1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TORIAN TERRELL AYTMAN, Case No. 1:23-cv-00382-JLT-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 13 v. STATE A CLAIM 14 WARDEN CHRISIAN PFIEFFER, et al., (ECF No. 9) 15 Defendants. FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Plaintiff Torian Terrell Aytman (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 18 forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint and first 19 amended complaint were screened, and Plaintiff was granted opportunities to amend. Plaintiff’s 20 second amended complaint is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 15.) 21 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 23 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 25 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 26 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 27 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 1 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 2 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 3 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 4 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 7 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 8 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 9 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 10 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 11 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 12 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 13 Plaintiff is currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), where the events in 14 the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names Christian Pfeiffer, Warden, KVSP as 15 the sole defendant. 16 In claim 1, Plaintiff alleges violation of the Eighth Amendment. Since the beginning of 17 2021, Plaintiff has been given the opportunity to go to the exercise yard less than 100 times. 18 Plaintiff complained to the building staff, their supervisors and had it addressed with the 19 supervisors’ supervisors. Once the facility cameras and body cameras were installed in the 20 prison, Plaintiff wrote the issue up because he had proof. Sgt. Anderson told Plaintiff during a 21 602 hearing that “per the warden” they cannot run yard when the facility is under Operational 22 Procedure #106 and #406, which deal with inmate movement and staff redirection during 23 instances of modified program due to lockdown events or short staff days. This is for all inmates 24 not affected by disciplinary yard restriction “because of this our inmate yard representatives” 25 addressed the issue directly to Warden Pfieffer, Assistant Warden Swain and a captain. The issue 26 was just brushed off with some excuses. 27 The daily activity report will show which officers were present and implemented these 28 policies under the warden’s instruction. Plaintiff names the warden as the sole defendant because 1 “each an [sic] every day one, if not both, of these policies are implemented, the warden must 2 approved and sign off on,” before delegating task to his subordinates to implement. This makes 3 Warden Pfeiffer the driving force behind the Eighth Amendment violations. Once he was aware 4 of the issue via 602, IAC and IFC meeting, it showed deliberate indifference to not issue an order 5 to change for the better. 6 As remedies Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. 7 III. Discussion 8 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 9 Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 10 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations 11 are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must 13 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 14 its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 15 are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 16 572 F.3d at 969. 17 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but not a plain statement of his claims. Much of 18 Plaintiff’s allegations is conclusory as to what happened, when it happened, or which defendant 19 was involved. While Plaintiff identifies policies, he fails to allege what the policies entail or how 20 they were applied to violate his rights. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency. 21 B. Supervisory Liability 22 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Warden Pfeiffer, or any defendant, liable based solely 23 upon their supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory 24 personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat 25 superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th 26 Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 27 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally 28 involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between 1 the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 2 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire v. Cal. Dep't 3 of Corrs. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 4 896, 915–16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TORIAN TERRELL AYTMAN, Case No. 1:23-cv-00382-JLT-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 13 v. STATE A CLAIM 14 WARDEN CHRISIAN PFIEFFER, et al., (ECF No. 9) 15 Defendants. FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Plaintiff Torian Terrell Aytman (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 18 forma pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint and first 19 amended complaint were screened, and Plaintiff was granted opportunities to amend. Plaintiff’s 20 second amended complaint is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 15.) 21 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 23 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 25 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 26 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 27 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 1 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 2 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 3 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 4 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 7 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 8 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 9 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 10 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 11 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 12 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 13 Plaintiff is currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), where the events in 14 the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names Christian Pfeiffer, Warden, KVSP as 15 the sole defendant. 16 In claim 1, Plaintiff alleges violation of the Eighth Amendment. Since the beginning of 17 2021, Plaintiff has been given the opportunity to go to the exercise yard less than 100 times. 