1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 YAKINI DEANDRE BYRD, Case No. 1:19-cv-01343-JDP 12 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER 13 v. ORDER ALLOWING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT TO PROCEED AGAINST 14 UNKNOWN, UNKNOWN DEFENDANT ON PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE IN 15 Defendant. VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 16 ECF No. 1 17 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 18 SEND PLAINTIFF A COPY OF SUBPOENA FORM AO 88B AND FORM USM-285 19 30 DAY DEADLINE 20 21 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this civil rights action brought 22 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed September 23, 2019, ECF No. 1, is before 23 the court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff alleges that an unknown tower officer 24 violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Plaintiff has stated a 25 cognizable claim against defendant for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 26 As the only defendant in this case is a doe defendant, we will not authorize service of 27 process at this time. Instead, the court will allow plaintiff to subpoena documents from the 28 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that may allow him to identify the doe 1 defendant. If plaintiff succeeds in identifying the doe defendant, he should file a motion to 2 substitute the named individual defendant. 3 Screening and Pleading Requirements 4 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 5 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 6 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 7 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 8 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 9 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 11 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 12 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 13 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 14 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 15 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 16 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 17 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 18 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 19 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 20 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), but may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it appears 21 beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim [that] would 22 entitle him to relief,” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). “‘[A] 23 liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim 24 that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 25 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 26 Discussion 27 Section 1983 allows a private citizen to sue for the deprivation of a right secured by 28 federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017). To 1 state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a defendant acting under color of state law 2 caused an alleged deprivation of a right secured by federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Soo Park 3 v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 2017). 4 The defendant is a state-prison employee who, accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, can 5 be inferred to have acted under color of state law when he shot defendant in the head with a block 6 gun. See Paeste v. Gov’t of Guam, 798 F.3d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[G]enerally, a public 7 employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his 8 responsibilities pursuant to state law.” (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988))). 9 The only issue that remains is whether the alleged shooting of plaintiff by defendant 10 violated federal law. The Eighth Amendment prohibits those who operate our prisons from using 11 “excessive physical force” against inmates. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per curiam); 12 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). For claims arising out of the use of excessive 13 physical force, the core inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or 14 restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 15 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). To facilitate this inquiry, the Supreme Court has articulated five 16 factors to consider: “(1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the need for application of 17 force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat 18 reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity 19 of a forceful response.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 20 Whether the alleged wrongdoing is objectively “harmful enough” to establish a 21 constitutional violation is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 22 8 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 23 cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis 24 uses of physical force. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (concluding that blows directed at inmate which 25 caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth and a cracked dental plate were not de minimis). 26 Conversely, deadly force against an inmate may be constitutionally defensible under some 27 circumstances. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 YAKINI DEANDRE BYRD, Case No. 1:19-cv-01343-JDP 12 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER 13 v. ORDER ALLOWING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT TO PROCEED AGAINST 14 UNKNOWN, UNKNOWN DEFENDANT ON PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE IN 15 Defendant. VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 16 ECF No. 1 17 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 18 SEND PLAINTIFF A COPY OF SUBPOENA FORM AO 88B AND FORM USM-285 19 30 DAY DEADLINE 20 21 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this civil rights action brought 22 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed September 23, 2019, ECF No. 1, is before 23 the court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff alleges that an unknown tower officer 24 violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Plaintiff has stated a 25 cognizable claim against defendant for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 26 As the only defendant in this case is a doe defendant, we will not authorize service of 27 process at this time. Instead, the court will allow plaintiff to subpoena documents from the 28 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that may allow him to identify the doe 1 defendant. If plaintiff succeeds in identifying the doe defendant, he should file a motion to 2 substitute the named individual defendant. 3 Screening and Pleading Requirements 4 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 5 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 6 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 7 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 8 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 9 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 11 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 12 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 13 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 14 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 15 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 16 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 17 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 18 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 19 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 20 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), but may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it appears 21 beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim [that] would 22 entitle him to relief,” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). “‘[A] 23 liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim 24 that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 25 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 26 Discussion 27 Section 1983 allows a private citizen to sue for the deprivation of a right secured by 28 federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017). To 1 state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a defendant acting under color of state law 2 caused an alleged deprivation of a right secured by federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Soo Park 3 v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 2017). 4 The defendant is a state-prison employee who, accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, can 5 be inferred to have acted under color of state law when he shot defendant in the head with a block 6 gun. See Paeste v. Gov’t of Guam, 798 F.3d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[G]enerally, a public 7 employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his 8 responsibilities pursuant to state law.” (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988))). 9 The only issue that remains is whether the alleged shooting of plaintiff by defendant 10 violated federal law. The Eighth Amendment prohibits those who operate our prisons from using 11 “excessive physical force” against inmates. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per curiam); 12 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). For claims arising out of the use of excessive 13 physical force, the core inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or 14 restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 15 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). To facilitate this inquiry, the Supreme Court has articulated five 16 factors to consider: “(1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the need for application of 17 force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat 18 reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity 19 of a forceful response.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. 20 Whether the alleged wrongdoing is objectively “harmful enough” to establish a 21 constitutional violation is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency. Id. at 22 8 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 23 cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis 24 uses of physical force. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (concluding that blows directed at inmate which 25 caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth and a cracked dental plate were not de minimis). 26 Conversely, deadly force against an inmate may be constitutionally defensible under some 27 circumstances. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326 (1986) (holding that shooting an inmate 28 to restore prison security during a riot did not violate the Eighth Amendment). 1 In this case, plaintiff has alleged that he was shot in the head with a block gun by 2 defendant, a tower officer, while plaintiff was also being beaten by other inmates. See ECF No. 1 3 at 3, 7, 10. Plaintiff also asserts that the manner of the shooting violated CDCR policy. See id. at 4 3. Plaintiff has pled serious injury and that the application of force was not needed. Based upon 5 plaintiff’s allegations, the court finds that plaintiff has stated a cognizable excessive force claim 6 against defendant. 7 Conclusion and Order 8 The court has screened plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it states a cognizable claim 9 against defendant for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 10 The court will allow plaintiff to subpoena documents from the California Department of 11 Corrections and Rehabilitation that may allow him to identify the doe defendant. When 12 completing the subpoena form AO 88B, plaintiff should identify with specificity the documents 13 he is seeking. Once plaintiff has completed and returned subpoena form AO 88B and form USM- 14 285, the court will direct the United States Marshals Service to serve the subpoena on the 15 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The court notes that it may limit 16 plaintiff’s request for production of documents. 17 If plaintiff can identify the doe defendant, he should file a motion to substitute. 18 Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that: 19 1. This action proceed against defendant on plaintiff’s claim for excessive force in 20 violation of the Eighth Amendment; 21 2. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of subpoena form AO 88B 22 and a copy of form USM-285; 23 3. Plaintiff has thirty days from the date of service of this order to complete and 24 return subpoena form AO 88B and form USM-285; 25 4. Plaintiff has 120 days from the date of service of this order to file a motion to 26 substitute a named defendant in place of Unknown; and 27 5. Failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action.
28 1 > IT IS SO ORDERED. V4), —N prssann — Dated: _ February 25, 2020 4 UNI STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 5 6 | No. 204. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28