(PC) Brooks v. Newsom

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 5, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00481
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIE LEE BROOKS, II, No. 2:23-cv-0481 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 GAVEN NEWSOM, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that his rights were violated during a 2022 parole hearing. 19 Presently before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 14) for screening. For the 20 reasons set forth below, the undersigned will recommend that the complaint be dismissed without 21 leave to amend. 22 SCREENING 23 I. Legal Standards 24 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 25 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 26 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 27 that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 28 //// 1 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 2 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 3 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 4 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 5 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 6 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 7 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 8 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 9 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 10 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 11 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 12 AtlanticCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 13 (1957)). 14 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 15 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 16 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 17 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 18 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 19 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 20 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 21 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 22 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 23 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 24 or other proper proceeding for redress. 25 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 26 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 27 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 28 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 1 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 2 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 3 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 4 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 5 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 6 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 7 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 8 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 9 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 10 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 11 II. Allegations in the Complaint 12 Plaintiff states the events giving rise to the claim occurred during a parole suitability 13 hearing at California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”). (ECF No. 14 at 3.) He has identified the 14 following defendants: (1) California Governor Gavin Newsom; (2) the Board of Parole Hearings 15 (“BPH”); (3) BPH Presiding Commissioner, Troy Taira; and (4) BPH Deputy Commissioner, 16 Rachel Stern. (Id. at 2.) 17 Plaintiff states on August 12, 2022, he had his first “Elderly Parole Suitability Hearing.” 18 (Id. at 3.) Following the hearing, Taira and Stern determined plaintiff was not suitable for 19 release. (Id.) He alleges that in making the determination, defendants “used the new BPH, 20 harsher procedural guidelines on [his] 32 years old case” rather than the procedures from 1990, 21 the year his crime was committed. (Id.) Plaintiff states that Governor Newsom has the authority 22 to review all parole decisions and he approved the procedures used during the hearing. (Id. at 3- 23 4.) 24 Plaintiff also alleges that both the state and federal law bar the infliction of punishment 25 that is grossly disproportionate to the offender’s individual culpability. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff claims 26 the BPH did not consider his individual culpability in light of the time he has served and failed to 27 apply the statutory requirements of Elderly Parole Suitability Programs to his hearing. (Id.) 28 //// 1 Plaintiff seeks “invalidation of the BPH Elderly Parole Suitability procedures and [a] new 2 Elderly Parole Suitability Hearing, conducted under constitutionally proper procedures and an 3 injunction ordering the State BPH, to comply with constitutional due process and ex post facto, 4 requirements in the future.” (Id. at 4, 7.) He also requests a declaratory and injunctive relief. 5 (Id.) 6 III. Does Plaintiff State a Claim under § 1983? 7 A. Due Process 8 The United States Supreme Court severely limited federal court review of state parole 9 board in Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011). The Court acknowledged that California law 10 creates a liberty interest in parole protected by the Due Process Clause, which is reasonable and 11 requires fair procedures. Id. at 219-20. Due process is satisfied where an inmate “is allowed an 12 opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” 13 Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 220 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional 14 Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979)). Swarthout bars any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 15 to support the Board’s decision. See Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d at 1046 (it “makes no 16 difference that [the petitioner] may have been subjected to a misapplication of California’s ‘some 17 evidence’ standard. A state’s misapplication of its own laws does not provide a basis for 18 granting” relief.); Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711, 717 19 (9th Cir. 2011) (issue is not whether the Board’s parole denial was substantively reasonable,” or 20 whether the Board correctly applied state parole standards, but simply was “whether the state 21 provided Miller with the minimum procedural due process outline in [Swarthout v.] Cooke”). 22 As in the original complaint, there are no allegations contained in the complaint to 23 indicate that plaintiff was not provided with the minimum procedural protections outlined in 24 Swarthout in any of his parole hearings. Rather, he claims that his rights were violated because 25 the commissioners used harsher procedural guidelines on his case than those applicable when the 26 crime occurred and failed to consider his individual culpability. (ECF No. 14 at 3-5.) Section 27 1983 provides a remedy only for violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United 28 States. Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 222 (the responsibility for assuring that the constitutionally 1 adequate procedures governing California’s parole system are properly applied rests with 2 California courts). 3 Plaintiff’s allegation that California regulations related to the Elderly Parole Program was 4 improperly applied, cannot be adjudicated by this court. The Supreme Court stated in Swarthout 5 v. Cooke, that it is not the role of federal courts to determine whether California’s laws or 6 regulations were correctly applied in plaintiff’s case. 562 U.S. at 222. A “mere error of state law 7 is not a denial of due process.” Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 222 (internal quotations omitted). 8 Additionally, merely asserting violations of Due Process cannot “transform a state-law issue into 9 a federal one.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). 