SAAHDI COLEMAN, No. 2:21-cv-00625-TLN-EFB (PC) Plaintiff, v. ORDER CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 12, 2022, the court screened plaintiff’s amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and found that plaintiff’s complaint contained significant portions that were illegible and scattershot allegations in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. ECF No. 25. The court granted plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint, but plaintiff failed to do so within the time granted by the court. Thus, on June 16, 2022, the court recommended that the district judge dismiss the case. ECF No. 26. However, that same day, plaintiff filed a motion seeking additional time to file the second amended complaint. ECF No. 27. Consequently, the court held the recommendation of dismissal in abeyance to allow plaintiff additional time. ECF No. 28. Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on August 10, 2022, which is now before the court for screening. I. Screening Requirement Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). II. Screening Order Plaintiff pursues claims based on the Eighth Amendment and the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution against fifteen defendants: (1) the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; (2) Jeff Lynch, warden at California State Prison – Sacramento (CSP-Sac) and member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing; (3) Dr. Morgan, head of the Short-Term Restricted Housing Unit (STRH Unit) at CSP-Sac and member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing; (4) Thompson, STRH Unit psychologist at CSP-Sac; (5) Collinsworth, correctional sergeant at CSP-Sac and member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing; (6) S. Manson, correctional sergeant at CSP-Sac; (7) Tyler, registered nurse on the CSP-Sac STRH Unit; (8) J. Stewart, member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing at CSP-Sac; (9) E. Jones, member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing at CSP-Sac; (10) B. Frericks, correctional officer on the STRH Unit; (11) B. Nguyen, correctional officer on the STRH Unit; (12) Burkheart, correctional officer on the STRH Unit; (13) J. Kelly, correctional officer on the STRH Unit; (14) J. Frederick, correctional counselor on the STRH Unit; and (15) D. Contreras, correctional counselor on the STRH Unit and member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing. ECF No. 30 at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that defendants subjected him to unconstitutionally-lengthy solitary confinement for 10 months in the CSP-Sac STRH Unit and in unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and then retaliated against him for grieving those conditions. According to plaintiff, the defendants participated in an “STRH brotherhood” that conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights and to cover up for one another. It is not always clear from the second amended complaint which claims plaintiff wishes to pursue against which defendants. However, after careful review, the court finds that plaintiff has stated potentially cognizable claims against fourteen of the fifteen listed defendants, as follows. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted). To state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a prisoner must allege facts showing five elements: (1) that a state actor took some adverse action against him (2) because of (3) his protected conduct, (4) that such action chilled his exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) that the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff need not allege that his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed, but merely that the defendant’s conduct was such as would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities. Id. at 568-69. Conduct protected by the First Amendment includes communications that are “part of the grievance process.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff alleges that an institutional classification committee consisting of defendants Lynch, Stewart, Jones, Morgan, Frederick, Contreras, and Collinsworth transferred him to CSP- Sac’s STRH Unit on May 1, 2020. These defendants allegedly elected to keep plaintiff confined there at five successive committee meetings for a total period of 10 months, even though a standing court order required his transfer out of the unit within 72 hours of May 6, 2020. //// According to plaintiff, staff on the STRH Unit “operated like an organized gang or brotherhood” and retaliated against inmates who tried to report staff misconduct. Members of this “brotherhood” wore a “distinctive neck covering and wristband.” Plaintiff “witnessed defendants Jeff Lynch, Dr. Morgan, J. Frederick, D. Contreras, J. Stewart, G. Jones, Sergeant Collinsworth and Sergeant S. Manson giving out handshakes, arm punches, or back slaps after [plaintiff] had just been attacked by defendant Tyler, or B. Freriks, or B. Nguyen or Burkheart.” Plaintiff alleges that he was denied clean clothes, underwear, warm showers, light, warmth, necessary COVID-19 protective gear, and proper ventilation in the STRH Unit. He claims that the unit showers were filthy and that, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, defendants Freriks, Nguyen, and Burkheart refused to disinfect recreational yard cages, telephones, or showers. Unspecified defendants “denied all sanitation and hygiene protocols” to plaintiff. On June 10, 2020, plaintiff informed the defendants on the classification committee that he was being denied clean clothes and bedding and that staff members were disregarding COVID-19 safety protocols. After the committee meeting, defendant Collinsworth pressed his elbow into plaintiff’s throat and said, “You’re not in gen-pop anymore. We don’t tolerate whistle blowers back here. We deal with everything in house. If you want to make it out of here in one piece, I sugge
