(PC) Barragan v. Herrera

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 27, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00442
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MIGUEL ANGEL BARRAGAN, No. 1:25-cv-00442-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT 13 v. JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 14 HERRERA, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF 15 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A Defendants. COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF 16 (ECF No. 12) 17

18 19 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed June 6, 2025. 21 I. 22 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 23 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 25 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 26 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 27 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 1 see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 2 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 3 is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 4 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 5 do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 6 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 7 participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 8 2002). 9 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 10 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 11 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 12 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that 13 each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. 14 Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 15 unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” 16 falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 17 II. 18 SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 19 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the 20 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 21 The Fresno County Sheriff’s Office failed to protect Plaintiff when it failed to properly 22 train and teach its employees. The Sheriff’s Office custody division jail orientation handbook is 23 given to every incarcerated person, and the Sheriff’s Office is accountable for its employee’s 24 failure to comply with the handbook. 25 On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff was intentionally and deliberately ordered to go into the 26 wrong housing pod by corporal S. Bruton. S. Bruton had knowledge that the pod housed “active 27 rival gang members.” At that time Plaintiff was documented as a “protective custody/keep 28 separate inmate.” The incident took place after Plaintiff attended a visit and was waiting for the 1 usual escort back to the pod. S. Bruton has personally escorted Plaintiff to and from visiting an 2 ample amount of times with no incident. Upon entrance into the pod, Plaintiff was forced to 3 cause a mass physical altercation to gain the attention of the other officers in hopes to make it out 4 alive and be returned to the right pod. S. Bruton could have checked in with the other floor 5 officers to view of the visiting pod schedule before attempting to escort him to the wrong pod. 6 Plaintiff reported Bruton’s misconduct by filing an inmate grievance which was denied by 7 sergeant P. Haros, lieutenant McCoy, and captain A. Esmay. 8 On October 22, 2024, sergeant P. Haros was responsible for the investigation and found 9 Plaintiff’s grievance was not sustained by falsely omitting statements in his report to justify his 10 recommendation. 11 On October 23, 2024, lieutenant McCoy as the supervisor responsible for the review and 12 findings agreed with P. Haros’s decision without a thorough review. 13 On October 9, 2024, Bruton stated that she opened the door to B-pod allowing Plaintiff to 14 enter. Staff are aware that contact with an unassigned pod creates potential risk of serious harm 15 to inmates. There is video footage of the incident and pictures of Plaintiff’s injuries were taken. 16 Plaintiff suffered injuries to his right eye, left side of head, and pain in his groin. As a result of 17 the incident, Plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, insomnia, and depression. 18 On November 13, 2024, captain A. Esmay issued the final decision denying Plaintiff’s 19 appeal as “unrighteous and void of merit.” 20 III. 21 DISCUSSION 22 A. Fresno County Sheriff’s Department 23 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to plausibly state a claim against defendants Fresno County 24 Sheriff’s Department. The complaint merely asserts in a conclusory manner that the Fresno 25 County Sheriff’s Department failed to protect him by failing to train. (ECF No. 12 at3.) This bald 26 and conclusory statement without any factual specificity is not entitled to the presumption of 27 truth. Iqbal, at 678. 28 /// 1 “[M]unicipalities may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional injuries pursuant to (1) an 2 official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or 3 (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.” Jessen v. Cnty. of Fresno, 808 F. App’x 432, 434– 4 35 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th 5 Cir. 2019) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To prevail on a 6 Monell claim against the Fresno County Sheriff Department based on a failure to train theory, 7 Plaintiff “must demonstrate that a municipality's failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference 8 to the rights of persons with whom the untrained employees come into contact.” Perez v. City of 9 Fresno, 98 F.4th 919, 931 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). In this context, deliberate indifference 10 requires “proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his 11 action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). Generally, “a pattern of similar 12 constitutional violations, rather than proof of a single incident, is necessary to demonstrate 13 deliberate indifference.” Perez, 98 F.4th at 931 (cleaned up). However, “single-incident liability 14 may exist in the rare case where ‘the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train’ are 15 “patently obvious.’ ” Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. 51, 63-64). 16 In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges without any factual specificity that the Fresno 17 County Sheriff Department “failed to properly train and teach.” (ECF No. 12 at 3.) Beyond these 18 bare, conclusory statements, the complaint fails to assert any facts establishing the need for more 19 or better training, such that the inadequacy was likely to result in constitutional harm, nor that 20 Defendants’ failure to provide additional training in fact resulted in the violation of Plaintiff's 21 constitutional rights. Without more than Plaintiff’s mere conclusory assertion that the Fresno 22 County Sheriff Department “failed to train,” falls far short of alleging a cognizable federal claim. 