18 Plaintiff complained to the building staff, their supervisors and had it addressed with the 19 supervisors’ supervisors. Once the facility cameras and body cameras were installed in the 20 prison, Plaintiff wrote the issue up because he had proof. Sgt. Anderson told Plaintiff during a 21 602 hearing that “per the warden” they cannot run yard when the facility is under Operational 22 Procedure #106 and #406, which deal with inmate movement and staff redirection during 23 instances of modified program due to lockdown events or short staff days. This is for all inmates 24 not affected by disciplinary yard restriction “because of this our inmate yard representatives” 25 addressed the issue directly to Warden Pfieffer, Assistant Warden Swain and a captain. The issue 26 was just brushed off with some excuses. 27 The daily activity report will show which officers were present and implemented these 28 policies under the warden’s instruction. Plaintiff names the warden as the sole defendant because 1 “each an [sic] every day one, if not both, of these policies are implemented, the warden must 2 approved and sign off on,” before delegating task to his subordinates to implement. This makes 3 Warden Pfeiffer the driving force behind the Eighth Amendment violations. Once he was aware 4 of the issue via 602, IAC and IFC meeting, it showed deliberate indifference to not issue an order 5 to change for the better. 6 As remedies Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. 7 III. Discussion 8 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 9 Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 10 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations 11 are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must 13 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 14 its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 15 are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 16 572 F.3d at 969. 17 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but not a plain statement of his claims. Much of 18 Plaintiff’s allegations is conclusory as to what happened, when it happened, or which defendant 19 was involved. While Plaintiff identifies policies, he fails to allege what the policies entail or how 20 they were applied to violate his rights. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency. 21 B. Supervisory Liability 22 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Warden Pfeiffer, or any defendant, liable based solely 23 upon their supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory 24 personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat 25 superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th 26 Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 27 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally 28 involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between 1 the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 2 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire v. Cal. Dep't 3 of Corrs. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 4 896, 915–16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even 5 without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a 6 policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving 7 force of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 8 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 Plaintiff alleges that the warden “knew” or “should have known” or “absolutely knew” 10 about conditions. Plaintiff merely relies on the Warden’s supervisory responsibilities to ensure 11 the safety and health of the prisoners, but this claim is based on respondeat superior which is not 12 cognizable under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Such conclusory allegations are 13 insufficient to state the causal link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional 14 violation. The allegations do not allege the warden was personally involved in constitutional 15 violations. 16 To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must . . . demonstrate that his 17 deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom established by a . . . policymaker possessed 18 with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane Cty. Wash., 594 F.3d 707, 713 19 (9th Cir. 2010). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 20 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 21 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 22 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 23 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 24 1982). Plaintiff's conclusory statements are insufficient to state a cognizable claim against the 25 supervisory defendants. 26 Plaintiff alleges that policies #104 and 406 are at issue, but fails to describe each of the 27 policies, or attach a copy, and explain why the policies are violation of his rights for which 28 Warden Pfeiffer is responsible. Plaintiff alleges that operational policies #106 and #406 are the 1 responsible policies for why he was not provided outside exercise. However, despite being 2 advised in the Court’s screening orders that he must do so, he provides no information about the 3 policy, what they say or the causal link between the policy and the alleged constitutional 4 violation. See Willard v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. 14-0760, 2014 WL 6901849, at *4 5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014) (“To premise a supervisor’s alleged liability on a policy promulgated by 6 the supervisor, plaintiff must identify a specific policy and establish a ‘direct causal link’ between 7 that policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”). Supervisory defendants may not 8 generally be held liable under a respondeat superior theory. 9 C. Conditions of Confinement 10 To state an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must satisfy both the objective and 11 subjective components of a two-part test. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991); Hallett 12 v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002). First, he must allege Defendants deprived him of the 13 “ ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.’ ” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 14 1998) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304). When determining whether an alleged deprivation is 15 objectively sufficiently serious to support an Eighth Amendment claim, the court must consider the 16 circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731–32 17 (9th Cir. 2000). The “subjection of a prisoner to lack of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can 18 constitute an infliction of pain within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Anderson v. County 19 of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1995). 