1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MAURICE DARONTE DAVIS, No. 2:24-CV-0460-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 LARSEN, et al., 15 Defendants. 16
17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 27 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 28 1 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 2 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 4 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 5 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 6 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 7 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 8 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 9 10 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 11 This action proceeds on Plaintiff Maurice Daronte Davis’ original complaint. See 12 ECF No. 1. Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Larsen, (2) D. Strave, and (3) D. 13 Minh. Id. at 1. 14 Plaintiff’s only claim alleges that he was improperly found guilty of stealing food 15 because he was not permitted to review body camera footage of the incident. Id. at 2. Plaintiff 16 alleges this was done in retaliation for Plaintiff filing a prior claim against a warden. Id. at 5. 17 Plaintiff works as a central kitchen worker in the pantry area at California State 18 Prison, Sacramento (CSPC). Id. at 2. Plaintiff and other central kitchen workers are not allowed 19 to eat until after prison staff and inmates in segregation are fed. Id. On July 1, 2023, there was 20 no food left for Plaintiff and other central kitchen workers to eat after staff and inmates were fed, 21 so Plaintiff and other workers cooked food for themselves. Id. Defendant Minh saw Plaintiff 22 cooking and asked what he was doing. Id. Plaintiff explained he was cooking and was going to 23 take the food back to his cell, and Defendant Minh replied by saying “OK”. Id. Defendant Minh 24 subsequently submitted a “write-up,” in which he stated Plaintiff refused a body search and stole 25 food. Id. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Plaintiff asked Defendant Larsen for witnesses and to review footage of the 2 incident from Defendant Minh’s body camera. Id. Defendant Larsen denied access to both. Id. 3 Plaintiff was told that D. Minh did not submit any “audio/video,” which Plaintiff claims violates 4 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) policies. Id. at 3. Plaintiff 5 also claims that no mental health personal saw him. Id. at 2. Plaintiff claims that he was 6 improperly found guilty of the violation because Defendant Minh did not submit footage from his 7 body camera and because Plaintiff was not able to see it. Id. at 3. 8 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable due process claim against Defendants 11 Larson and Minh. However, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim exhibits a number of defects. Plaintiff 12 also fails to state facts connecting Defendant Strave and any alleged constitutional violations. 13 Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his complaint or proceed on his due process 14 claims against Defendants Lawson and Minh only. 15 A. Due Process 16 The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or 17 property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to 18 state a claim of deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a liberty or 19 property interest for which the protection is sought. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 20 (1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Due process protects against the 21 deprivation of property where there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property. See Bd. 22 of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577. Protected property interests are created, and their dimensions are 23 defined, by existing rules that stem from an independent source – such as state law – and which 24 secure certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to those benefits. See id. 25 With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, due process requires prison 26 officials to provide the inmate with: (1) a written statement at least 24 hours before the 27 disciplinary hearing that includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the inmate, 28 and an explanation for the disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary 1 evidence and call witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security; 2 and (3) legal assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff, 418 3 U.S. at 563-70. Due process is satisfied where these minimum requirements have been met, see 4 Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), and where there is “some evidence” in the 5 record as a whole which supports the decision of the hearing officer, see Superintendent v. Hill, 6 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The “some evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and is 7 satisfied where “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached.” 8 Id. at 455-56. However, a due process claim challenging the loss of good-time credits as a result 9 of an adverse prison disciplinary finding is not cognizable under § 1983 and must be raised by 10 way of habeas corpus.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MAURICE DARONTE DAVIS, No. 2:24-CV-0460-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 LARSEN, et al., 15 Defendants. 16
17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 27 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 28 1 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 2 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 4 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 5 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 6 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 7 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 8 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 9 10 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 11 This action proceeds on Plaintiff Maurice Daronte Davis’ original complaint. See 12 ECF No. 1. Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Larsen, (2) D. Strave, and (3) D. 13 Minh. Id. at 1. 14 Plaintiff’s only claim alleges that he was improperly found guilty of stealing food 15 because he was not permitted to review body camera footage of the incident. Id. at 2. Plaintiff 16 alleges this was done in retaliation for Plaintiff filing a prior claim against a warden. Id. at 5. 17 Plaintiff works as a central kitchen worker in the pantry area at California State 18 Prison, Sacramento (CSPC). Id. at 2. Plaintiff and other central kitchen workers are not allowed 19 to eat until after prison staff and inmates in segregation are fed. Id. On July 1, 2023, there was 20 no food left for Plaintiff and other central kitchen workers to eat after staff and inmates were fed, 21 so Plaintiff and other workers cooked food for themselves. Id. Defendant Minh saw Plaintiff 22 cooking and asked what he was doing. Id. Plaintiff explained he was cooking and was going to 23 take the food back to his cell, and Defendant Minh replied by saying “OK”. Id. Defendant Minh 24 subsequently submitted a “write-up,” in which he stated Plaintiff refused a body search and stole 25 food. Id. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Plaintiff asked Defendant Larsen for witnesses and to review footage of the 2 incident from Defendant Minh’s body camera. Id. Defendant Larsen denied access to both. Id. 3 Plaintiff was told that D. Minh did not submit any “audio/video,” which Plaintiff claims violates 4 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) policies. Id. at 3. Plaintiff 5 also claims that no mental health personal saw him. Id. at 2. Plaintiff claims that he was 6 improperly found guilty of the violation because Defendant Minh did not submit footage from his 7 body camera and because Plaintiff was not able to see it. Id. at 3. 