(PC) Crook v. Macomber

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY J. CROOK, Case No. 1:25-cv-00443-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 14 JEFF MACOMBER, STATE OF DISMISS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE1

CALIFORNIA, and GAVIN NEWSOME, 15 14-DAY DEADLINE Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Anthony J. Crook is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 19 this civil rights action. (Doc. Nos. 1, 7). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 20 recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to 21 comply with a court order and prosecute this action. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging 24 Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement and medical deliberate indifference claims seeking 25 monetary damages for injuries due to unsafe working conditions—multiple large potholes in the 26 kitchen floor. Specifically, Plaintiff sustained burns when a pothole impeded one of the legs of 27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 28 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 1 the cake cart Plaintiff was pushing, causing it to tip over and spill hot pans onto Plaintiff’s 2 exposed arms. 3 On May 1, 2025, the Court issued a screening order, pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915A finding 4 the Complaint, as pled, failed to state an official capacity claim against any of the named 5 Defendants, was barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the extent it sought monetary damages 6 against the State of California and Governor Newsome, and failed to allege sufficient facts to 7 state either a conditions of confinement or medical deliberate claim. (See generally Doc. No. 8). 8 The Court afforded Plaintiff three options to exercise before June 6, 2025: (1) file an amended 9 complaint; (2) file a notice that he intends to stand on his initial complaint subject to the 10 undersigned recommending the district court dismiss for reasons stated in the May 1, 2025 11 Screening Order; or (3) file a notice to voluntarily dismiss this action, without prejudice, under 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) because no defendant had yet been served. (Id. at 10- 13 11). The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that if he “fails to timely respond to this Court Order or 14 seek an extension of time to comply” the undersigned “will recommend that the district court 15 dismiss this case as a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and prosecute 16 this action.” (Id. at 11, ¶ 2). As of the date of this of this Findings and Recommendation, 17 Plaintiff has failed to exercise any of the three options from the Court’s Screening Order, or 18 request an extension of time to comply, and the time to do so has expired.2 See docket. 19 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 20 A. Legal Standard 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 22 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court 23 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 24 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, this Court’s Local Rules, which correspond with 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with … 26 any order of the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions … 27 2 More than 45 days have passed since the date Plaintiff was deliver his response to the Screening Order to 28 correctional officials for mailing. 1 within the inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent power 2 to control their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including dismissal 3 of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). 4 A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey a court 5 order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 6 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone v. U.S. 7 Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court 8 order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to 9 prosecute and to comply with local rules). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court 10 must consider the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 11 litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 12 (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less 13 drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 14 1988). 15 B. Analysis 16 After considering each of the above-stated factors, the undersigned concludes dismissal 17 without prejudice is warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of 18 litigation is deemed to be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California 19 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). 20 Turning to the second factor, this Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 21 overstated. This Court has one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and due to the delay in 22 filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operated 23 under a declared judicial emergency through May 2, 2021. See In re Approval of the Judicial 24 Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of California, 956 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). This 25 Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a 26 recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket when a litigant ceases to 27 litigate his/her case or respond to a court order. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor 28 weighs in favor of dismissal. 1 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’ 2 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 3 factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor—risk of prejudice 4 to defendant—weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 5 unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 6 1976). Because Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action, 7 the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 8 The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors the 9 disposition of cases on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). 10 However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case 11 toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is 12 the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 13 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on 14 multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” 15 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 2002) (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of 16 district court’s involuntary dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to 17 timely respond to court order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon 18 the size and load of the docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our 19 beleaguered trial judges.”). Further, as set forth in the Screening Order, the Court already 20 determined that the Complaint, as pled, failed to state a claim, so this factor does not weigh in 21 favor of the Plaintiff. 22 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 23 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 24 Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s May 1, 2025 Order 25 expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to comply with the Court’s order would result in a 26 recommendation for dismissal of this action. (Doc. 8 at 11). Thus, Plaintiff had adequate 27 warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. And the instant dismissal is a 28 dismissal without prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, thereby 1 | satisfying the fifth factor. 2 After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, the undersigned 3 || recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Local Rule 110. 4 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 5 The Clerk of the Court randomly assign this case to a District Judge. 6 It is further RECOMMENDED: 7 This action be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiffs failure to obey a court order 8 | and failure to prosecute this action. 9 NOTICE 10 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 11 | Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 12 | of the date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written objections 13 | with the Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 14 | and Recommendations.” A party’s failure to file objections within the specified time may result in 15 | waiver of his rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 16 | Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 17 Dated: _ July 22. 2025 Mile. Wh. foareh Zaskth 19 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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