(PC) Brownlee v. Burnes

District Court, E.D. California·Decided August 22, 2024·No. 1:23-cv-00376·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BENJAMIN JUSTIN BROWNLEE, Case No. 1:23-cv-00376-JLT-HBK (PC)

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A 13 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND 14 J. BURNES, M. RIVERA, P. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION RODRIGUEZ, and J.J. FLORES, 15 (Doc. No. 40) Defendants. 16 FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 17 18 19 Plaintiff Benjamin Justin Brownlee initiated this action as a state prisoner proceeding pro 20 se by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 3, 2023. (Doc. No. 1, 21 “Complaint”). Plaintiff proceeds on his First Amended Complaint, as screened, against 22 Defendants Burnes, Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores. (Doc. Nos. 18, 21, 22, 23, 24). After 23 Defendants were served and the Court issued a Case Management Screening Order, Plaintiff filed 24 the instant “Request for an Order to Show Cause With a Temporary Restraining Order and 25 Preliminary Injunction.” (Doc. No. 40, “Motion”). For the reasons discussed below, the 26 undersigned recommends that the district court deny Plaintiff’s Motion.

27 //// //// 28 1 I. BACKGROUND AND ALLEGED FACTS 2 1. Allegations in FAC 3 Plaintiff proceeds on his First Amended Complaint filed on October 10, 2023. (Doc. No. 4 18, “FAC”). The gravamen of the FAC is that Defendants, all correctional officers at Corcoran 5 State Prison (CSP), physically and sexually assaulted him on July 25, 2018, or failed to intervene 6 in the assault. (Id. at 15-18). 7 2. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 8 Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on July 19, 2024. (Doc. No. 40). Plaintiff’s Motion is 9 directed to the warden of Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJDCF”), where he is 10 currently housed, other unspecified employees at RJDCF, and to “Defendants or/and there [sic] 11 agents” who he contends are impeding his ability to prosecute this case or harassing and 12 retaliating against him in various ways. (Id. at 1-3). 13 Plaintiff asserts his requests for access to the law library are being denied, his personal 14 property has not been returned to him, he has been denied access to the phone and thus cannot 15 contact defense counsel in this case, and mail staff have been interfering with his legal mail. 16 (Id.). Plaintiff implies these actions are being taken under the direction, or on behalf of, the 17 Defendants in this case, and that they are preventing Plaintiff from adequately prosecuting his 18 case. (Id. at 3). 19 II. APPLICABLE LAW 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs injunctions and restraining orders, and 21 requires that a motion for temporary restraining order include “specific facts in an affidavit or a 22 verified complaint [that] clearly show that immediate, and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 23 result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” as well as written 24 certification from the movant’s attorney stating “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons 25 why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 26 Temporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary 27 injunctions, with the exception that preliminary injunctions require notice to the adverse party. 28 See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1126 1 (E.D. Ca. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). Eastern District of California Local Rule 231, 2 however, requires notice for temporary restraining orders as well, “[e]xcept in the most 3 extraordinary of circumstances,” and the court considers whether the applicant could have sought 4 relief by motion for preliminary injunction at an earlier date. Local Rule 231(a)-(b) (E.D. Cal. 5 2019). A temporary restraining order “should be restricted to serving [its] underlying purpose of 6 preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a 7 hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers 8 Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). 9 A temporary restraining order is “an extraordinary remedy” and may be issued only if 10 Plaintiff establishes: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in 11 the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his/her favor; and (4) that 12 an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 13 (2008). Plaintiff bears the burden of clearly satisfying all four prongs. Alliance for the Wild 14 Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A TRO will not issue if Plaintiff merely 15 shows irreparable harm is possible – a showing of likelihood is required. Id. at 1131. The Ninth 16 Circuit also has a second test, holding that a party requesting relief is entitled to a preliminary 17 injunction if it demonstrates: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the 18 possibility of irreparable injury or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of 19 hardships tips sharply in its favor. Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv, 753 F.2d 719, 20 727 (9th Cir. 1985); see also McKinney v. Hill, 925 F.2d at 1470 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting same). 21 However, the injunctive relief an applicant requests must relate to the claims brought in 22 the complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th 23 Cir. 2015) (“When a Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the complaint, 24 the court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.”). Absent a nexus between the injury 25 claimed in the motion and the underlying complaint, the court lacks the authority to grant Plaintiff 26 any relief. Id. at 636. 27 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes additional requirements on prisoner 28 litigants seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. In such cases, 1 “[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to 2 correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means 3 necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); Villery v. California Dep't of Corr., 4 2016 WL 70326, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016). As the Ninth Circuit has observed, the PLRA 5 places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to inmates, 6 and “operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the 7 bargaining power of prison administrators—no longer may courts grant or approve relief that 8 binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” Gilmore v.

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