(PC) Bell v. Jones

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMay 4, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-00793
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Bell v. Jones ((PC) Bell v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Bell v. Jones, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIC BELL, SR., No. 2:20-cv-00793-CKD-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND 14 GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a county pretrial detainee proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a 21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 28 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 1 I. Screening Requirement 2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 9 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 10 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 11 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 12 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 13 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 14 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 15 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 16 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 17 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 18 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 19 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 20 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 21 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 22 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 23 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 24 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 25 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 26 II. Allegations in the Complaint 27 Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Sacramento County Sheriff at Rio 28 Cosumnes Correctional Center (“RCCC”). He filed the pending action as a purported class action 1 on behalf of himself and other pretrial detainees who were not released after the governor’s 2 March 25, 2020 executive order “that over 400 convicted nonviolent inmates be released within a 3 5 day period…” due to COVID 19. ECF No. 1 at 3, 7. Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of 4 confinement at both the RCCC and the Sacramento County Main Jail do not comply with the 5 Center for Disease Control’s guidelines for social distancing and the use of face masks to prevent 6 the spread of the COVID 19 virus. Id. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the bunk beds in the J 7 and K Barracks at RCCC are only 2 ½ feet apart from one another. Id. 8 Plaintiff names Gavin Newsom, the Governor of the State of California; the Presiding 9 Judge of the Sacramento Superior Court who is not named; and, Scott Jones, the Sheriff of 10 Sacramento County, as defendants in this action. ECF No. 1 at 2. 11 By way of relief, plaintiff seeks punitive damages at the rate of $100,000 per plaintiff and 12 compensatory damages in the amount of $200,000 per plaintiff. ECF No. 1 at 3, 6. 13 III. Legal Standards 14 A. Class Action 15 This lawsuit is brought by plaintiff as a class action. Plaintiff, however, is a non-lawyer 16 proceeding without counsel. It is well established that a layperson cannot ordinarily represent the 17 interests of a class. See McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1966). This rule 18 becomes almost absolute when, as here, the putative class representative is incarcerated and 19 proceeding pro se. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975). In direct terms, 20 plaintiff cannot “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” as required by Rule 21 23(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Martin v. Middendorf, 420 F. Supp. 779 22 (D.D.C. 1976). This action, therefore, will not be construed as a class action and instead will be 23 construed as an individual civil suit brought by plaintiff. 24 B. Supervisory Liability 25 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 26 rights by those acting under color of state law. See e.g., Patel v. Kent School Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 27 971 (9th Cir. 2011); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). A county sheriff may 28 act under color of state law for purposes of section 1983. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Bell v. Jones, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-bell-v-jones-caed-2020.