(PC) Dickerson v. Wheeler

District Court, E.D. California·Decided December 3, 2024·No. 2:24-cv-00895·Unknown

Opinion

JEFFREY DICKERSON, No. 2:24-cv-0895 SCR P Plaintiff, v. ORDER WARDEN, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Before the court is plaintiff’s first amended complaint for screening. For the reasons set forth below, this court finds plaintiff states a minimally sufficient claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act against the Warden but states no other claims for relief cognizable under §1983. Plaintiff will be given the choice of proceeding immediately on his ADA claim or filing a second amended complaint. I. Legal Standards As described in the court’s prior screening order, the court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners to determine whether they sufficiently state claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The prisoner must plead an arguable legal and factual basis for each claim in order to survive dismissal. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). In addition, the prisoner must demonstrate a link between the actions of each defendant and the deprivation of his rights. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff may demonstrate that connection by alleging facts showing: (1) a defendant’s “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or (2) that a defendant set “in motion a series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the defendant] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A court shall dismiss a complaint if it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1). II. Discussion A. Plaintiff’s Allegations in the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 17) Plaintiff is incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”). Plaintiff identifies as defendants the Warden of HDSP and Chief Medical Executive Dr. Kevin Reuter. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is somewhat difficult to read. As best the court can tell, plaintiff alleges the following: Plaintiff is disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) because he requires a wheelchair and has a prosthetic leg. The B-yard did not have toilets until plaintiff complained. Plaintiff states that he “often fell down attempting to get inside.” Because he did not have access to a toilet, plaintiff urinated and defecated on himself. Staff denied him a shower after he defecated on himself. Plaintiff alleges that that his physical disabilities require that he have treatment with “constant exercise.” Defendants deprived him of medical care because he was forced to choose between getting exercise in the yard and staying inside where he had access to a bathroom. Defendants told plaintiff they could not accommodate his disabilities at HDSP. While the court is not required to review exhibits to determine plaintiff’s claims, this court has briefly reviewed the many attachments to the “Memorandum of Points and Authorities by the Petitioner” filed with plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF No. 17-1.) The attachments involve plaintiff’s complaints about a host of health issues and about the lack of a toilet on B yard. At least two attachments appear to involve plaintiff’s complaints about the lack of a toilet. Plaintiff attaches copies of the Institutional Level responses, signed by defendant Reuter, denying plaintiff’s grievances regarding the lack of a toilet on the B yard for over a year. (ECF No. 17-1 at 5-9, 39- 43.) In another attachment, apparently part of a grievance, plaintiff states that the prosthetic leg does not fit, requiring him to be in a wheelchair. He indicates that if he received appropriate physical therapy, he would not require a wheelchair. (Id. at 38.) For relief, plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring a transfer to an appropriate prison and compensatory and punitive damages. B. Does Plaintiff State Claims Cognizable under §1983? 1. Americans with Disabilities Act a. Legal Standards Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §12132. Title II authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities, United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153 (2006), and state prisons “fall squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public entity,’” Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). The proper defendant in an ADA action is the public entity responsible for the alleged discrimination. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 153. “A disability discrimination claim may be based on ‘one of three theories of liability: disparate treatment, disparate impact, or failure to make a reasonable accommodation.’” Payan v. Los Angeles Community College District, 11 F.4th 729, 738 (quoting Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 260 (2d Cir. 2016)). In contrast to a Title II disparate impact claim, which “is focused on modifying a policy or practice to improve systemic accessibility,” a Title II “reasonable accommodation claim is focused on an accommodation based on an individualized request or need[.]” Id. “Generally, public entities must ‘make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.’” Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1215 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(7)). The state is responsible for providing inmates with “the fundamentals of life, such as sustenance, the use of toilet and bathing facilities, and elementary mobility and communication,” and as such, the ADA requires that these “opportunities” be provided to disabled inmates “to the same extent that they are provided to all other detainees and prisoners.” Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1220 (finding ADA violation where defendant failed to articulate “any legitimate rationale for maintaining inaccessible bathrooms, sinks, showers, and other fixtures in the housing areas and commons spaces assigned to mobility- and dexterity-impaired detainees”). To state a claim that a public program or service violated Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability;” (2) he was either excluded from participation in or

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