1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL A. CRAIG, No. 2:22-cv-01874 DAD- AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 GENA JONES, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has paid the filing fee for this action. This proceeding was referred to this 19 court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff’s amended complaint and 20 motion for the appointment of counsel are now before the court. 21 I. Motion for the Appointment of Counsel 22 Plaintiff has requested appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme Court has 23 ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 24 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional 25 circumstances, the district court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 26 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. 27 Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 28 The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s 1 likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in 2 light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 3 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances 4 common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not 5 establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of 6 counsel. In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. 7 II. Screening Requirement 8 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 9 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 10 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 11 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 12 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 13 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 14 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 15 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 16 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 17 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 18 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 19 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 20 A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 21 which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 22 support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 23 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 24 Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 25 this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. 26 Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light 27 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor, Jenkins v. 28 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 1 III. Allegations of the Amended Complaint 2 At all times relevant to the allegations in the amended complaint, plaintiff was a disabled 3 inmate at the California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”). Plaintiff’s specific disability requires 4 him to use a wheelchair. The 93 page amended complaint in this case is based on events 5 occurring between July 2018 and December 2022. Plaintiff sues over 20 different prison officials 6 ranging from supervisory staff such as the prison warden, correctional officers, and various 7 medical staff at CHCF. The amended complaint consists of a lengthy run-on narrative about a 8 vast array of issues including plaintiff’s medical care, his disciplinary proceedings, the condition 9 of the water at the prison, his property that was confiscated, as well as the use of violence against 10 him by other inmates. 11 IV. Legal Standards 12 The following legal standards are provided based on plaintiff’s pro se status as well as the 13 nature of the allegations in the complaint. 14 A. Linkage 15 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 16 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 17 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 18 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 19 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 20 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 21 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 22 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 23 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 24 plaintiff's federal rights. 25 B. Joinder of Parties and Claims 26 A plaintiff may properly assert multiple claims against a single defendant in a civil action. 27 Fed. Rule Civ. P. 18. In addition, a plaintiff may join multiple defendants in one action where 28 “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to 1 or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences” and 2 “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 20(a)(2).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL A. CRAIG, No. 2:22-cv-01874 DAD- AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 GENA JONES, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has paid the filing fee for this action. This proceeding was referred to this 19 court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff’s amended complaint and 20 motion for the appointment of counsel are now before the court. 21 I. Motion for the Appointment of Counsel 22 Plaintiff has requested appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme Court has 23 ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 24 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional 25 circumstances, the district court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 26 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. 27 Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 28 The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s 1 likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in 2 light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 3 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances 4 common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not 5 establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of 6 counsel. In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. 7 II. Screening Requirement 8 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 9 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 10 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 11 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 12 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 13 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 14 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 15 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 16 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 17 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 18 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 19 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 20 A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 21 which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 22 support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 23 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 24 Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 25 this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. 26 Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light 27 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor, Jenkins v. 28 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 1 III. Allegations of the Amended Complaint 2 At all times relevant to the allegations in the amended complaint, plaintiff was a disabled 3 inmate at the California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”). Plaintiff’s specific disability requires 4 him to use a wheelchair. The 93 page amended complaint in this case is based on events 5 occurring between July 2018 and December 2022. Plaintiff sues over 20 different prison officials 6 ranging from supervisory staff such as the prison warden, correctional officers, and various 7 medical staff at CHCF. The amended complaint consists of a lengthy run-on narrative about a 8 vast array of issues including plaintiff’s medical care, his disciplinary proceedings, the condition 9 of the water at the prison, his property that was confiscated, as well as the use of violence against 10 him by other inmates. 11 IV. Legal Standards 12 The following legal standards are provided based on plaintiff’s pro se status as well as the 13 nature of the allegations in the complaint. 14 A. Linkage 15 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 16 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 17 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 18 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 19 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 20 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 21 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 22 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 23 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 24 plaintiff's federal rights. 25 B. Joinder of Parties and Claims 26 A plaintiff may properly assert multiple claims against a single defendant in a civil action. 