(PC) Correa v. Bravdrick

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 22, 2021·No. 1:19-cv-00369·Unknown

Opinion

ANGELO CORREA, Case No. 1:19-cv-00369-DAD-JLT (PC)

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND EXCUSE PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO EXHAUST BRAUDRICK, et al., (Doc. 37) Defendants. 21-DAY DEADLINE Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Doc. 37.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion be denied and that Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust be excused. Defendants filed their exhaustion-based motion for summary judgment on July 27, 2020. (Doc. 37.) After receiving two extensions of time (Docs. 39, 41), Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 5, 2020 (Doc. 42), to which Defendants filed a reply on October 14, 2020 (Doc. 43). On December 28, 2020, the Court found that there was a dispute of a material fact regarding whether an administrative remedy was available, which required a credibility determination to resolve. (Doc. 50 at 7.) Accordingly, the Court set an evidentiary hearing on this matter. (Id.) The Court held the evidentiary hearing on March 9, 2021. (Doc. 57.) This matter is now ripe for a decision on the summary-judgment motion as well as to resolve the dispute of fact. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Wasco State Prison. Defs.’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 1 (Doc. 37-3 at 1). Defendants Braudrick, Maddux, and Salinas were employed at the prison as a correctional officer, a correctional sergeant, and a psychiatric technician, respectively. Id. ¶ 2; Pl.’s Compl. 2-3 (Doc. 24 at 2-3). In his operative, first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected him to excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs on March 22, 2017. Pl.’s Compl. 2-8; Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 3-6. Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint in this action on February 26, 2020. (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the alleged incident of excessive force and deliberate indifference on September 20, 2017. Feliciano Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 37-6 at 9-13). In the grievance, Plaintiff states that he filed three other “602 complaints” (i.e., grievances) against Defendants Braudrick, Maddux, and Salinas, on April 10, 2017, but that he had not received a response. Id. Prison authorities cancelled the September 20, 2017 grievance at the second level of review for exceeding time limitations. Id. In his supporting declaration, Plaintiff states that he submitted three “602 complaints” on April 10, 2017, to a correctional officer “working second shift” in the “ad.-seg. building D6 - B side.” Pl.’s Decl. 1 (Doc. 42 at 33.) Plaintiff states that he was then transferred to California State Prison, Corcoran, and did not return to Wasco State Prison until four months later. Id. Plaintiff states that he filed a “22 request form” inquiring about not having received a response to his complaints. Id. 2. An exhibit to a declaration submitted in support of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment includes a CDCR 22 form or “Inmate/Parolee Request for Interview, Item, or Service,” filed by Plaintiff, in which Plaintiff wrote that he submitted “3 602 complaints” against Defendants “about an incident that happen[ed] on 3/22/2017.” Feliciano Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 37-6 at 15.) Plaintiff filed an appeal of the September 2017 cancellation on December 7, 2017. Feliciano Decl. Ex. E (Doc. 37-6 at 133-35.) Therein, Plaintiff states that he submitted an appeal authorities cancelled the appeal for exceeding time limitations on December 8, 2017. Id. Plaintiff then submitted an appeal directly to the third level of review, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Office of Appeals. Moseley Decl. Ex. B (Doc. 37-5 at 8-39). The Office of Appeals rejected the appeal, in part, because Plaintiff had bypassed the lower levels of review. Id. Between the date of the incident and the date on which Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint, the Office of Appeals did not accept or adjudicate on the merits any of Plaintiff’s grievances concerning the incidents underlying this action. See Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 8-9. A. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party “initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment … is satisfied.” Id. at 323. B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory and “unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). Inmates are required to “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006). The exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner or offered by the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the defendant must plead and prove. Jon

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