(PC) De'Armond, Jr. v. White

District Court, E.D. California·Decided December 1, 2022·No. 1:19-cv-01695·Unknown

Opinion

MICHAEL THOMAS DE’ARMOND JR., Case No. 1:19-cv-01695-JLT-HBK (PC) Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S EXHAUSTION- v. BASED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT1 (Doc. No. 42) Defendant.

FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment filed on November 5, 2021. (Doc. No. 42, “MSJ”). Plaintiff did not file any opposition and the time to do so has expired. See docket, see also L.R. 230(l). For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends the district court grant Defendant’s MSJ. A. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint Plaintiff, Michael Thomas De’Armond, Jr. (“De’Armond Jr.” or “Plaintiff”), a state 1 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2022). prisoner, is proceeding pro se on his initial complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint alleged on December 19, 2018, Defendant White, a correctional officer at California Correctional Institute (“CCI”), “blind sighted” him by spraying him with chemical spray in response to Plaintiff referring to Defendant and his co-workers as the mythical prison gang, “The Green Wall.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3). Once he was sprayed, Plaintiff immediately assumed the prone position on his own. (Id.). While in the prone position, Plaintiff alleges unnamed individuals repeatedly punched and kicked him and pulled his hair. (Id). The Court’s screening order found the Complaint stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claim against Defendant White when he sprayed and beat Plaintiff without cause. (Doc. No. 11). B. Defendant’s Exhaustion-Based Motion for Summary Judgment Defendant timely filed the instant MSJ. In support, Defendant included statements of undisputed facts (Doc. No. 42-1); Rand Notice; (Doc. No. 42-2); Declaration of Howard E. Moseley, Assistant Director of the Office of the Appeals (Doc. No. 42-3); Plaintiff’s Appeal History (Doc. No. 42-3 at 5); Letter dated June 7, 2019 from the Office of Appeals with documents from the appeal process (Doc. No. 42-3 at 7-14); Declaration of Jennifer Stone, Grievance Coordinator for the Office of Grievances at California Correctional Institution (Doc. No. 42-4, 1-5); Appeals Tracking System for Plaintiff (Doc. No. 42-4 at 7); Memorandum dated January 26, 2019 with attachments regarding the second level response (Doc. No. 42-4 at 9-15); and Memorandum dated July 11, 2019 with attachments regarding the second level response (Doc. No. 42-4 at 17-27). Defendant contends the uncontroverted evidence proves Plaintiff did not fully exhaust his available administrative grievances regarding his Eight Amendment claim against Defendant White. C. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Exhaustion-Based MSJ Plaintiff has not filed any opposition to Defendant’s MSJ. See docket. Defendant served the MSJ on Plaintiff by First-Class Mail. (Doc. No. 42 at 10-11). The time for Plaintiff to file any opposition has long expired. L.R. 230(l). //// //// Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material where it is (1) relevant to an element of a claim or a defense under the substantive law and (2) would affect the outcome of the suit. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1987). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts, by affidavits, deposition testimony, documents, or discovery responses, showing there is a genuine issue that must be resolved by trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Pacific Gulf Shipping Co. v. Vigorous Shipping & Trading S.A., 992 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2021). A mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). Rather, the evidence must allow a reasonable juror, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, to return a verdict in that party’s favor. Id. In an exhaustion-based summary judgment motion, the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing “that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014). If the defendant carries that burden, “the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains, however, with defendant. Id. The undersigned has carefully reviewed and considered all arguments, points and authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, if any, objections, and other papers filed by the parties. The omission to an argument, document, paper, or objection is not to be construed that the undersigned did not consider the argument, document, paper, or objection. Instead, the undersigned thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence it deemed admissible, material, and appropriate for purposes of issuing these Findings and Recommendations. C. Exhaustion Under the PLRA Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). It is condition precedent to filing a civil rights claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). The PLRA recognizes no exception to the exhaustion requirement, and the court may not recognize a new exception, even in “special circumstances.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). The one significant qualifier is that “the remedies must indeed be ‘available’ to the prisoner.” Id. at 639. A prison’s internal grievance process controls whether the grievance satisfies the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. D. CDCR Applicable Grievance Procedures CDCR’s administrative remedy process governs this action.2 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1 (2018). At the time relevant to this action, a prisoner was required to proceed through three formal levels of rev

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