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SAAHDI COLEMAN, No. 2:21-cv-00625-TLN-EFB (PC) Plaintiff, v. ORDER CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 12, 2022, the court screened plaintiff’s amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and found that plaintiff’s complaint contained significant portions that were illegible and scattershot allegations in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. ECF No. 25. The court granted plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint, but plaintiff failed to do so within the time granted by the court. Thus, on June 16, 2022, the court recommended that the district judge dismiss the case. ECF No. 26. However, that same day, plaintiff filed a motion seeking additional time to file the second amended complaint. ECF No. 27. Consequently, the court held the recommendation of dismissal in abeyance to allow plaintiff additional time. ECF No. 28. Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on August 10, 2022, which is now before the court for screening. I. Screening Requirement Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). II. Screening Order Plaintiff pursues claims based on the Eighth Amendment and the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution against fifteen defendants: (1) the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; (2) Jeff Lynch, warden at California State Prison – Sacramento (CSP-Sac) and member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing; (3) Dr. Morgan, head of the Short-Term Restricted Housing Unit (STRH Unit) at CSP-Sac and member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing; (4) Thompson, STRH Unit psychologist at CSP-Sac; (5) Collinsworth, correctional sergeant at CSP-Sac and member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing; (6) S. Manson, correctional sergeant at CSP-Sac; (7) Tyler, registered nurse on the CSP-Sac STRH Unit; (8) J. Stewart, member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing at CSP-Sac; (9) E. Jones, member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing at CSP-Sac; (10) B. Frericks, correctional officer on the STRH Unit; (11) B. Nguyen, correctional officer on the STRH Unit; (12) Burkheart, correctional officer on the STRH Unit; (13) J. Kelly, correctional officer on the STRH Unit; (14) J. Frederick, correctional counselor on the STRH Unit; and (15) D. Contreras, correctional counselor on the STRH Unit and member of the institutional classification committees concerning plaintiff’s housing. ECF No. 30 at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that defendants subjected him to unconstitutionally-lengthy solitary confinement for 10 months in the CSP-Sac STRH Unit and in unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and then retaliated against him for grieving those conditions. According to plaintiff, the defendants participated in an “STRH brotherhood” that conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights and to cover up for one another. It is not always clear from the second amended complaint which claims plaintiff wishes to pursue against which defendants. However, after careful review, the court finds that plaintiff has stated potentially cognizable claims against fourteen of the fifteen listed defendants, as follows. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted). To state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a prisoner must allege facts showing five elements: (1) that a state actor took some adverse action against him (2) because of (3) his protected conduct, (4) that such action chilled his exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) that the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff need not allege that his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed, but merely that the defendant’s conduct was such as would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities. Id. at 568-69. Conduct protected by the First Amendment includes communications that are “part of the grievance process.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff alleges that an institutional classification committee consisting of defendants Lynch, Stewart, Jones, Morgan, Frederick, Contreras, and Collinsworth transferred him to CSP- Sac’s STRH Unit on May 1, 2020. These defendants allegedly elected to keep plaintiff confined there at five successive committee meetings for a total period of 10 months, even though a standing court order required his transfer out of the unit within 72 hours of May 6, 2020. //// According to plaintiff, staff on the STRH Unit “operated like an organized gang or brotherhood” and retaliated against inmates who tried to report staff misconduct. Members of this “brotherhood” wore a “distinctive neck covering and wristband.” Plaintiff “witnessed defendants Jeff Lynch, Dr. Morgan, J. Frederick, D. Contreras, J. Stewart, G. Jones, Sergeant Collinsworth and Sergeant S. Manson giving out