(PC) Cyprian v. Constable

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 30, 2024·No. 2:19-cv-00689·Unknown

Opinion

REALIOUS CYPRIAN, No. 2:19-cv-00689-DJC-AC Plaintiff, v. ORDER

T. CONSTABLE, et al.,

Defendants.

This matter is currently scheduled for trial on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants T. Constable and J. W. Thomas. A trial date is set for July 1, 2024 with a Final Pretrial Conference scheduled for May 2, 2024. Plaintiff has now filed a motion to compel discovery, which Defendants have opposed, and a motion to appoint counsel. (ECF Nos. 95 & 98.) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel requests production of “video footage on 7-28-18 from 10:45AM to 11:15AM[.]” (ECF No. 95 at 1–2.) Plaintiff’s request is untimely. Discovery in this matter closed over two years ago on October 29, 2021.1 (ECF No. 52 1 Magistrate Judge Allison Claire later modified the discovery and scheduling order to permit Defendants to finish the deposition of a witness and, in doing so, permitted parties to file motions to compel within fourteen days of that date. (See ECF No. 62.) However, this modification did not extend the general discovery deadline but even if it did, Plaintiff’s present motion would still be untimely. at 6.) The time for discovery has long passed and Plaintiff may not now seek to compel discovery without first requesting that the Court reopen discovery. Even if that request were made, it is exceedingly unlikely the Court would grant it given the imminent nature of trial, Defendant’s opposition to the request, the lack of diligence in obtaining this video during discovery, and the foreseeability that Plaintiff would want this discovery. City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017) (Instructing courts to consider “1) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is opposed, 3) whether the non-moving party would be prejudiced, 4) whether the moving party was diligent in obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the court, 5) the foreseeability of the need for additional discovery in light of the time allowed for discovery by the district court, and 6) the likelihood that the discovery will lead to relevant evidence.”). Moreover, Plaintiff previously filed a motion to compel production of the video surveillance from July 28, 2018. (ECF No. 63.) That motion was previously denied as untimely by Judge Claire on August 22, 2022. (ECF No. 79.) Plaintiff has not shown that prior order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law such that it should be reconsidered. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Local Rule 303(f). Plaintiff also includes what appear to be additional requests in his motion, though it is unclear what Plaintiff is requesting. In full, Plaintiff states:

It’s clear that multiple African American Citizens have express that T. Constable has racial discriminatory or white supremist personality so as a direct evidence of profile as to the reason why T. Constable wanted to see a gay black man beaten is clear it reflex to this case (Request no3). Plaintiff request Defendant T. Constable to produce (Request no4) due to he is known at CHCF as a racist officer that jumps on black men (Tyrone Johnson) which Plaintiff was a eye witness. (Id. at 2.) The Court does not know what Plaintiff is seeking with these requests. //// Regardless, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is untimely as discovery closed on October 29, 2021. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 95) is denied as untimely. Plaintiff has also filed a motion requesting the Court appoint counsel to represent him. (ECF No. 98.) Plaintiffs in civil right actions do not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). District courts do not have the authority to require that counsel represent indigent plaintiffs in civil rights actions. Mallard v. U.S. Court Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). The Court may still request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), though such appointment is only permitted under “exceptional circumstances”. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. “To decide whether these exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both ‘the likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). Here, the Court does not find the necessary exceptional circumstances at this time. While this action has survived summary judgment and proceeds to trial, that fact alone is unpersuasive as to Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits given that Defendant’s remaining Eighth Amendment claims were not litigated in the Summary Judgment Motion. Thus, the fact that Plaintiff’s claims have survived summary judgment does not demonstrate Plaintiff is likely to succeed at trial. Plaintiff does not seek to otherwise establish his likelihood of success in his motion. (ECF No. 98 at 2.) Instead, Plaintiff argues that he is “below a layman of the law” and has previously proceeded with the help of a “jail house lawyer” but no longer has such assistance. (Id. at 1–2.) Though the ability of a plaintiff to articulate his claims is relevant, the Court must consider such ability relative to the complexity of his claims. Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. The only remaining claim after summary judgment is a single Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Constable and Thomas for failure to protect Plaintiff. Though the Court does not have the benefit of having the remaining claims be litigated before it as these were not the subject of a Motion to Dismiss or Summary Judgment motion, these claims do not appear complex. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is unable to litigate these apparently simple claims. However, in light of the impending trial and the referral of this case for a settlement conference below, the Court finds the appointment of counsel for Plaintiff is warranted for the limited purpose of representing plaintiff at a settlement conference. Thomas A. Woods has been selected from the Court’s Pro Bono Attorney Panel to represent Plaintiff for this limited purpose and has agreed to be appointed. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 98) is DENIED without prejudice to renewal following the settlement conference. In the alternative to Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, Plaintiff also requests an extension of time to file a Pretrial Statement. (ECF No. 98 at 2.) Plaintiff’s Pretrial Statement was due on April 11, 2024 with the Pretrial Conference set for May 2, 2024. (ECF No. 90.) Plaintiff’s Motion was sent on April 10, 2024 and not received by the Court until April 17, 2024. (See ECF No. 98.) While the Court understands the challenges posed to Plaintiff by his pro se status, the Court and parties must have Plaintiff’s Pretrial Statement before the Pretrial Conference. With the natural delays caused by prison mail, this limits the Co

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