20 Objectively, extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement 21 claim and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are 22 sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 23 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Although the Constitution “ ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ ” Wilson v. 24 Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), “inmates are entitled to reasonably adequate sanitation, personal 25 hygiene, and laundry privileges, particularly over a lengthy course of time,” Howard v. Adkison, 26 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989). 27 Second, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to plausibly show each Defendant he seeks to 28 hold liable had a “sufficiently culpable mind.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297. “In prison-conditions cases 1 that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 2 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citation omitted). That is, that the official must “kn[ow] of and disregard[ 3 ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]” Id. at 837. 4 Outside Exercise 5 Deprivation of outdoor exercise may violate the Eighth Amendment rights of inmates 6 confined to continuous and long-term segregation. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 7 1996). At the same time, outdoor exercise privileges may be restricted for disciplinary or security 8 purposes. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding long-term denial of 9 outdoor exercise to prisoner posing serious security risk who can exercise in his cell); see also 10 Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979) (declining to find whether deprivation of 11 outdoor exercise is per se unconstitutional). The right to outdoor exercise is not absolute or 12 indefeasible, Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010), but “ordinarily the lack of 13 outside exercise for extended periods is a sufficiently serious deprivation” for Eighth Amendment 14 purposes. LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1457. “[T]he Constitution requires jail officials to provide outdoor 15 recreation opportunities, or otherwise meaningful recreation, to prison inmates.” Norbert v. City 16 and County of San Francisco, 10 F.4th 918, 931 (2021) (quoting Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 17 1185 (9th Cir. 2018)). Indoor recreational opportunities may satisfy constitutional standards. Id. 18 at 929-30. For example, access to a dayroom designed for exercise may be adequate recreation. 19 Id. at 931. Without knowing the contents of the challenged policies, it is not possible to screen 20 whether outdoor exercise privileges were restricted for disciplinary or security purposes. 21 There are no factual allegations that the policies improperly restrict outside access. 22 Outdoor exercise privileges may be restricted for disciplinary or security purposes, and Plaintiff 23 alleges that outside activity was curtailed during staff shortages and lockdowns. Plaintiff fails to 24 allege if some substitute to outside exercise was granted such as indoor recreational opportunities. 25 Plaintiff also fails to allege the second component: that the defendant had a “sufficiently 26 culpable mind” such that he was deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s health. Plaintiff fails to 27 allege any factual support that Warden Pfeiffer knew of Plaintiff’s situation and that he disregarded 28 Plaintiff’s situation. Plaintiff bases his claim against Warden Pfeiffer that he had been informed of 1 conduct at the facility and Warden Pfeiffer is responsible for all actions at the institution. Liability 2 however cannot be based upon respondeat superior. 3 D. Title 15 and Policy Violation 4 To the extent that any Defendant has not complied with applicable state statutes or prison 5 regulations for failure to follow procedures, these deprivations do not support a claim under 6 §1983. Section 1983 only provides a cause of action for the deprivation of federally protected 7 rights. See e.g., Nible v. Fink, 828 Fed. Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2020) (violations of Title 15 of the 8 California Code of Regulations do not create private right of action); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 9 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (section 1983 claims must be premised on violation of federal 10 constitutional right); Prock v. Warden, No. 1:13-cv-01572-MJS (PC), 2013 WL 5553349, at *11– 11 12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013) (noting that several district courts have found no implied private right 12 of action under title 15 and stating that “no § 1983 claim arises for [violations of title 15] even if 13 they occurred.”); Parra v. Hernandez, No. 08cv0191-H (CAB), 2009 WL 3818376, at *3 (S.D. 14 Cal. Nov. 13, 2009) (granting motion to dismiss prisoner's claims brought pursuant to Title 15 of 15 the California Code of Regulations); Chappell v. Newbarth, No. 1:06-cv-01378-OWW-WMW 16 (PC), 2009 WL 1211372, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2009) (holding that there is no private right of 17 action under Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations); Tirado v. Santiago, No. 1:22-CV- 18 00724 BAM PC, 2022 WL 4586294, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2022), report and recommendation 19 adopted, No. 1:22-CV-00724 JLT BAM PC, 2022 WL 16748838 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2022) 20 (same). 21 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 22 For the reasons discussed, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Federal 23 Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Despite being provided 24 with the relevant legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiencies in his 25 complaint. Further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th 26 Cir. 2000). 27 /// 28 /// 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for failure 2 to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted. 3 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 4 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 5 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 6 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 7 Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 8 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 9 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 10 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12
13 Dated: October 24, 2023 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14
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