(PC) Burpee v. Huff

Opinion

TODD D. BURPEE, Case No. 1:21-cv-00297-KES-HBK Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT1 FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD Defendant. (Doc. No. 36) Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 36, “MSJ”). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant Defendant’s MSJ on Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim. A. Procedural History and Allegations in Operative Complaint On March 2, 2021, Plaintiff Todd Burpee initiated this action while confined at California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). (Doc. No. 1). On July 28, 2023, the undersigned recommended that this action proceed solely against Sergeant Huff and an unknown correctional officer on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim. (Doc. No. 10). On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice electing to proceed solely on the claim found 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2023). cognizable. (Doc. No. 11). On November 14, 2023, the Court issued an order to show cause,

directing Plaintiff to provide additional identifying information so that the unknown correctional

officer could be served. (Doc. No. 20). On February 13, 2024, the undersigned recommended

that the doe defendant be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule 4 of Civil Procedure because

Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient information to identify and locate the unknown correctional

officer for service of process. (Doc. No. 25). On June 17, 2024, the District Judge adopted the

magistrate’s Findings and Recommendations in full. (Doc. No. 35).

In relevant part, Plaintiff asserts, while housed at Valley State Prison (“VSP”), he ordered

a Rastafarian crown and medallion in late May 2020 from a CDCR approved vendor. (Doc. No.

1 at 2-4). On June 25, 2020, Plaintiff went to the Receiving and Release Department to pick up the crown and medallion but the unknown correctional officer working at the Receiving and Release Department would not give Plaintiff the two items because the crown had the color red on it and the medallion was larger than 1.5 inches. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff disputes that the Rastafarian crown and medallion violate the guidelines established by CDCR’s Religious Personal Property Matrix. (Id.). The unknown correctional officer spoke with Defendant Huff who affirmed the unknown correctional officer’s decision and refused to give Plaintiff his Rastafarian crown or medallion. (Id.). Plaintiff states other “similarly situated” inmates were the same two religious items that he was denied. (Id. at 6). As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 10). B. Operative Pleadings On June 3, 2025, Defendant filed his MSJ. (Doc. No. 36). Supporting his MSJ, Defendant submits: (1) a memorandum of points and authorities (Doc. No. 36); (2) a statement of undisputed material facts (Doc No. 36-1); (3) the declaration of Huff (Doc. No. 36-2); (4) Exhibit A to Huff’s declaration (Doc. No. 36-3); (5) the declaration of Castro (Doc. No. 36-4); (6) Exhibit A to Castro’s declaration (Doc. No. 36-5); (7) the declaration of Matsumura (Doc. No. 36-6); and (8) Exhibit A to Matsumura’s declaration (Doc. No. 36-7). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish the existence of a class because he is unable to identify any of the other inmates who possessed the items he was denied, and is unable to establish that those inmates received the items from Defendant Huff. (Doc. No. 36 at 2). Further, Defendant denied Plaintiff the possession of a

Rastafarian crown and medallion because the items violated CDCR’s Religious Personal Property

Matrix and not based on any discriminatory intent. (Id.). Finally, Defendant asserts he is entitled

to qualified immunity as it was not clear to him at the time of the incident that the actions he took

would violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Id.)

On August 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed his response in opposition to Defendant’s MSJ. (Doc.

No. 41). In support, Plaintiff submits: (1) a memorandum of points and authorities (id. at 1–4);

(2) and various exhibits including invoices, photos of the items ordered, and CDCR’s Religious

Personal Property Matrix (id. at 6–20). Plaintiff’s response does not include a response to

Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts. In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that the religious items were wrongfully disallowed because they were purchased from an approved CDCR vendor. (Id. 1-2). Further, Plaintiff points out that the Rastafarian crown and medallion should have been allowed because inmates may possess multicolored items if they do not appear to be predominantly one of the restricted colors (green, black, brown, tan, red, or blue), and the Rastafarian crown was predominantly white. (Id. at 3). Defendant filed a timely reply. (Doc. No. 42). Defendant points out that Plaintiff opposition fails to address the equal protection claim and instead focusses on whether the religious items violated CDCR Religious Personal Property Matrix. (Id. at 2). A. Summary Judgment Standard The “purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment should be entered “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the “initial responsibility” of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Id. at 323. An issue of material fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence

for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, while a fact is material if it “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party

to present specific facts that show there to be a genuine issue of a material fact. See Fed R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. An opposing party “must do more than simply show that

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The

party is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that a factual dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party is not required to establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). However, “failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving party demonstrated there is no genuine issue of material fact and showed judgment to be appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). “[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002). A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to establish a genuine dispute to defeat an otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion. Anderson., 477 U.S. at 252. However, where “opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record” courts “should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

Plaintiff’s verified complaint may serve as an affidavit in opposition to summary

judgment if based on personal knowledge and specific facts admissible in evidence. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, a complaint’s conclusory

allegations unsupported by specific facts, will not be sufficient to avoid summary judgment.

Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). And,

where a plaintiff fails to properly challenge the facts asserted by the defendant, the plaintiff may

be deemed to have admitted the validity of those facts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

The undersigned has carefully reviewed and considered all arguments, points and authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, if any, objections, and other papers filed by the parties. The omission to an argument, document, paper, or objection is not to be construed that the undersigned did not consider the argument, document, paper, or objection. Instead, the undersigned thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence it deemed admissible, material, and appropriate for purposes of issuing these Findings and Recommendations. B. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “No State shall . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people equally.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). There are two different ways in which a plaintiff may state an equal protection claim. A plaintiff’s first option is to allege “facts plausibly showing that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based upon membership in a protected class[.]” Id. (quoting Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005)). The second way a plaintiff may state a claim is “as a ‘class of one’ by alleging that [the] plaintiff has ‘been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the treatment[.]” Koboyashi v. McMulling, 2022 WL 3137958, at *23 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2022) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). The Supreme Court has held that for equal protection purposes, race is a suspect distinction. City of

New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).

A. Undisputed Material Facts

Defendant provides a statement of undisputed material facts. (Doc. No. 36-1). Each

listed fact cites to sworn declarations, deposition testimony, and the complaint. (See generally

id.). In his Response, Plaintiff fails to include a response to Defendant’s statement of undisputed

facts or his own statement of undisputed facts. (See Doc. No. 41).

Where Plaintiff’s Response implicitly argues that Defendant’s undisputed facts are

inaccurate and his argument is based solely on conclusory statements or the complaint, and lacks detailed facts, while Defendant provides detailed facts or documentary evidence in support, the Court generally does not find Plaintiff’s objections sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also FTC v. Publishing Clearing House, 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A conclusory, self- serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.”). Having reviewed the record, the undersigned finds the following facts to be material and undisputed, unless otherwise noted. • On June 25, 2020, Plaintiff Burpee went to the Receiving and Release (“R&R”) Department of Valley State Prison to pick up special purchase religious items. The Correctional Sergeant assigned to the Receiving and Release Department at that time was Defendant Huff. (Doc. No. 1 at 2, 4). • The items Plaintiff had ordered and attempted to pick up included a Rastafarian Crown and a rasta medallion. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). • California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) Religious Personal Property Matrix (“RPPM”) states that all religious medallions may not exceed a diameter of one and a half (1.5) inches. (Doc. No. 36-2 at 2 ¶4; Doc. No. 36-3 at 2-3). • The RPPM states that any Rastafarian Crowns may only be “white, gray, or multicolored (no red or blue).” (Doc. No. 36-3 at 2). • The rasta medallion that Plaintiff had ordered was approximately two inches in diameter.

(Doc. No. 36-7 at 3-18, “Burpee Depo. Tr.” at 15:19-21).

• The Rastafarian Crown was predominantly white with a thin strip of red, green, and

yellow. (Burpee Depo. Tr. at 15:25-16:10).

• On June 25, 2020, Plaintiff was denied the items by an unknown correctional officer due

to the medallion being too large and the crown containing a restricted color (red). (Doc.

No. 1 at 4).

• Plaintiff informed the officer that he had ordered the items from an approved vendor of

the CDCR, and the officer then consulted with Defendant Huff. (Doc. No. 1 at 4).

• Defendant Huff stated that Plaintiff could not have the items because the crown contained red, and the medallion was bigger than 1.5 inches. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). • Plaintiff then initiated the grievance process regarding the items, which resulted in an interview with Defendant Huff on July 14, 2020. During the interview, Defendant Huff again stated that the crown was not allowed because the RPPM specified that items could not contain the color red, and that the medallion was not allowed because it was larger than 1.5 inches. (Doc. No. 1 at 5). • Plaintiff possesses a copy of a receipt another inmate received at the time he got his Rastafarian crown, which Plaintiff alleges is the exact same crown he was denied, from the R&R. The other inmate did not order a medallion. (Burpee Depo. Tr. at 20:5-21:3). • This inmate received the crown from a correctional officer named Mendoza on May 13, 2018, not Defendant Huff. (Burpee Depo. Tr. at 21:6-22:8). • Defendant Huff was not working on May 13, 2018, and did not have any control over the R&R Department on that date. (Doc. No. 36-5 at 2; Doc. No. 36-2 at 2 ¶10). • Although Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that other inmates received the same items he was denied, Plaintiff has no evidence establishing that Defendant Huff gave those items to these inmates. Indeed, Plaintiff does not even know the names of those inmates, nor has he spoken to the other inmates about which officer may have provided the items to them, or their experience at R&R. (Doc. No. 1 at 6; Burpee Depo. Tr. at 19:16-24, 22:14-23:10). • Defendant has applied the RPPM equally to every inmate, and did not treat Plaintiff any

differently than he treated any other inmate. (Doc. No. 36-2 at 2 ¶¶11-12).

B. No Intentional Discrimination

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to the same treatment as any other incarcerated person

regardless of his religion. (Doc. No. 41 at 3). Specifically, he argues Defendant “Huff . . .

intentionally [did] not follow the RPPM.” (Doc. No. 41 at 3). In support of his claim, Plaintiff

proffers a receipt from another inmate who received a similar Rastafarian crown from the R&R.

(See Doc. No. 41 at 15; see also Burpee Depo. Tr. at 20:5-21:3). This inmate received the crown

from a correctional officer named Mendoza on May 13, 2018. (Burpee Depo. Tr. at 21:6-22:8).

Defendant argues, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to establish that the alleged discrimination was intentional. (Doc. No. 36 at 1). The Court agrees with Defendant. CDCR’s RPPM states that all religious medallions may not exceed a diameter of one and a half (1.5) inches and that Rastafarian Crowns may only be “white, gray, or multicolored (no red or blue).” (Doc. No. 36-3 at 2-3). Plaintiff testified that the medallion he ordered was two inches in diameter and Rastafarian Crown contained a thin red strip. (Burpee Depo. Tr. at 15:19-16:10). According to Plaintiff, Defendant Huff stated that he could not have the items because the crown contained red, and the medallion was bigger than 1.5 inches. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). The Court finds that Defendant Huff’s application of the RPPM apparently fell squarely within these policy directives—denying the Rastafarian Crown because it contained red and denying the medallion because it exceeded 1.5 inches. Even if Defendant Huff somehow misapplied the RPPM, the record does not support that Defendant Huff’s alleged discrimination was intentional. Defendant declares that he applied the RPPM equally to every inmate, and did not treat Plaintiff any differently than he treated any other inmate. (Doc. No. 36-2 at 2 ¶¶11-12). Moreover, although Plaintiff alleges that other inmates received the same items he was denied, Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence establishing that Defendant Huff gave the items at issue to any other inmate. (Doc. No. 1 at 6; Burpee Depo. Tr. at 19:16-24, 22:14-23:10). Because Plaintiff fails to show that Defendant acted with any discriminatory animus, he is unable to state an equal protection claim. See Uhuru v. Bonnifield, 2025 WL 1225808, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025

WL 1226721 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2025); see also Nible v. Fink, 2019 WL 1547261, at *9 (S.D.

Cal. Apr. 8, 2019) (“Plaintiff cannot carry his burden at trial of proving that Defendants

confiscated his runes with discriminatory intent, or that similarly situated people of different

religions are being treated differently.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2611102

(S.D. Cal. June 26, 2019), aff’d, 828 F. App’x 463 (9th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, the undersigned

recommends that Defendant’s MSJ be granted as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal

Protection Clause claim.

C. Qualified Immunity

In the alternative, Defendant asserts that she is entitled to qualified immunity in this case because no official in her position would believe that their conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the circumstances. A government official is entitled to qualified immunity under Section 1983 unless (1) the official “violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of his conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982). To demonstrate that a right was “clearly established” requires a showing that the statutory or constitutional question was “beyond debate,” such that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589; Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018). This standard is “demanding” and protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). “[A] court typically should identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [the defendant] was held to have violated the constitutional right at issue.” S.B v. County of San Diego, 864 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017)). “Even when no case is ‘directly on point,’ courts may compare relevant factors to determine whether every reasonable officer should have known the conduct in question was unlawful.” Anderson v. Virga, 2018 WL 1556806, *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2018) (citing Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 946–47 (9th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the right alleged was clearly established. Moran v. Washington, 47 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1998). As discussed supra, the Court finds the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff failed to put forth sufficient evidence to establish a constitutional claim. Thus, because the Court finds no constitutional violation, the Court need not address the second prong. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: 1. The District Court GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 36). 2. Judgment be entered in Defendant’s favor and the case closed. These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written objections with the Court. /d.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)()(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). Dated: _ August 27, 2025 Mihaw. Wh. foareh fackte HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE