(PC) Dixon v. Navarro

Opinion

DELMAR JEWELL DIXON, JR., Case No. 2:19-cv-01966-KJM-JDP (PC) Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO v. DISMISS BE GRANTED DANIEL NAVARRO, ECF No. 44 Defendant. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND TO DISMISS DEFENDANT’S REPLY ECF Nos. 43 & 46 Plaintiff Delmar Jewell Dixon, Jr. is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that defendant Daniel Navarro violated his due process rights by reporting that plaintiff was conspiring to distribute a controlled substance in Mule Creek State Prison. Defendant Navarro has moved to dismiss this claim, ECF No. 44, and his motion should, for the reasons stated hereafter, be granted. Plaintiff, for his part, has moved both for early discovery, ECF No. 43, and to dismiss defendant’s reply to his opposition to the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 47. Those motions will be denied.

Motion for Discovery Plaintiff requests discovery that he argues is necessary to respond to defendant’s “responsive pleading.” ECF No. 43. Plaintiff has not justified a need for early discovery. If my recommendations are not adopted and this case proceeds, I will set a schedule for discovery. This motion is denied. Motion to Dismiss Reply Plaintiff argues that defendant’s reply to his opposition should be dismissed because he disagrees with the positions taken by defendant therein. ECF No. 47 at 1-2. Defendant, as the movant, is entitled to a reply. Plaintiff is not entitled to a sur-reply, much less to strike a reply with which he disagrees. This motion is denied. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss I. Legal Standards A complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2)insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1984). II. Analysis Defendant argues that the allegations in the complaint, taken as true, do not establish that he was responsible for any violation of plaintiff’s rights. ECF No. 44-1 at 7. I agree. Plaintiff alleges that defendant falsely accused him of planning to distribute drugs in the prison and that, based on those false accusations, other non-defendant officials punished him. ECF No. 22 at 9, 12. In a § 1983 action, each defendant is liable only for his or her own actions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Plaintiff has not alleged that defendant was responsible for punishing him. Thus, the question is whether authoring a false report about an inmate, standing alone, is sufficient to violate his due process rights. I determine that it is not. Other circuits have held that, standing alone, filing false disciplinary charges against an inmate does not violate the inmate’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951-52 (2d Cir. 1986). Courts in this circuit and judges in this district have found the same. See Solomon v. Meyer, No. 11-cv- 02827-JST (PR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9865, 2014 WL 294576, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014); Johnson v. Felker, No. 1:12-cv-02719 GEB KJN (PC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170474, 2013 WL 6243280, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). I see no reason to distinguish, in this case, between false disciplinary charges and a false report. I find it unnecessary to reach defendant’s other arguments and recommend that the motion to dismiss be granted on this basis. It is ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff’s motion for discovery, ECF No. 43, is DENIED. 2. Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendant’s reply, ECF No. 47, is DENIED. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that: 1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 44, be GRANTED. 2. The claim against defendant Navarro be dismissed without leave to amend. 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close the case These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). ( ie — Dated: _ August 23, 2022 Q_—— JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE