1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TOM BROWN, No. 2:23-CV-2273-KJM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 JEFF DIRSKE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint. See ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 27 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 28 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 1 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 3 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 4 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 5 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 6 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 7 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 8 9 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 10 Plaintiff, a Stanislaus County inmate, names the following as defendants: (1) Jeff 11 Dirske, the Stanislaus County Sheriff; (2) Stanislaus County; (3) Hoe, a physician with Wellpath; 12 and (4) Wellpath, the medical provider for Stanislaus County jails. See ECF No. 1, pgs. 1, 2. 13 Plaintiff states that he was diagnosed with the need for hip replacement surgery as well as heart 14 problems between February and June 2023. See id. at 3. Upon Plaintiff’s arrest in August 2023, 15 he was taken into custody in Modesto, where he remains. See id. According to Plaintiff, upon 16 his incarceration in Modesto, he notified jail officials of his need for hip surgery and heart 17 treatment. See id. Plaintiff states that he has submitted numerous requests to “medical staff” and 18 that “medical” denies Plaintiff his pain medication. Id. Plaintiff claims that he has been told by 19 jail medical staff on numerous occasions that his conditions are “not life threatening.” Id. 20 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of related defects. Critically, Plaintiff 23 has not alleged facts to show how any of the named defendants are connected to a violation of 24 Plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights. More specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged specific 25 facts to show the liability of Stanislaus County, a municipal entity, or Defendant Dirske, who as 26 the Stanislaus County Sheriff is a supervisory defendant. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 In general, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an 2 actual connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged 3 deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 4 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within 5 the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or 6 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 7 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory 8 allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not 9 sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff 10 must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged 11 constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 12 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts connecting the four named defendants – 13 Dirske, Stanislaus County, Hoe, and Wellpath – to a violation of Plaintiff’s statutory or 14 constitutional rights. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend and, in doing so, should keep the 15 following rules in mind. 16 More specific allegations are required for a municipal defendant such as 17 Stanislaus County. Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” 18 to whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 19 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. 20 at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 21 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 22 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 23 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 24 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 25 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 26 custom of the municipality. See id. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts specific to Stanislaus County, let alone 2 facts indicating that a municipal policy or custom was the cause of a violation of Plaintiff’s 3 statutory or constitutional rights. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend. 4 Specific allegations are also required for supervisory defendants such as Defendant 5 Dirske.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TOM BROWN, No. 2:23-CV-2273-KJM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 JEFF DIRSKE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint. See ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 27 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 28 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 1 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 3 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 4 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 5 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 6 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 7 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 8 9 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 10 Plaintiff, a Stanislaus County inmate, names the following as defendants: (1) Jeff 11 Dirske, the Stanislaus County Sheriff; (2) Stanislaus County; (3) Hoe, a physician with Wellpath; 12 and (4) Wellpath, the medical provider for Stanislaus County jails. See ECF No. 1, pgs. 1, 2. 13 Plaintiff states that he was diagnosed with the need for hip replacement surgery as well as heart 14 problems between February and June 2023. See id. at 3. Upon Plaintiff’s arrest in August 2023, 15 he was taken into custody in Modesto, where he remains. See id. According to Plaintiff, upon 16 his incarceration in Modesto, he notified jail officials of his need for hip surgery and heart 17 treatment. See id. Plaintiff states that he has submitted numerous requests to “medical staff” and 18 that “medical” denies Plaintiff his pain medication. Id. Plaintiff claims that he has been told by 19 jail medical staff on numerous occasions that his conditions are “not life threatening.” Id. 20 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of related defects. Critically, Plaintiff 23 has not alleged facts to show how any of the named defendants are connected to a violation of 24 Plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights. More specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged specific 25 facts to show the liability of Stanislaus County, a municipal entity, or Defendant Dirske, who as 26 the Stanislaus County Sheriff is a supervisory defendant. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 In general, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an 2 actual connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged 3 deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 4 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within 5 the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or 6 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 7 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory 8 allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not 9 sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff 10 must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged 11 constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 12 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts connecting the four named defendants – 13 Dirske, Stanislaus County, Hoe, and Wellpath – to a violation of Plaintiff’s statutory or 14 constitutional rights. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend and, in doing so, should keep the 15 following rules in mind. 16 More specific allegations are required for a municipal defendant such as 17 Stanislaus County. Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” 18 to whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 19 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. 20 at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 21 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 22 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 23 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 24 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 25 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 26 custom of the municipality. See id. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts specific to Stanislaus County, let alone 2 facts indicating that a municipal policy or custom was the cause of a violation of Plaintiff’s 3 statutory or constitutional rights. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend. 4 Specific allegations are also required for supervisory defendants such as Defendant 5 Dirske. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 6 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 7 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 8 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 9 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 10 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 11 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 12 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 13 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 14 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 15 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 16 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 17 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 18 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 19 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 20 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 21 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 22 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 23 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 24 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts specific to Defendant Dirske, let alone 25 facts going beyond a respondeat superior theory of liability and showing Dirske’s personal 26 involvement in a violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to 27 amend. 28 / / / 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 3 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 4 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 5 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 9 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 10 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 12 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 18 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 19 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 20 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 21 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 22 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / ] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 3 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 4 | service of this order. 5 6 || Dated: January 31, 2024 Svc 7 DENNIS M. COTA 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28