(PC) Cox v. Daram

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJuly 31, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-01295
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Cox v. Daram ((PC) Cox v. Daram) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Cox v. Daram, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERNEST LEE COX, Jr., No. 2:20-cv-1295 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 VASUKI DARAM, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 18 1983. Before the court are plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, plaintiff’s complaint 19 for screening, plaintiff’s renewed motion for a temporary restraining order, and plaintiff’s request 20 for the appointment of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, this court grants plaintiff’s 21 motion to proceed in forma pauperis, finds plaintiff has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment 22 claim against all defendants, and gives plaintiff the choice of either proceeding on his cognizable 23 Eighth Amendment claim or amending his complaint to attempt to state additional claims. This 24 court addresses plaintiff’s motions for a temporary restraining order and for the appointment of 25 counsel by separate order. 26 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 27 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 28 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 1 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 3 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 4 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 5 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 6 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 7 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 8 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 9 1915(b)(2). 10 SCREENING 11 I. Legal Standards for Civil Rights Complaints 12 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 13 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 14 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 15 that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 16 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 17 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 18 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke 19 v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 20 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably 21 meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 22 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an 23 arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal 24 Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 25 pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 26 the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 27 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 28 //// 1 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain 2 more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 3 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 4 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 5 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 6 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 7 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 8 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 9 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 10 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 11 or other proper proceeding for redress. 12 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 13 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 14 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 15 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 16 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform 17 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 18 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 19 II. Analysis 20 A. Allegations of the Complaint 21 Plaintiff is an inmate at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). He identifies four defendants: 22 (1) Dr. Vasuki Daram; (2) I. Bal, Chief Medical Executive, MCSP; (3) M. Williams, Associate 23 Warden of Health Care, MCSP; and (4) T. Patterson, Chief Executive Officer, MCSP. 24 Plaintiff alleges that he was prescribed a continuous positive airway pressure (“CPAP”) 25 machine to treat his sleep apnea. Sleep apnea causes him to stop breathing while sleeping. 26 Plaintiff also suffers from prostate cancer, for which he is currently being treated with 27 chemotherapy, and hypertension. 28 //// 1 Plaintiff alleges that on April 10, 2020, officials at MCSP removed the electrical cord plaintiff 2 requires to run his CPAP machine. Plaintiff was informed that MCSP officials had determined 3 that the use of CPAP machines could contribute to the spread of the COVID-19 virus. A couple 4 days later, the MCSP warden issued a statement that inmates who require CPAP machines would 5 be moved to single cells so that they could continue to use them. 6 Plaintiff requested he be permitted to continue to use his CPAP machine. On May 6, plaintiff 7 was interviewed by defendant Daram regarding his request.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Jenkins v. McKeithen
395 U.S. 411 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.
534 U.S. 506 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
United States v. Daniel Isaac Drake
673 F.2d 15 (First Circuit, 1982)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Lee v. City of Los Angeles
250 F.3d 668 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Duvall v. County of Kitsap
260 F.3d 1124 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Lovell v. Chandler
303 F.3d 1039 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
Johnson v. Duffy
588 F.2d 740 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Cox v. Daram, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-cox-v-daram-caed-2020.