(PC) Dickson v. Gomez

District Court, E.D. California·Decided November 9, 2020·No. 1:17-cv-00294·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTOPHER DICKSON, Case No. 1:17-cv-00294-DAD-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 13 v. (ECF No. 54)

14 GOMEZ, et al., ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE UNAUTHORIZED 15 Defendants. SURREPLY (ECF No. 55) 16 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17 REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 18 FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 19 (ECF No. 37) 20 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 21 22 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23 I. Background 24 Plaintiff Christopher Dickson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 25 forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on 26 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint against Defendants Gomez, Rios, and Martinez for 27 excessive force, against Defendants Duncan and Esparza for violations of Plaintiff’s due process 28 rights, and against Defendant Sao for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 1 On December 3, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds 2 that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative process before filing this action against 3 Defendants Duncan, Esparza, Gomez, Martinez, Rios, and Sao or for any claim against these 4 Defendants, and that Plaintiff failed to identify all his medical claims and identify Defendant Sao 5 within his inmate appeals and thus did not exhaust administrative remedies as to Defendant Sao 6 and the claim against Defendant Sao.1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 7 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 403 (2014). (ECF No. 37.) On January 8 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, styled as his 9 objection to the motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 46.) Defendants filed a reply on 10 January 29, 2020. (ECF No. 47.) 11 On August 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement his opposition to the motion 12 for summary judgment. (ECF No. 54.) Defendants filed a motion to strike, characterizing the 13 filing as an unauthorized surreply, on August 17, 2020. (ECF No. 55.) Plaintiff did not file a 14 response to the motion to strike, but the Court finds a response unnecessary. 15 The motion for summary judgment, motion to supplement, and motion to strike are 16 deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l). 17 II. Motion to Supplement and Motion to Strike Unauthorized Surreply 18 In his motion to supplement, Plaintiff states that while waiting for the Court’s ruling on 19 Defendants’ fully briefed motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff requested documents from his 20 family that had been filed away for safekeeping. (ECF No. 54.) Upon receiving those files, 21 Plaintiff noticed that he was in possession of correspondence that Plaintiff filed with the then- 22 Inspector General Robert A. Barton and the CDCR Ombudsman, trying to get Plaintiff’s CDCR 23 602 Appeals through exhaustion. As the Court currently has before it the issue of whether 24 Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies or whether he was hindered from that 25 obligation, Plaintiff has submitted this correspondence as exhibits attached to his motion to 26 supplement. (Id.)

27 1 Concurrent with this motion, Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th 28 Cir. 1988); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1988). (ECF No. 37-2.) 1 In response, Defendants argue that the motion to supplement should be considered a 2 surreply not authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Rules. (ECF No. 3 55.) Plaintiff’s supplement to his opposition is therefore unauthorized, impermissible and should 4 be stricken and not considered by this Court. (Id.) 5 In an abundance of caution, and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court finds it 6 appropriate to grant Plaintiff’s motion to supplement and deny Defendants’ motion to strike the 7 surreply as unauthorized. Although Defendants are correct that nothing in the Federal Rules of 8 Civil Procedure or the Court’s Local Rules authorizes the filing of a surreply, the Court finds that 9 Plaintiff’s surreply does not change the Court’s analysis of the underlying summary judgment 10 motion, as discussed below. Therefore, Defendants are not prejudiced by the Court’s 11 consideration of the additional exhibits filed. 12 III. Legal Standards 13 A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement 14 Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides that “[n]o action 15 shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal 16 law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 17 administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is 18 required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the 19 process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion requirement applies to 20 all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 21 The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendants bear the burden of 22 raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Albino, 23 747 F.3d at 1166. “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, 24 a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Otherwise, 25 the defendants must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to 26 summary judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most 27 favorable to the plaintiff, shows he failed to exhaust. Id. 28 /// 1 Defendants must first prove that there was an available administrative remedy and that 2 Plaintiff did not exhaust that available remedy. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th 3 Cir. 2015) (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts to 4 Plaintiff to show something in his particular case made the existing and generally available 5 administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (citing 6 Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation marks omitted). The ultimate burden of proof on the issue 7 of exhaustion remains with Defendants. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 8 B.

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