handshakes, arm punches, or back slaps after [plaintiff] had just been attacked by defendant Tyler, or B. Freriks, or B. Nguyen or Burkheart.” Plaintiff alleges that he was denied clean clothes, underwear, warm showers, light, warmth, necessary COVID-19 protective gear, and proper ventilation in the STRH Unit. He claims that the unit showers were filthy and that, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, defendants Freriks, Nguyen, and Burkheart refused to disinfect recreational yard cages, telephones, or showers. Unspecified defendants “denied all sanitation and hygiene protocols” to plaintiff. On June 10, 2020, plaintiff informed the defendants on the classification committee that he was being denied clean clothes and bedding and that staff members were disregarding COVID-19 safety protocols. After the committee meeting, defendant Collinsworth pressed his elbow into plaintiff’s throat and said, “You’re not in gen-pop anymore. We don’t tolerate whistle blowers back here. We deal with everything in house. If you want to make it out of here in one piece, I suggest you learn how to play by our rules, you are a guest in our house.” After this confrontation, Collinsworth began housing inmates with severe mental illness on the same tier as plaintiff “because he knew they would scream and bang on the doors all night so that I couldn’t sleep.” Other staff who wore the distinctive neck covering and wrist band of the brotherhood began to make degrading comments to plaintiff during strip searches and depriving him of phone calls, showers, and yard time. When plaintiff asked Collinsworth to stop the ongoing harassment, Collinsworth said, “This is just a small taste of the pain I can inflict on you in my house.” On June 22, 2020, plaintiff and other STRH unit inmates filed a group appeal against Collinsworth and Manson regarding staff harassment and/or an incident in which defendant Tyler (a nurse on the unit) coughed on plaintiff’s cell door after stating that he thought he had been exposed to COVID-19. After submitting the appeal, the cells of the inmates were searched and their property was destroyed while they were on the recreational yard. Manson told the inmates, “I know everything that goes on in my unit. If you and your pals want to tell on me and my officers, I will make your stay back here a living hell.” According to plaintiff, Manson wore a distinctive neck covering and wristband of what plaintiff characterizes as the STRH brotherhood. Plaintiff filed another grievance on August 20, 2020, concerning his belief that STRH staff operated like a gang to harass and intimidate inmates. According to plaintiff, defendant Freriks then came to plaintiff’s cell door wearing his STRH neck covering and told plaintiff that he had “fucked up this time and was a snitch bitch.” Freriks began to slam a metal rod on plaintiff’s door during welfare checks to deprive plaintiff of rest and to make comments about plaintiff’s genitals during strip searches that were audible to everyone on the tier. Freriks also made loud comments about plaintiff’s need for mental health care, which caused other inmates to taunt plaintiff as “weak” and “soft.” Allegedly, this conduct kept plaintiff from being open about his mental health needs for fear that staff and inmates would hear something to use against him. Defendants Tyler, Burkheart, and Nguyen “all started to rile the inmate[s]” to taunt plaintiff when they came on the tier. On September 21, 2020, plaintiff returned to his cell to find that it had been trashed, with pieces of the grievance littered on the floor. Plaintiff reported to his mental health clinicians, defendants Thompson and Morgan, that Freriks had sexually harassed him by making comments about his genitals during a strip search. He also reported it to defendants Lynch, Stewart, Jones, Frederick, Contreras, Collinsworth, and Manson. Plaintiff filed a complaint with appeals coordinator defendant Kelly about the harassment. But none of these defendants responded. Rather, Kelly mis-used his position, providing unfiled inmate grievances to members of the STRH brotherhood so that they could retaliate. On September 23, 2020, plaintiff submitted another grievance concerning the STRH brotherhood. Thereafter, defendant Burkheart, who was sweating and coughing, refused to wear a face mask while escorting plaintiff to the recreation yard. Burkheart referred to plaintiff as a snitch and told him to “worry about whose door is going to accidentally open while you’re on the tier, instead of about that fake news.” Thereafter, plaintiff became sick with a headache, night chills, and loss of his sense of taste. When plaintiff told Burkheart he was unwell, Burkheart told plaintiff that “COVID-19 was ‘fake news’ and that he didn’t have to wear a mask because he’s an American.” Burkheart began to skip plaintiff for COVID testing and temperature checks, and soon defendant Freriks and other STRH Unit staff followed suit. Plaintiff experienced two bouts with COVID-like symptoms but was denied treatment. Plaintiff continued to file grievances in October, November, and December 2020, including appeals to the Chief Inmate Appeals Office. In these appeals, plaintiff complained of the ongoing harassment, poor conditions, and retaliation in the STRH Unit. Plaintiff identified defendants Nguyen, Freriks, Burkheart, Collinsworth, Manson, and Tyler as “key members of an STRH organized gang.” On January 31, 2021, Nguyen came to escort plaintiff to