27 Fed. Rule Civ. P. 18. In addition, a plaintiff may join multiple defendants in one action where 28 “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to 1 or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences” and 2 “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 20(a)(2). However, unrelated claims against different defendants must be pursued in separate 4 lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is intended “not only 5 to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to 6 ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 7 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the 8 required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id. 9 C. Supervisory Liability 10 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their 11 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) 12 (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, 13 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own 14 misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between 15 the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a 16 plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or 17 directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act 18 to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 19 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). 20 D. Deliberate Indifference 21 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 22 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 23 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 24 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 25 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 26 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 27 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 28 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 1 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 2 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 3 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 4 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 5 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 6 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 7 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 8 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 9 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 10 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 11 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 12 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 13 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 14 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 15 approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 16 showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 17 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 18 difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 19 a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 20 treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 21 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 22 medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 23 indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 24 Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 25 prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 26 known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 27 //// 28 //// 1 E. Conditions of Confinement 2 In order for a prison official to be held liable for alleged unconstitutional conditions of 3 confinement, the prisoner must allege facts that satisfy a two-prong test. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 4 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The first prong is an objective 5 prong, which requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. 6 & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). In order to be 7 sufficiently serious, the prison official’s “act or omission must result in the denial of the ‘minimal 8 civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074. The objective prong is not 9 satisfied in cases where prison officials provide prisoners with “adequate shelter, food, clothing, 10 sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 11 2000) (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)). “[R]outine discomfort 12 inherent in the prison setting” does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Johnson v. 13 Lewis, 217 F.3d at 732 (“[m]ore modest deprivations can also form the objective basis of a 14 violation, but only if such deprivations are lengthy or ongoing”). Rather, extreme deprivations 15 are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying 16 the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an 17 Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 18 (1992). The circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical in determining 19 whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth 20 Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d at 731. 21 The second prong focuses on the subjective intent of the prison official. Peralta, 774 F.3d 22 at 1082 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The deliberate indifference standard 23 requires a showing that the prison official acted or failed to act despite the prison official’s 24 knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 25 842); see also Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991). Mere 26 negligence on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability. Farmer, 511 27 U.S. at 835. 28 //// 1 V. Analysis 2 The court finds the allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint so vague and conclusory 3 that it is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for 4 relief. The court has determined that the amended complaint does not contain a short and plain 5 statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible 6 pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and 7 succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must 8 allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that 9 support plaintiff's claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. 10 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the amended complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. 11 The court will, however, grant plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. 12 If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how 13 the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s federal constitutional or 14 statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the second amended 15 complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no 16 liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a 17 defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. 18 Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 19 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights 20 violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 21 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 22 make plaintiff’s second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 23 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 24 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 25 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the original 26 pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended complaint, as 27 in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 28 alleged. 1 VI. ‘Plain Language Summary for Unrepresented Party 2 Since plaintiff is acting as his own attorney in this case, the court wants to make sure that 3 || the words of this order are understood. The following information is meant to explain this order 4 | in plain English and is not intended as legal advice. 5 The court has reviewed the allegations in your amended complaint and determined that 6 || they do not state any claim against the defendants because they are merely conclusory statements 7 || without any facts to support them. The amended complaint is too vague to determine which 8 | defendant did what action that injured you in violation of a constitutional right. 9 Although you are not required to do so, you may file a second amended complaint within 10 || 30 days from the date of this order that is no more than 25 pages in length. This amended 11 || complaint should include: 1) the name of defendant(s); 2) the action(s) each defendant performed 12 | or failed to perform; 3) the date or time frame of their action(s); 4) how the action caused injury 13 || to you; and, 5) the specific constitutional provision the defendant(s)’ action violated. 14 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 23) is denied without 16 || prejudice. 17 2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second 18 || amended complaint that is no longer than 25 pages in length. The second amended complaint 19 || must bear the docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended 20 || Complaint.” 21 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the civil complaint form used 22 || in this district. 23 4. Failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in 24 || arecommendation that this action be dismissed. 25 || DATED: May 23, 2024 ~ 26 Hhthtin— Clare ALLISON CLAIRE 27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28