(PC) Brooks v. Newsom

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 12, 2023
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00481
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIE LEE BROOKS, II, No. 2:23-cv-0481 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 GAVEN NEWSOM, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that his rights were violated during a 2022 parole hearing. 19 Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 7.), 20 request that the court screen the amended complaint (ECF No. 8), and his amended complaint 21 (ECF No. 6) for screening. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will grant the 22 motions to proceed in forma pauperis, grant the request to screen the first amended complaint, 23 and dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. 24 IN FORMA PAUPERS 25 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1915(a). (ECF Nos. 2, 7.) Accordingly, the requests to proceed in forma pauperis will be 27 granted. 28 //// 1 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 2 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 3 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 4 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 5 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 6 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 7 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 8 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915(b)(2). 10 REQUEST FOR SCREENING OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 11 Before the court had the opportunity to screen the original complaint, plaintiff filed a first 12 amended complaint. (ECF No. 6.) Thereafter, plaintiff submitted a request that the court screen 13 his First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 8.) In support of his request, he states that the amended 14 complaint contains additional allegations and support for his claims. Because an amended 15 complaint supersedes any prior complaint, the court will grant plaintiff’s request and screen the 16 first amended complaint. 17 SCREENING 18 I. Legal Standards 19 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 20 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 22 that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 23 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 24 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 25 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 26 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 27 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 28 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 1 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 2 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 3 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 4 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 5 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 6 AtlanticCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 7 (1957)). 8 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 9 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 10 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 11 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 12 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 13 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 14 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 15 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 16 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 17 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 18 or other proper proceeding for redress. 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 20 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 21 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 22 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 23 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 24 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 25 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 26 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 27 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 28 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 1 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 2 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 3 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 4 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 5 II. Allegations in the Complaint 6 Plaintiff states the events giving rise to the claim occurred while he was incarcerated at 7 Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). (ECF No. 6 at 1.) He has identified the following 8 defendants: (1) the state of California; (2) California Governor Gavin Newsom; (3) the Board of 9 Parole Hearings (“BPH”); (4) John Doe 1, BPH Commissioner; and (5) John Doe 2, BPH 10 Commissioner. (Id. at 2.) 11 Plaintiff alleges on August 12, 2022, he had an “Elderly Parole Suitability Hearing,” and 12 suitability was denied for three years. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that the commissioners 13 determined that he was unsuitable for parole based on their hatred of black men and claims that 14 the BPH uses racist procedures to deny parole suitability. He further claims that the 15 commissioners disregarded factors that support a finding of suitability such as the past 10 years of 16 his disciplinary record, his participation in self-help groups, exemplary behavior, his age and 17 serious health conditions, and his amount of time served. (Id.) 18 Plaintiff further states that he is a “qualified individual with a disability.” He alleges that 19 his “dark skin in the States, BPH, discriminatory policy of denial of parole suitability on August 20 12, 2022, due to race means [he] is an individual with a disability who with or without reasonable 21 modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural social culture, of 22 discrimination against Black inmates.” (Id. at 6.) 23 Plaintiff claims that the finding of unsuitability violated his right to remain free of cruel 24 and unusual punishment and deprived him of his right to due process and equal protection under 25 the law. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, an order rendering the finding of 26 unsuitability invalid, and monetary damages. 27 //// 28 //// 1 III. Does Plaintiff State a Claim under § 1983? 2 A. Due Process 3 The United States Supreme Court severely limited federal court review of state parole 4 board in Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011). The Court acknowledged that California law 5 creates a liberty interest in parole protected by the Due Process Clause, which is reasonable and 6 requires fair procedures. Id. at 219-20. Due process is satisfied where an inmate “is allowed an 7 opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” 8 Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 220 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional 9 Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979)). Swarthout bars any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 10 to support the Board’s decision. See Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d at 1046 (it “makes no 11 difference that [the petitioner] may have been subjected to a misapplication of California’s ‘some 12 evidence’ standard. A state’s misapplication of its own laws does not provide a basis for 13 granting” relief.); Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711, 717 14 (9th Cir. 2011) (issue is not whether the Board’s parole denial was substantively reasonable,” or 15 whether the Board correctly applied state parole standards, but simply was “whether the state 16 provided Miller with the minimum procedural due process outline in [Swarthout v.] Cooke”). 17 There are no allegations contained in the complaint to indicate that plaintiff was not 18 provided with the minimum procedural protections outlined in Swarthout in any of his parole 19 hearings. Rather, he claims that he was denied parole based on his race and that commissioners 20 failed to consider factors that would support a finding of suitability for parole. Section 1983 21 provides a remedy only for violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States. 22 Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 222 (the responsibility for assuring that the constitutionally adequate 23 procedures governing California’s parole system are properly applied rests with California 24 courts). 25 Accordingly, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to 26 show that the denial of parole violated his right to due process. Additionally, any allegation that 27 denial of parole violated his rights under California law, such an allegation fails to state a 28 cognizable § 1983 claim. Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) 1 (“To the extent that the violation of state law amounts to the deprivation of a state created liberty 2 interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no 3 redress.”). 4 B. Equal Protection 5 The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 6 alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Hartmann v. Calif. 7 Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 8 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). State prison 9 inmates retain a right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 11 334 (1968)). An equal protection claim may be established by showing that defendants 12 intentionally discriminated against plaintiff based on his membership in a protected class, 13 Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123, or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated 14 differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Dept. 15 of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601-02 (2008). Disability is not a suspect class for Equal Protection 16 purposes. Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008). 17 Plaintiff has stated that he was denied parole based on his race. (ECF No. 6 at 4-7.) 18 However, he has failed to provide any additional details to support his conclusion. “To state a 19 claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted 20 with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based upon his membership in a protected 21 class.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Conclusory 22 statements of bias are not sufficient to support a claim for race-based discrimination. Thornton v. 23 City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 24 In any amended complaint, plaintiff must allege facts that would support a finding that the 25 commissioners acted with discriminatory intent. 26 C. ADA 27 Plaintiff claims that he is a “qualified individual with a disability [his] dark skin in the 28 States, BPH, discrimen[a]tory policy of denial of parole suitability on Aug. 12, 2022 due to race 1 means [he is] an individual with a disability who with or without reasonable modifications to 2 rules, polices, or practices, the removal of architectural social culture, of discrimination against 3 Black inmates.” (ECF No. 6 at 7.) “Under the ADA, race is not a disability because race is not a 4 physical or mental impairment. Therefore, [the plaintiff] cannot bring a suit for racial 5 discrimination under the ADA.” Martin v. Mecklenburg County Park and Recreation Dept., No. 6 3:06 CV 290, 2006 WL 3780418, *3 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 20, 2006). 7 D. Immune and Proper Defendants 8 Plaintiff has named two John Doe BPH commissioners as defendants. However, BPH 9 commissioners are state officers entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting in their 10 official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) “[A] suit 11 against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official’s office.”). 12 BPH commissioners, who exercise quasi-judicial responsibilities in rendering parole decisions, 13 are absolutely immune from damages liability in their official capacities. See Sellars v. 14 Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981); cf. Swift v. 15 California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004) (parole officers not entitled to absolute 16 immunity for conduct independent of Board’s decision-making authority, e.g., in performing 17 investigatory or law enforcement functions). Because parole board officials are entitled to 18 absolute immunity when rendering a parole decision, Sellers, 641 F.2d at 1302, plaintiff fails to 19 state a cognizable claim against the Doe defendant commissioners in the complaint. 20 Plaintiff has named the state of California and Governor Newsom as defendants in this 21 action. However, the complaint does not contain any allegations explaining how these defendants 22 were involved in the violation of his rights. 23 The Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) requires that there be an actual connection or link 24 between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by 25 plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 26 (1976). To state a claim for relief under §1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with 27 some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights. 28 Additionally, plaintiff must clearly identify which defendants he feels are responsible for each 1 violation of his constitutional rights and the factual basis. His complaint must put each defendant 2 on notice of plaintiff’s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 3 (9th Cir. 2004). In any amended complaint, plaintiff should explain how each named defendant 4 violated his rights. 5 E. Eighth Amendment 6 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. 7 Const. amend. VIII. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual 8 punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); 9 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). 10 Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy 11 and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited 12 by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 13 Plaintiff has indicated that his claim in this action arises under the Eighth Amendment. 14 (ECF No. 6 at 6.) However, he has not alleged facts that would support a finding that denial of 15 parole exposed him to cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that 16 plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. 17 AMENDING THE COMPLAINT 18 As set forth above, the complaint fails to state a claim. However, plaintiff will be given 19 the opportunity to submit an amended complaint. Plaintiff is advised that in an amended 20 complaint he must clearly identify each defendant and the action that defendant took that violated 21 his constitutional rights. The court is not required to review exhibits to determine what plaintiff’s 22 charging allegations are as to each named defendant. The charging allegations must be set forth 23 in the amended complaint, so defendants have fair notice of the claims plaintiff is presenting. 24 That said, plaintiff need not provide every detailed fact in support of his claims. Rather, plaintiff 25 should provide a short, plain statement of each claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 26 Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought 27 in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must 28 contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who 1 personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. 2 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation 3 of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act 4 he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). 5 In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed. 6 R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed. 7 R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or 8 occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). 9 The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 10 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any 11 heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading). Plaintiff’s claims must be 13 set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 14 N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, 15 which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 16 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. 17 E.D. Cal. R. 220. Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, all prior pleadings are superseded. 18 Any amended complaint should contain all of the allegations related to his claim in this action. If 19 plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against the defendant, they must be set forth in the amended 20 complaint. 21 By signing an amended complaint, plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry and 22 has evidentiary support for his allegations, and for violation of this rule the court may impose 23 sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 24 CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 26 1. Plaintiff’s requests for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 7) are granted. 27 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 28 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 2 | Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 3 | herewith. 4 3. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 6) is dismissed with leave to amend. 5 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 6 | complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 7 | Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 8 || number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” 9 5. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be 10 || dismissed. 11 | Dated: October 11, 2023 12 13 14 ORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 | pp:12 > DB/DB Prisoner Inbox/Civil Rights/S/broo048 L.scrn

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