10 Federal courts may not intervene in parole decisions if minimum procedural protections 11 were provided, i.e., an opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons why parole was 12 denied. Here, there are no allegations that would indicate plaintiff was not provided the 13 opportunity to be heard or deprived of a statement of reasons explaining the commissioners’ 14 decision. Thus, his claim is not cognizable. Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 15 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (“To the extent that the violation of state law amounts to the deprivation of a 16 state created liberty interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, 17 Section 1983 offers no redress.”). 18 B. Immune and Proper Defendants 19 Plaintiff has identified Commissioner Taira and Deputy Commissioner Stern as 20 defendants. However, as plaintiff was previously advised (ECF No. 9 at 7), BPH commissioners 21 are state officers entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting in their official 22 capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) “[A] suit against a 23 state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official’s office.”). BPH 24 commissioners, who exercise quasi-judicial responsibilities in rendering parole decisions, are 25 absolutely immune from damages liability in their official capacities. See Sellars v. Procunier, 26 641 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981); cf. Swift v. California, 384 27 F.3d 1184, 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004) (parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity for 28 conduct independent of Board’s decision-making authority, e.g., in performing investigatory or 1 law enforcement functions). Because parole board officials are entitled to absolute immunity 2 when rendering a parole decision, Sellers, 641 F.2d at 1302, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable 3 claim against defendants Taira and Stern. 4 Plaintiff has named the state of California and Governor Newsom as defendants in this 5 action. However, the complaint does not contain any allegations explaining how these defendants 6 were involved in the violation of his rights. 7 The Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) requires that there be an actual connection or link 8 between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by 9 plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 10 (1976). To state a claim for relief under §1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with 11 some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights. 12 Additionally, plaintiff must clearly identify which defendants he feels are responsible for each 13 violation of his constitutional rights and the factual basis. His complaint must put each defendant 14 on notice of plaintiff’s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 15 (9th Cir. 2004). In any amended complaint, plaintiff should explain how each named defendant 16 violated his rights. 17 E. Eighth Amendment 18 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. 19 Const. amend. VIII. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual 20 punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); 21 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). 22 Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy 23 and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited 24 by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 25 Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because denial of 26 parole has rendered the punishment “grossly disproportionate to his individual culpability.” (ECF 27 No. 14 at 5.) The court notes that plaintiff has not indicated the nature of his commitment 28 offense. However, he states that his sentence was 43 years, 4 months and he became eligible for a 1 parole hearing after serving 25 years and turning 65 years old. (Id. at 3.) However, plaintiff has 2 no constitutional right to release prior to the expiration of an otherwise valid sentence. 3 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be 4 conditionally release before the expiration of a valid sentence.”). 5 Other courts have consistently held that denial of parole does not implicate the Eighth 6 Amendment. See e.g., Johnson v. Finn, 468 Fed. Appx. 680, 684 (9th Cir. 2012) (denial of parole 7 and continued incarceration pursuant to indeterminate sentenced did not constitute cruel and 8 unusual punishment); Dackerman v. Ndoh, No. CV 16-6626-R (E), 2016 WL 8735628, at *3 9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016) (Eighth Amendment claim based on parole denial and “continued 10 incarceration plainly meritless for petitioner convicted of attempted murder, false imprisonment, 11 kidnapping, and assault), recommendations adopted, 2016 WL 8738147 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2016); 12 Garcia v. Valenzuela, 2014 WL 683795, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014) (denial of parole and 13 continued incarceration fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim in light of Cooke, Greenholtz, 14 and Harris). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable 15 Eighth Amendment claim. 16 IV. No Leave to Amend 17 As set forth above, plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a cognizable claim. 18 The court will recommend that plaintiff’s amended complaint be dismissed without leave to 19 amend because plaintiff was previously notified of the deficiencies and has failed to correct them. 20 A plaintiff’s “repeated failure to cure deficiencies” constitutes “a strong indication that the 21 [plaintiff] has no additional facts to plead” and “that any attempt to amend would be futile[.]” 22 See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 10088 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 23 citations marks omitted) (upholding dismissal of complaint with prejudice when there were “three 24 iterations of [the] allegations—none of which, according to [the district] court, was sufficient to 25 survive a motion to dismiss”); see also Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 26 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal without leave to amend where plaintiff failed to correct 27 deficiencies in complaint, where court had afforded plaintiff opportunities to do so, and had 28 discussed with plaintiff the substantive problems with his claims), amended by 234 F.3d 428, 1 | overruled on other grounds by Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007); 2 | Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial of leave to 3 || amend appropriate where further amendment would be futile). 4 Plaintiff was previously advised of the standards applicable claims raised under the Due 5 | Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment and notified of the defects in the allegations. (ECF 6 | No.9 at5-7.) As explained above, plaintiff did not correct the deficiencies in the second 7 | amended complaint. Thus, the undersigned is convinced that further amendment would be futile. 8 || Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend that the complaint be dismissed without leave to 9 | amend. 10 CONCLUSION 11 For the reasons set forth above, the Clerk of the Court is ORDRERED to randomly assign 12 | this action to a United States District Judge. 13 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's second amended complaint (ECF No. 14 | 14) be dismissed without leave to amend. 15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States Magistrate Judge 16 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one (21) 17 | days after being served these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 18 | with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections 19 | to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 20 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 21 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 22 || Dated: March 4, 2024

24 5 ORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 pp:i2 38 DB/DB Prisoner Inbox/Civil Rights/S/broo0481.scrn? fr