(PC) Cross v. Meza

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMay 19, 2021
Docket2:19-cv-02416
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Cross v. Meza ((PC) Cross v. Meza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Cross v. Meza, (E.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 QUINTIN R. CROSS, No. 2:19-cv-2416 AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 T. MEZA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 19 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 20 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(a). ECF No. 2. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 25 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 26 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 27 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 28 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 1 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(b)(2). 3 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 4 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 6 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 7 “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 9 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 11 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal 12 theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 13 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as 14 stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a 15 constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. 16 Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted). 17 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 18 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 19 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 20 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 21 (1957)). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 22 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. 23 Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In order to survive dismissal 24 for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the 25 elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to 26 relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “‘[T]he 27 pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a 28 suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles 1 Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 2 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 3 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 5 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 6 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this 7 standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. 8 Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) (citation omitted), as well as construe the 9 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, 10 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). 11 III. Complaint 12 Plaintiff brings suit against thirteen named correctional officers and other prison officials 13 at Mule Creek State Prison, presenting two constitutional claims: retaliation for plaintiff’s 14 exercise of First Amendment rights, and denial of dinners in violation of his Eighth Amendment 15 rights. The factual allegations need not be summarized here in detail. The gist of the factual 16 bases for the claims follows. 17 Claim One alleges that throughout 2018 and 2019, various MCSP officials wrongfully 18 denied or otherwise terminated plaintiff’s many grievances and appeals, thwarting exhaustion of 19 his administrative remedies. During the same period, plaintiff was repeatedly subjected to the 20 taking of or interference with his personal property, and he was place in administrative 21 segregation for no legitimate reason. Staff made disparaging comments about plaintiff’s filing of 22 602s, and it was said that plaintiff “wanted to be the new Johnny Cochran filing all this 23 paperwork.” Plaintiff was written up for exercising his rights. In response to plaintiff’s request 24 for a different correctional counselor, defendants moved plaintiff to a “punishment building” 25 where gang members are housed. Plaintiff’s wrongfully seized personal property has not been 26 returned to him.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Jenkins v. McKeithen
395 U.S. 411 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital
425 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Richard E. Loux v. B. J. Rhay, Warden
375 F.2d 55 (Ninth Circuit, 1967)
United States v. Daniel Isaac Drake
673 F.2d 15 (First Circuit, 1982)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Rhodes v. Robinson
408 F.3d 559 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Wilhelm v. Rotman
680 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Foster v. Runnels
554 F.3d 807 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Johnson v. Lewis
217 F.3d 726 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Johnson v. Duffy
588 F.2d 740 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Cross v. Meza, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-cross-v-meza-caed-2021.