23 B. Failure to Protect 24 “A pre-trial detainee bringing a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim 25 must show that the conditions under which that detainee was confined ‘put [him] at substantial 26 risk of suffering serious harm.’ ” Smith v. Washington, 781 F. App’x 595, 597 (9th Cir. 2019) 27 (quoting Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d at 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016))). Pretrial 28 detainee conditions-of-confinement claims are analyzed using a standard of “objective deliberate 1 indifference.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d at 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018). 2 A pretrial detainee must therefore show that: (1) a particular defendant made an 3 intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the pretrial detainee was confined, 4 (2) those conditions put him at substantial risk of suffering serious harm, (3) the defendant did not 5 take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in similar 6 circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk - making the consequences of the 7 defendant's conduct obvious, and (4) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the 8 detainee's injuries. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125; see also Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. The Ninth 9 Circuit held in Castro that under the Fourteenth Amendment, failure-to-protect claims, such as 10 prison officials’ failure to protect an inmate from violence at the hands of other inmates, brought 11 by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the above discussed objective deliberative indifference 12 standard. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1069, 1071. 13 Here, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege Defendant Bruton made an intentional decision to 14 place him under conditions of substantial risk of suffering harm or that Defendant Burton had 15 reason to know or should have known that allowing Plaintiff into the Pod with other inmates 16 would pose a substantial risk. Although Plaintiff contends that Defendant Burton intentionally 17 and deliberately ordered to go into the wrong housing pod, there are no facts from which a 18 plausible inference can be drawn that Bruton knew or should have known that escorting Plaintiff 19 in the pod would place Plaintiff at a substantial risk of suffering serious harm. Plaintiff does not 20 allege any facts to support that Bruton knew or should have known that Plaintiff was at risk of 21 being attacked by rival gang members. 22 In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations of the threat of harm are unsupported and appear purely 23 speculative, and Plaintiff’s allegations amount to nothing more than potential negligence. There 24 are no facts showing that any inmate ever made a credible threat against Plaintiff or that any harm 25 ever occurred. Rather, Plaintiff admits that after being placed in the pod, he created a physical 26 disturbance with other inmates. Absent any evidence that such a threat existed, Plaintiff cannot 27 hold Defendants liable for deliberate indifference to his safety. See Williams v. Wood, 223 F. 28 App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir.) (“[S]peculative and generalized fears of harm at the hands of other 1 prisoners do not rise to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm to his future health.” (citing 2 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843)); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[Deliberate 3 indifference] standard does not require that the guard or official ‘believe to a moral certainty that 4 one inmate intends to attack another at a given place at a time certain before that officer is 5 obligated to take steps to prevent such an assault. But, on the other hand, he must have more than 6 a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.’ ” (citation omitted)); Johnson v. Hicks, 2014 WL 7 1577280, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014) (dismissing failure to protect claim because plaintiff’s 8 allegations that his attacker was “well known for in-cell violence” were insufficient to show that 9 inmate posed a “particular, present danger” to plaintiff, or that any named defendant was aware of 10 such danger). Any deliberate indifference to safety claim on this basis therefore fails. 11 Finally, Plaintiff fails to establish any violation by Defendants sergeant P. Haros, 12 lieutenant McCoy, and captain A. Esmay, who denied Plaintiff's administrative grievances or 13 appeals regarding these matters. An officer’s processing of an inmate's grievances or appeals, 14 without more, cannot serve as a basis for section 1983 liability. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 15 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates do not have a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific 16 prison grievance procedure.” (citation omitted)); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.) 17 (due process not violated simply because defendant fails properly to process grievances submitted 18 for consideration); Shallowhorn v. Molina, 572 F. App’x 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2014) (district court 19 properly dismissed Section 1983 claims against defendants who “were only involved in the 20 appeals process”; the defendants could not be held liable under Section 1983 for denying an 21 inmate appeal (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860)). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a 22 cognizable claim for relief. 23 IV. 24 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 25 For the reasons stated, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim 26 for relief under § 1983. Despite being provided with the relevant legal standard applicable to his 27 claims, Plaintiff has been unable to state a claim. Thus, further leave to amend is not warranted. 28 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 1 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly assign a 2 | District Judge to this action. 3 Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the instant action be dismissed for failure 4 | to state a cognizable claim for relief. 5 This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 6 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within fourteen (14) 7 | days after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 8 | objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should 9 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is 10 | advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 11 | onappeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 12 | Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 13 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. ee 16 | Dated: _ August 26, 2025 STANLEY A. BOONE 17 United States Magistrate Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28