if a prison official ‘knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and 23 disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Labatad, 714 F.3d at 24 1160 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). 25 Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to attempt to state an Eighth Amendment claim. 26 Improper Joinder 27 Finally, plaintiff is cautioned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) provides that all 28 persons may be joined in one action as defendants if “any right to relief is asserted against them 1 jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, 2 occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to 3 all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). See also George v. Smith, 507 4 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated claims against unrelated defendants belong in different 5 suits”). If unrelated claims are improperly joined, the court may dismiss them without prejudice. 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; 7 Alan Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Richard Marcus, Federal 7 Practice and Procedure § 1684 (3d ed. 2012); Michaels Building Co. v. Ameritrust Co., 848 F.2d 8 674, 682 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissing under Rule 21 of certain defendants where claims 9 against those defendants did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrences, as required by 10 Rule 20(a)). 11 Here, it is unclear whether plaintiff’s putative retaliation claim against defendant Lt. 12 Osborne is related to plaintiff’s third claim against unidentified staff at CSP-SOL. In his 13 amended complaint, plaintiff should take care only to raise claims arising out of the same incident 14 involving the same individual or individuals. Unrelated claims must be brought in a separate 15 action. 16 V. Leave to Amend 17 For all of the above reasons, the court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so 18 vague and conclusory that it is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails 19 to state a claim for relief. The court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short 20 and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a 21 flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim 22 plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 23 Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants 24 engaged in that support plaintiff's claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the 25 requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court, however, 26 grants leave to file an amended complaint. 27 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 28 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., 1 West, 487 U.S. at 48. Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named 2 defendant is involved. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There can be no liability 3 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s 4 actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 5 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 6 rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 7 Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims.4 See 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 9 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 10 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 11 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 12 because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez 13 v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint 14 supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” (internal citation 15 omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any 16 function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim 17 and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 18 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 19 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 20 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 21 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

22 4 As discussed above, a plaintiff may properly assert multiple claims against a single defendant. 23 Fed. Rule Civ. P. 18. Also, a plaintiff may join multiple defendants in one action where “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or 24 arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 20(a)(2). Unrelated claims against different defendants must be pursued in separate lawsuits. See George, 507 F.3d at 607. This rule is intended “not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple 26 claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing 27 fees -- for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” 28 George, 507 F.3d at 607. MAIS 2 CUVEE IN MVOC IO OPEN PT Ay 44 VI Le

1 } § 1915(b)C1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 2 | Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 3 | herewith. 4 3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. 5 4. Within sixty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 6 | Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court: 7 a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and 8 b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint. 9 | Plaintiff's amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 10 | Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 11 | also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 12 Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the 13 || dismissal of this action. 14 | Dated: May 18, 2020 is Fensbl A Abar 16 KENDALL J. NE Hdots0710.14n UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TRACY LEE DOTSON, No. 2:20-cv-0710 KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. NOTICE OF AMENDMENT 14 CHANDLER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order 18 filed______________. 19 _____________ Amended Complaint DATED: 20

21 ________________________________ Plaintiff 22 23 24 25 26 27 28