(PC) Ausborn v. California Health Care Facility

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RANDY AUSBORN, No. 2:20-CV-1341-JAM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE FACILITY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 23 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 24 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 25 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 26 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 27 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 28 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 1 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 2 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 3 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 4 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 5 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 6 and conclusory. 7 8 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 9 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) the California Health Care 10 Facility; (2) E. Smith, a correctional officer; (3) Fainhat, a doctor; (4) and V. Nelson, also a 11 correctional officer. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. Plaintiff alleges three claims. 12 Claim I1 13 Plaintiff claims that, on April 6, 2020, while on suicide watch, Defendant Smith 14 came to his cell and stepped on Plaintiff’s toes with his boots. See id. at 3. Plaintiff states that 15 Defendant Smith then told Plaintiff to move and when he did Defendant Smith threw Plaintiff on 16 his left side, causing blood to run from his eye. See id. Plaintiff states he required six stitches 17 above his eye. See id. 18 Claim II 19 In his second claim, Plaintiff asserts that his “medical is bad” because of the state 20 prison system. See id. at 4. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Fainhat left him in pain. See id. 21 Claim III2 22 Plaintiff alleges that, on April 25, 2020, Defendant Nelson “went in my room, grab 23 me, pick me up, and cary [sic] me [indecipherable].” Id. at 5. 24 / / / 25 / / /

26 1 While Plaintiff labels this a claim under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments based on denial of access to the courts, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest an Eighth Amendment claim 27 based on excessive force. 2 Plaintiff again references the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in this claim and states 28 it is about access to the courts though the allegations do not suggest such a claim. 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment 3 claim based on Plaintiff’s allegations in the first claim that Defendant Smith used excessive force 4 on April 6, 2020. Plaintiff’s allegations are deficient as to the remaining defendants for the 5 reasons discussed below. 6 B. Defendant California Health Care Facility 7 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought 8 against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v. 9 Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition 10 extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t 11 of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 12 Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state 13 agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 14 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 15 Here, Plaintiff sues the California Health Care Facility, which is a state prison. As 16 a unit of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, this defendant is not a 17 proper defendant. 18 B. Defendants Fainhat and Nelson 19 Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants arise under the Eighth Amendment 20 based apparently on the alleged denial of medical care (Fainhat) and the alleged use of excessive 21 force (Nelson). Neither claim is sufficient to proceed. 22 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 23 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 24 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 25 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 26 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 27 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 28 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 1 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 2 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 3 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 4 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 5 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 6 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 7 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 8 1. Medical Needs 9 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 10 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; 11 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health 12 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is 13 sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant 14 injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 15 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 16 Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition 17 is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily 18 activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See 19 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 20 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases 21 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with 22 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 23 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to 24 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 25 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See 26 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical 27 treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See 28 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate 1 that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 2 Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give 3 rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a 4 difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate 5 course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 6 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 7 Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Fainhat left him in pain. Plaintiff does not, 8 however, elaborate on this claim, indicate he had a serious medical need that was disregarded by 9 Defendant Fainhat, or otherwise explain Defendant Fainhat’s alleged conduct. 10 2. Excessive Force 11 When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial 12 inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 13 or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); 14 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as 15 opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims, 16 is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect 17 on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 18 U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following 19 factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship 20 between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably 21 perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 22 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force 23 was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 24 1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally, 25 because the use of force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining 26 security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 27 475 U.S. at 321-22. 28 / / / 1 It appears Plaintiff claims Defendant Nelson used excessive force. Plaintiff has 2 | not, however, explained the nature of the force used, why it was used, or whether Plaintiff was 3 | injured. Further, part of Plaintiffs claim is indecipherable. 4 5 I. CONCLUSION 6 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 7 || amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 8 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 9 | amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 10 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 11 | prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 12 | amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 13 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 14 | conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. See 15 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 16 || each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 17 || between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 18 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 19 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 20 | complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 21 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 22 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims. 23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a first amended 24 | complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. 25 26 || Dated: March 23, 2021 Sx