1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EFRAIN GARCIA DEMARA, No. 1:24-cv-01030-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. TO THIS ACTION 14 DR. RAMADAN, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION 15 Defendants. FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF 16 (ECF No. 10) 17 18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed November 7, 2024. 21 I. 22 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 23 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 25 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 26 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 27 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 28 1 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 2 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 3 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 4 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 5 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 7 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 8 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 10 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 11 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 12 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 13 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 14 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 15 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 16 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 17 at 969. 18 II. 19 SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 20 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of 21 the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 22 Dr. Ramadan did not want to help Plaintiff with his left leg and requested ten million to 23 assist Plaintiff. Warden Ken Clark gave Dr. Ramadan the job and freedom to do whatever he 24 wants. 25 III. 26 DISCUSSION 27 A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 28 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with 1 respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 2 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 3 available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a condition precedent to filing a 4 civil rights claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 5 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute making exhaustion a 6 precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to 7 suit.” (citations omitted)). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison 8 life.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Further, the nature of the relief sought by the 9 prisoner or the relief offered by the prison's administrative process is of no consequence. Booth v. 10 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And, because the PLRA’s text and intent requires “proper” 11 exhaustion, a prisoner does not satisfy the PLRA’s administrative grievance process if he files an 12 untimely or procedurally defective grievance or appeal. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. A prisoner 13 need not plead or prove exhaustion. Instead, it is an affirmative defense that must be proved by 14 defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). A prison’s internal grievance process, not 15 the PLRA, determines whether the grievance satisfies the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Id. at 16 218. However, courts may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the 17 complaint. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). 18 Based on the face of the complaint, Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies 19 prior to filing this case. On the form complaint, in response to the question whether Plaintiff 20 completed the grievance process, he checks the box “no.” (ECF No. 10 at 2.) Thus, it appears 21 that Plaintiff has not exhaust the administrative remedies prior to filing this action. In such 22 instances, the Court would typically direct Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be 23 dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust. However, as stated below, because Plaintiff 24 fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and further amendment would be futile dismissal is 25 warranted. 26 B. Denial of Medical Treatment 27 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison 28 medical treatment, an inmate must show “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” 1 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate 2 indifference consists of two parts. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal 3 citations omitted). First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that 4 failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary 5 and wanton infliction of pain. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted.) Second the plaintiff 6 must show that the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. Id.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EFRAIN GARCIA DEMARA, No. 1:24-cv-01030-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. TO THIS ACTION 14 DR. RAMADAN, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION 15 Defendants. FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF 16 (ECF No. 10) 17 18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed November 7, 2024. 21 I. 22 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 23 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 25 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 26 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 27 “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 28 1 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 2 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 3 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 4 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 5 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 7 that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 8 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 9 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 10 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 11 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 12 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 13 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 14 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 15 has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 16 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 17 at 969. 18 II. 19 SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 20 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of 21 the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 22 Dr. Ramadan did not want to help Plaintiff with his left leg and requested ten million to 23 assist Plaintiff. Warden Ken Clark gave Dr. Ramadan the job and freedom to do whatever he 24 wants. 25 III. 26 DISCUSSION 27 A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 28 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with 1 respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 2 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 3 available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a condition precedent to filing a 4 civil rights claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 5 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute making exhaustion a 6 precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to 7 suit.” (citations omitted)). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison 8 life.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Further, the nature of the relief sought by the 9 prisoner or the relief offered by the prison's administrative process is of no consequence. Booth v. 10 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And, because the PLRA’s text and intent requires “proper” 11 exhaustion, a prisoner does not satisfy the PLRA’s administrative grievance process if he files an 12 untimely or procedurally defective grievance or appeal. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. A prisoner 13 need not plead or prove exhaustion. Instead, it is an affirmative defense that must be proved by 14 defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). A prison’s internal grievance process, not 15 the PLRA, determines whether the grievance satisfies the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Id. at 16 218. However, courts may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the 17 complaint. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). 