1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LOUIS DIGGS, No. 2:21-CV-00465-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SOLANO COUNTY JAIL, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a former county inmate proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 I. Screening Requirement 21 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 22 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 23 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 24 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 25 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 26 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 27 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 28 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 1 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 2 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 3 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 4 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 5 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 6 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 7 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 8 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 9 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 10 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 11 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 12 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 13 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 14 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 15 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 16 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 17 II. Allegations in the Complaint 18 In a cursory six-page complaint, plaintiff challenges the medical care that he received for 19 a dislocated shoulder at the Solano County Jail and at the Claybank Detention Facility. 20 According to plaintiff, he informed everyone that he came into contact with that his shoulder 21 needed to be reset. However, nothing was done. In his second claim for relief, plaintiff alleges 22 medical malpractice based on his failure to receive pain medication for his medical condition. 23 Plaintiff names “all medical staff” at the two county detention facilities as defendants in 24 this action. The only specific individuals that plaintiff identifies as defendants are a nurse named 25 Liz and an unnamed intake sergeant both employed at the Solano County Jail. 26 By way of relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. 27 III. Legal Standards 28 The following legal standards are being provided to plaintiff based on his pro se status as 1 well as the nature of the allegations in his complaint. 2 A. Linkage 3 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 4 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 5 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 6 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 7 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 8 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 9 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 10 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 11 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 12 plaintiff's federal rights. 13 B. Deliberate Indifference 14 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 15 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 16 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 17 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 18 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 19 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 20 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 21 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 22 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 23 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 24 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 25 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 26 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 27 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 28 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 1 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 2 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 3 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 4 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 5 indifference. Id.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LOUIS DIGGS, No. 2:21-CV-00465-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SOLANO COUNTY JAIL, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a former county inmate proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 I. Screening Requirement 21 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 22 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 23 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 24 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 25 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 26 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 27 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 28 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 1 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 2 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 3 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 4 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 5 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 6 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 7 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 8 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 9 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 10 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 11 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 12 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 13 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 14 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 15 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 16 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 17 II. Allegations in the Complaint 18 In a cursory six-page complaint, plaintiff challenges the medical care that he received for 19 a dislocated shoulder at the Solano County Jail and at the Claybank Detention Facility. 20 According to plaintiff, he informed everyone that he came into contact with that his shoulder 21 needed to be reset. However, nothing was done. In his second claim for relief, plaintiff alleges 22 medical malpractice based on his failure to receive pain medication for his medical condition. 23 Plaintiff names “all medical staff” at the two county detention facilities as defendants in 24 this action. The only specific individuals that plaintiff identifies as defendants are a nurse named 25 Liz and an unnamed intake sergeant both employed at the Solano County Jail. 26 By way of relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. 27 III. Legal Standards 28 The following legal standards are being provided to plaintiff based on his pro se status as 1 well as the nature of the allegations in his complaint. 2 A. Linkage 3 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 4 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 5 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 6 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 7 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 8 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 9 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 10 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 11 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 12 plaintiff's federal rights. 13 B. Deliberate Indifference 14 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 15 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 16 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 17 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 18 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 19 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 20 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 21 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 22 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 23 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 24 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 25 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 26 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 27 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 28 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 1 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 2 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 3 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 4 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 5 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 6 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 7 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 8 approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 9 showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 10 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 11 difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 12 a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 13 treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 14 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 15 medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 16 indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 17 Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 18 prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 19 known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 20 IV. Analysis 21 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon 22 which relief can be granted under federal law. First and foremost, plaintiff does not identify any 23 specific medical personnel at either detention facility whose actions amount to deliberate 24 indifference. Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that 25 demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's federal rights. Additionally, the acts of medical malpractice 26 described in the complaint do not equate to deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth 27 Amendment. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 28 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). For these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. 1 The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint. 2 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 3 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 4 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 5 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 6 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 7 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 8 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 9 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 10 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 11 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 12 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 13 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 14 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 15 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 16 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 17 V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 18 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 19 intended as legal advice. 20 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that they do not 21 state any claim against the defendants. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being 22 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order. 23 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30 24 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 25 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 26 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 27 1. Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2, 7) are granted. 28 2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 1 3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 2 || complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 3 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 4 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an 5 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 6 || be dismissed. 7 | Dated: July 1, 2021 / hice MN fe Ho. AG CAROLYN K DELANEY? 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 1] 12 13 14 15 || 12/digg0465.14.docx 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28