1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RODNEY BROOKS, Case No. 2:18-cv-00374-WBS-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED 14 S. BEASLEY, et al., AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY RULING BE DENIED 15 Defendants. ECF Nos. 103 & 104 16 OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 17 DAYS 18 19 Plaintiff brought this case alleging that defendants S. Beasley and J. Lee violated his First 20 and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they adjudicated Rules Violation Reports (“RVR”) and 21 found him guilty without safeguarding his due process rights. He also claims that defendant Lee 22 found him guilty in retaliation for his filing of complaints against another high-ranking officer. 23 ECF No. 58 at 6. Now, defendants have moved for summary judgment, ECF No. 103, and 24 plaintiff has moved to stay a ruling on that motion, ECF No. 104; what is identified on the docket 25 as plaintiff’s opposition, ECF No. 106, is a request to allow him to conduct further discovery. I 26 recommend that plaintiff’s requests for a stay and for further discovery be denied and that 27 defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted. 28 1 Requests for Stay and Further Discovery 2 As I noted in my previous order denying plaintiff’s request to reopen discovery, he has 3 sought repeated modifications to the scheduling order, ECF Nos. 80, 83, 86, 90, & 100, and I 4 have extended deadlines twice. ECF Nos. 88 & 97. In denying the last request, I emphasized that 5 plaintiff had not acted diligently in conducting discovery, and that he had not shown that 6 additional discovery was likely to lead to discoverable information. ECF No. 105 at 3. That 7 order was issued on November 15, 2023. The requests at issue were filed shortly before the 8 order, on October 30, 2023, and, shortly after it, on December 26, 2023. ECF Nos. 104 & 106. 9 Plaintiff’s contemporaneous filings have not given me cause to reconsider my decision not to 10 reopen discovery, and his request for a stay should be denied. 11 Motion for Summary Judgment 12 A. Legal Standards 13 Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 14 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington 15 Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine 16 only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, 17 while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 18 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 19 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 20 Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, also known as partial summary 21 judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a claim or a portion of that claim. 22 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 23 56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a 24 single claim . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that apply on a 25 motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. 26 Civ. P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 27 Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials 28 in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or 1 (2) argument showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a 2 genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 3 its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider 4 other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. 5 Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 6 2001); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 7 “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 8 material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the 9 moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 10 party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 11 essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 12 Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this 13 initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts 14 demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 15 376, 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The non-moving party must “show more than 16 the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). However, 17 the non-moving party is not required to establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; 18 it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the 19 parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. 20 Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 21 The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving 22 party has demonstrated there to be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is 23 appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 24 “[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility 25 determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 26 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 27 nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 28 Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 1 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 2 B. Background 3 Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated in connection with two disciplinary hearings 4 overseen by defendants.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RODNEY BROOKS, Case No. 2:18-cv-00374-WBS-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED 14 S. BEASLEY, et al., AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY RULING BE DENIED 15 Defendants. ECF Nos. 103 & 104 16 OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 17 DAYS 18 19 Plaintiff brought this case alleging that defendants S. Beasley and J. Lee violated his First 20 and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they adjudicated Rules Violation Reports (“RVR”) and 21 found him guilty without safeguarding his due process rights. He also claims that defendant Lee 22 found him guilty in retaliation for his filing of complaints against another high-ranking officer. 23 ECF No. 58 at 6. Now, defendants have moved for summary judgment, ECF No. 103, and 24 plaintiff has moved to stay a ruling on that motion, ECF No. 104; what is identified on the docket 25 as plaintiff’s opposition, ECF No. 106, is a request to allow him to conduct further discovery. I 26 recommend that plaintiff’s requests for a stay and for further discovery be denied and that 27 defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted. 28 1 Requests for Stay and Further Discovery 2 As I noted in my previous order denying plaintiff’s request to reopen discovery, he has 3 sought repeated modifications to the scheduling order, ECF Nos. 80, 83, 86, 90, & 100, and I 4 have extended deadlines twice. ECF Nos. 88 & 97. In denying the last request, I emphasized that 5 plaintiff had not acted diligently in conducting discovery, and that he had not shown that 6 additional discovery was likely to lead to discoverable information. ECF No. 105 at 3. That 7 order was issued on November 15, 2023. The requests at issue were filed shortly before the 8 order, on October 30, 2023, and, shortly after it, on December 26, 2023. ECF Nos. 104 & 106. 9 Plaintiff’s contemporaneous filings have not given me cause to reconsider my decision not to 10 reopen discovery, and his request for a stay should be denied. 11 Motion for Summary Judgment 12 A. Legal Standards 13 Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 14 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington 15 Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine 16 only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, 17 while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 18 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 19 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 20 Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, also known as partial summary 21 judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a claim or a portion of that claim. 22 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 23 56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a 24 single claim . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that apply on a 25 motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. 26 Civ. P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 27 Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials 28 in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or 1 (2) argument showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a 2 genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 3 its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider 4 other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. 5 Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 6 2001); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 7 “The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 8 material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the 9 moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 10 party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 11 essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 12 Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this 13 initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts 14 demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 15 376, 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The non-moving party must “show more than 16 the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). However, 17 the non-moving party is not required to establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; 18 it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the 19 parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. 20 Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 21 The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving 22 party has demonstrated there to be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is 23 appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 24 “[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility 25 determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 26 2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 27 nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 28 Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 1 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 2 B. Background 3 Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated in connection with two disciplinary hearings 4 overseen by defendants. The following background information is contained in defendants’ 5 motion and, by centering his opposition on a request for additional discovery, plaintiff has failed 6 meaningfully to dispute any of it. 7 On September 8, 2017, plaintiff was issued an RVR for ordering one inmate, Reyes, to 8 attack another, Mendoza. ECF No. 103-2 at 9. Reyes allegedly disobeyed that order, and, in 9 turn, plaintiff ordered two other inmates to attack him for his disobedience. Id. Those inmates 10 did attack Reyes. Id. A disciplinary hearing on this RVR was held before defendant Lee on 11 October 5, 2017, and, based on multiple statements from confidential informants, plaintiff was 12 found guilty. Id. at 9-10. This hearing however, had to be “reissued and reheard” because a 13 “Security Threat Group nexus” was accidentally appended to plaintiff’s charges at the conclusion 14 of the hearing. Id. at 10. 15 The RVR was reissued in November 2017, and, on May 10, 2018, plaintiff waived his right 16 to an investigative employee and indicated that he had two questions he wished to ask four inmate 17 witnesses. Id. at 10-11. The new hearing was held before defendant Beasley on May 15, 2018, 18 and plaintiff was again found guilty. Id. at 11. Plaintiff was not allowed to call the four inmate 19 witnesses because Beasley determined that they would only be able to provide insufficiently 20 relevant character evidence in plaintiff’s defense. Id. 21 C. Due Process Claims 22 Plaintiff’s due process claims related to his disciplinary hearings should be dismissed. 23 Due process in prison disciplinary hearings requires only that the prisoner receive: (1) advanced 24 written notice of the alleged violation; (2) an opportunity to present evidence and call witnesses, 25 unless doing so would be hazardous to institutional security; and (3) legal assistance where the 26 charges are complex or the prisoner is illiterate. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 27 (1974). Where a decision involves the revocation of a prisoner’s good time credits, due process 28 also demands that the adverse decision be supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent v. Hill, 1 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 2 The procedural requirements were met at both hearings. Defendants have presented 3 evidence that, at the October 2017 hearing before Lee, plaintiff was served in advance with the 4 charges, was allowed to present evidence, and received the assistance of an investigative 5 employee. ECF No. 103-4 at 4-5, 24. Some evidence, in the form of confidential memorandums 6 from informants, supported the hearing decision. Id. at 5, 59. Defendants also persuasively argue 7 that, even if there were due process violations at this hearing, such violations cannot provide a 8 basis for recovery, given the decision to reissue and rehear the charges. See Torricellas v. Poole, 9 954 F. Supp. 1405, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Because the disciplinary action was dismissed on 10 administrative appeal and plaintiff was not subject to any discipline or loss of credits, any 11 procedural defects in the disciplinary hearing are not compensable. It is, therefore, not necessary 12 to analyze the process provided to plaintiff.”); Brown v. Marshall, No. CIV-S-07-0956-MCE- 13 DAD, 2012 WL 12906131, at *9-13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2012). 14 As to the hearing before Beasley, defendants have provided evidence that plaintiff was 15 served with charges in advance and waived his right to an investigative employee. ECF No. 105- 16 3 at 3, 9. And Beasley’s decision not to call witnesses who could provide character testimony for 17 plaintiff was not violative of due process. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566 (acknowledging that prison 18 officials could, if they provide their reasons, decline to call witnesses in prison disciplinary 19 hearings for, among other things, lack of relevant testimony). Here, plaintiff acknowledged that 20 none of his desired witnesses was present for the battery of Reyes and as such each would be 21 providing only character testimony. ECF No. 103-6 at 2-3. Finally, Beasley provided “some 22 evidence” in finding plaintiff guilty, including memoranda from confidential informants and the 23 incident report. Id. at 3-4. 24 In closing, I again emphasize that plaintiff has failed to dispute any of the foregoing 25 evidence by way of a properly filed opposition. 26 D. First Amendment Retaliation Claim 27 Plaintiff’s remaining First Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Lee should also 28 be dismissed. He alleges that Lee found him guilty at his disciplinary hearing in order to retaliate 1 against him for complaints he had filed against a different correctional officer. This claim fails 2 for two reasons. First, as noted above, Lee’s guilty finding was withdrawn, and the hearing was 3 reheard. As such, plaintiff cannot show that he was harmed or that there was the requisite chilling 4 effect. Resnick v. Warden Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In a constitutional tort, as 5 in any other, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s actions caused him some injury.”). 6 Second, a retaliation claim fails if the act complained of advanced legitimate correctional goals. 7 See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). As noted above, enough evidence 8 supported Lee’s finding of guilt and, accordingly, plaintiff cannot show that finding him guilty 9 did not advance the legitimate correctional goal of punishing inmates who harm their peers. Id. 10 (“The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional 11 goals for the conduct he complains of.”). 12 D. Conclusion 13 I find it unnecessary to reach defendants’ other arguments. As stated above, defendants 14 have presented sufficient evidence to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Plaintiff, 15 by failing to file a substantive opposition, has failed to carry his burden of putting forth facts 16 demonstrating the existence of any genuine issue. 17 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that: 18 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 103, be GRANTED and 19 judgment be entered in their favor. 20 2. Plaintiff’s motion to stay ruling, ECF No. 104, be DENIED. 21 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 22 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 23 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 24 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 25 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 26 objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 27 parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 28 1 appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 2 | v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ March 13, 2024 Q_——_. 7 JEREMY D. PETERSON 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28