18 Based on the face of the complaint, Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies 19 prior to filing this case. On the form complaint, in response to the question whether Plaintiff 20 completed the grievance process, he checks the box “no.” (ECF No. 10 at 2.) Thus, it appears 21 that Plaintiff has not exhaust the administrative remedies prior to filing this action. In such 22 instances, the Court would typically direct Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be 23 dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust. However, as stated below, because Plaintiff 24 fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and further amendment would be futile dismissal is 25 warranted. 26 B. Denial of Medical Treatment 27 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison 28 medical treatment, an inmate must show “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” 1 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate 2 indifference consists of two parts. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal 3 citations omitted). First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that 4 failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary 5 and wanton infliction of pain. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted.) Second the plaintiff 6 must show that the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. Id. The second 7 prong is satisfied by showing “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or 8 possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. Indifference “may appear 9 when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be 10 shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. (internal citations 11 omitted). However, an inadvertent or negligent failure to provide adequate medical care alone 12 does not state a claim under § 1983. Id. 13 “A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner – or between medical 14 professionals – concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 15 indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 16 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 17 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2012) 18 (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that 19 the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances 20 and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] 21 health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks 22 omitted).). In addition, “[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 23 because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Snow, 681 F.3d at 987-88, overruled in 24 part on other grounds, Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1082-83; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 25 Here, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Ramada did not want to help Plaintiff with his left leg 26 unless he gave the doctor ten million dollars. However, Plaintiff fails to meet either the prongs 27 for a claim of deliberate indifference. That is, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he suffered 28 from a serious medical condition or that Dr. Ramada knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to 1 Plaintiff and disregarded such risk Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). Accordingly, 2 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 3 C. Supervisory Liability 4 Plaintiff contends that Warden Ken Clark is liable because he gave Dr. Ramadan the job 5 and freedom to do whatever he wants. 6 A supervisory official is liable under section 1983 if (1) the official is personally involved 7 in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a “sufficient causal connection between the 8 supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 9 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). “The 10 requisite causal connection can be established … by setting in motion a series of acts by others or 11 by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or 12 reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr, 652 13 F.3d at 1207–08 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, a 14 supervisor may “be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the 15 training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional 16 deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” 17 Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208). 18 “Conclusory allegations that various prison officials knew or should have known about 19 constitutional violations occurring against plaintiff simply because of their general supervisory 20 role are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Sullivan v. Biter, No. 15-cv-00243, 21 2017 WL 1540256, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 22 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) and Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207). In other words, to state a claim against any 23 individual defendant based on supervisory liability, Plaintiff “must allege facts showing that the 24 individual defendant participated in or directed the alleged violation, or knew of the violation and 25 failed to act to prevent it.” Richard v. Holtrop, No. 15-cv-5632, 2016 WL 11520620, at *5 (C.D. 26 Cal. May 12, 2016) (emphasis in original) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th 27 Cir. 1998)) (“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual 28 was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”). Supervisory liability is not an 1 independent cause of action under § 1983, and to state a claim against supervisory personnel 2 Plaintiff must allege both an underlying constitutional violation and a sufficient causal connection 3 between the supervisor's actions and the violation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. 4 Here, it is clear that Plaintiff seeks to hold Warden Ken Clark vicariously liable under a 5 theory of respondeat superior liability. However, the law does not allow for such a claim. 6 Indeed, Plaintiff fails to set forth any factual allegations to state a cognizable underlying claim for 7 deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Id. 8 D. Further Leave to Amend 9 If the court finds that a complaint or claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, 10 the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Leave to amend should be 11 granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a 12 plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Cato v. 13 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to 14 amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that 15 the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” (citation omitted). 16 However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a claim cannot be cured by amendment, 17 the Court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06. 18 Here, in light of Plaintiff’s failure to provide additional information about his claims 19 despite specific instructions from the Court, further leave to amend would be futile and the first 20 amended complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 21 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would 22 be futile.”). Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, as with Plaintiff’s original complaint, fails to set 23 forth any factual allegations to demonstrate that Dr. Ramadan acted with deliberate indifference 24 to a serious medical need. Accordingly, further leave to amend the complaint should be denied. 25 IV. 26 ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION 27 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly 28 assign a District Judge to this action. 1 Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the instant action be dismissed, without 2 | further leave to amend, for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. 3 This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 4 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 5 | days after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 6 | objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should 7 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is 8 | advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 9 | onappeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 10 | Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 11 12 B IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. ee 14 | Dated: _ November 12, 2024 STANLEY A. BOONE 15 United States Magistrate Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28