the shower. When plaintiff requested that Nguyen – who appeared to be ill – wear a mask, Nguyen yanked plaintiff out of the shower and took him to a shower with no hot water. Later, Nguyen provided plaintiff with a “fake official looking CDCR document” labeled “Hurt feelings report.” The document identified plaintiff as a snitch. Nguyen told the inmates on the tier that “that’s what happens when you and your buddies file snitch-02s, deal with it.” Nguyen distributed the report among the inmates, who targeted plaintiff with human waste on his way to the recreational yard due to his having been labeled a snitch. The negative effects of the report continue to plague plaintiff and place his safety at risk. For the limited purposes of screening under § 1915A and construed liberally, the second amended complaint states potentially cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Lynch, Morgan, Collinsworth, Manson, Tyler, Stewart, Jones, Frericks, Nguyen, Burkheart, Kelly, Frederick, and Contreras. The second amended complaint also states potentially cognizable First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Collinsworth, Manson, Tyler, Frericks, Nguyen, Burkheart, Kelly, and Frederick. In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment provides a right that protects prisoners from some disclosure of sensitive personal information. Robinson v. Purcell, No. 2:14-cv-0790 MCE AC P, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49641, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2019); see Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff alleges that his STRH Unit Clinician, defendant Thompson, conducted psychiatric appointments with him at his cell door, which allowed staff and other inmates to hear sensitive personal information. Plaintiff has stated a potentially cognizable 14th Amendment claim against defendant Thompson. The second amended complaint fails to state a viable claim against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, because state agencies are immune from § 1983 liability under the 11th Amendment. Brown v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009); Mitchell v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Under the eleventh amendment, agencies of the state are immune from private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court.”).1 Plaintiff may choose to proceed only with the claims identified as cognizable by this order. Alternatively, the court will provide plaintiff with one final opportunity to amend his complaint again to remedy his defective claim against CDCR or further clarify which claims he wishes to pursue against which defendants. He is cautioned that any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving him of his constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). Plaintiff may also include any allegations based on state law that are so closely to his federal allegations that “the form the same case or controversy.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The third amended complaint must also contain a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Nor may he bring multiple, unrelated claims against more than one defendant. Id. 1 A limited exception to the rule barring suit against states exists for suits against state officials, sued in their official capacity, for prospective injunctive relief. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989). Thus, plaintiff may conceivably salvage his claim against CDCR by instead suing the head of CDCR in her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief only. Coleman v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. CV 06-2606-JFW (PJW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131038, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009). I. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. The findings and recommendations issued on June 16, 2022 (ECF No. 26) are hereby VACATED; 2. Plaintiff's second amended complaint (ECF No. 30) states, for screening purposes, potentially cognizable claims as identified in this order against defendants Lynch, Morgan, Thompson, Collinsworth, Manson, Tyler, Stewart, Jones, Freriks, Nguyen, Burkheart, Kelly, Frederick, and Contreras. 3. Plaintiff's claim against CDCR 1s dismissed with leave to amend within 30 days of service of this order. Plaintiff is not obligated to amend his complaint. 4. Within thirty days, plaintiff shall return the notice below advising the court whether he elects to proceed with the cognizable claims or file a third amended complaint. If the former option is selected and returned, the court will enter an order directing service on defendants at that time; 5. Failure to comply with any part of this this order may result in dismissal of this action. DATED: December 21, 2022. Yr b, / A A Wy 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SAAHDI COLEMAN, No. 2:21-cv-00625-TLN-EFB (PC) Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants. In accordance with the court’s Screening Order, plaintiff hereby elects to: (1) ______ proceed only with the First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims identified in the court’s second screening order against defendants Lynch, Morgan, Thompson, Collinsworth, Manson, Tyler, Stewart, Jones, Freriks, Nguyen, Burkheart, Kelly, Frederick, and Contreras; OR (2) ______ delay serving any defendant and file a third amended complaint. _________________________________ Plaintiff Dated: