(PC) Bosley v. Truckee Police Department

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 24, 2025·No. 2:23-cv-02994·Unknown

Opinion

JACOB M. BOSLEY, Case No. 2:23-cv-2994-JDP (P) Plaintiff, v. ORDER; FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendant. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, alleges that defendants Calahan and Yarborough, both officers with the Truckee Police Department, violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him during an arrest on September 22, 2023. ECF No. 16 at 3. After reviewing the third amended complaint, I find that the excessive force claim against these defendants is cognizable and should proceed. The other claims in the complaint, however, should be dismissed as inadequately plead and insufficiently related to the excessive force claim. I will direct plaintiff to submit service documents for Calahan and Yarborough and will recommend that his other claims be dismissed.

Screening Order I. Screening and Pleading Requirements A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). II. Analysis Plaintiff alleges that, on September 22, 2023, defendants Calahan and Yarborough, both officers with the Truckee Police Department, violated his Fourth Amendment1 rights by using excessive force against him during an arrest. ECF No. 16 at 3. He claims both officers pressed their bodyweight against him and made it impossible for him to breathe. Id. Plaintiff also claims that he was unnecessarily sprayed with teargas while in his car. Id. He alludes to other dates and other officers at the scene, but the complaint fails to make explicit claims against the other officers, and they are not included in the caption of the complaint. Accordingly, only the claims against Calahan and Yarborough should proceed. Plaintiff’s other claims should be dismissed. Plaintiff’s allegation that employees of Kimco Realty have harassed him and other homeless individuals in parking lots is non-cognizable for two reasons. First, as noted in my previous screening order, there is no indication that Kimco Realty is a state actor for the purposes of section 1983. Second, plaintiff’s claims that unnamed employees have stalked and harassed him are too vague to proceed.2 His only specific claim is that, in August 2023, an unnamed employee blocked his car and took pictures of it. Id. at 4. This allegation does not give rise to any federal claim and does not appear related to his excessive force claim. Plaintiff’s claim that, on September 20, 2023, unnamed Truckee Police department officers arrested him at a public parking lot is also too vague to proceed. Id. at 5. Plaintiff does not name any of the offending officers or indicate what happened during or after the arrest. Neither do his allegations, taken as true, show that this claim is sufficiently related to his excessive force claim.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

(PC) Bosley v. Truckee Police Department, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

(PC) Bosley v. Truckee Police Department ((PC) Bosley v. Truckee Police Department) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

The Arrogante Barcelones
20 U.S. 496 (Supreme Court, 1822)
Graham v. Connor
490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bartlett v. Strickland
556 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Kobold v. Good Samaritan Regional Medical Center
832 F.3d 1024 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Michael Hayes v. Idaho Correctional Center
849 F.3d 1204 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Turner v. Duncan
158 F.3d 449 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)