8 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable due process claim against Defendants 11 Larson and Minh. However, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim exhibits a number of defects. Plaintiff 12 also fails to state facts connecting Defendant Strave and any alleged constitutional violations. 13 Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his complaint or proceed on his due process 14 claims against Defendants Lawson and Minh only. 15 A. Due Process 16 The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or 17 property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to 18 state a claim of deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a liberty or 19 property interest for which the protection is sought. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 20 (1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Due process protects against the 21 deprivation of property where there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property. See Bd. 22 of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577. Protected property interests are created, and their dimensions are 23 defined, by existing rules that stem from an independent source – such as state law – and which 24 secure certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to those benefits. See id. 25 With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, due process requires prison 26 officials to provide the inmate with: (1) a written statement at least 24 hours before the 27 disciplinary hearing that includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the inmate, 28 and an explanation for the disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary 1 evidence and call witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security; 2 and (3) legal assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff, 418 3 U.S. at 563-70. Due process is satisfied where these minimum requirements have been met, see 4 Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), and where there is “some evidence” in the 5 record as a whole which supports the decision of the hearing officer, see Superintendent v. Hill, 6 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The “some evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and is 7 satisfied where “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached.” 8 Id. at 455-56. However, a due process claim challenging the loss of good-time credits as a result 9 of an adverse prison disciplinary finding is not cognizable under § 1983 and must be raised by 10 way of habeas corpus. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997). 11 Plaintiff has stated cognizable due process claims against Defendants Larson and 12 Minh. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Larson violated his due process rights by denying him a fair 13 hearing when Defendant Larson denied Plaintiff access to review body camera footage of the 14 incident underlying the rules violation report. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff claims he is entitled to 15 review body camera footage when an inmate is faced with disciplinary action. Id. Plaintiff has 16 stated a cognizable due process claim against Defendant Minh because he alleges Defendant 17 Minh wrote a false rules violation report. Id. at 2. 18 B. Retaliation 19 In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, the prisoner must 20 establish that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that the retaliatory 21 action was not related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving institutional 22 security. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In meeting 23 this standard, the prisoner must demonstrate a specific link between the alleged retaliation and the 24 exercise of a constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995); 25 Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989). The prisoner must also 26 show that the exercise of First Amendment rights was chilled, though not necessarily silenced, by 27 the alleged retaliatory conduct. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000), see also 28 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the prisoner plaintiff must 1 establish the following in order to state a claim for retaliation: (1) prison officials took adverse 2 action against the inmate; (2) the adverse action was taken because the inmate engaged in 3 protected conduct; (3) the adverse action chilled the inmate’s First Amendment rights; and (4) the 4 adverse action did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568. 5 As to the chilling effect, the Ninth Circuit in Rhodes observed: “If Rhodes had not 6 alleged a chilling effect, perhaps his allegations that he suffered harm would suffice, since harm 7 that is more than minimal will almost always have a chilling effect.” Id. at n.11. By way of 8 example, the court cited Pratt in which a retaliation claim had been decided without discussing 9 chilling. See id. This citation is somewhat confusing in that the court in Pratt had no reason to 10 discuss chilling because it concluded that the plaintiff could not prove the absence of legitimate 11 penological interests. See Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808-09. Nonetheless, while the court has clearly 12 stated that one of the “basic elements” of a First Amendment retaliation claim is that the adverse 13 action “chilled the inmates exercise of his First Amendment rights,” id. at 567-68, see also 14 Resnick, 213 F.3d at 449, the comment in Rhodes at footnote 11 suggests that adverse action 15 which is more than minimal satisfies this element. 16 Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts that show Defendants knew about 17 Plaintiff’s lawsuit against the warden at any time. As such, Plaintiff failed to show that 18 Defendants’ adverse action was taken because the Plaintiff engaged in the protected conduct of 19 bringing forth lawsuits. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his complaint. 20 C. Causal Link 21 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 22 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 23 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 24 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 25 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 26 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 27 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 28 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 1 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 2 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 3 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 4 Here, Plaintiff fails to state any facts linking Defendant Strave to any alleged 5 constitutional violations. Although Defendant Strave is named as a Defendant, he is not 6 mentioned anywhere in Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his 7 complaint. 8 9 III. CONCLUSION 10 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 11 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 12 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 13 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 14 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 15 prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 16 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 17 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 18 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 19 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 20 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 21 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 22 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 23 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 24 complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 25 recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 26 further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims. 27 / / / 28 / / / ] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a first amended 2 | complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. 3 4 | Dated: April 16, 2024 Svc > DENNIS M. COTA 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28