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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 ANGEL RUIZ, Case No. 1:20-cv-01100-EPG (PC) 11 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 12 RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION v. 13 BE DISMISSED JUNIOR FORTUNE, et al., 14 (ECF No. 20) Defendants. 15 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 16 TWENTY-ONE DAYS
17 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 Angel Ruiz (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 20 this action. Plaintiff filed the complaint commencing this action on July 27, 2020. (ECF No. 21 1). On October 7, 2020, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it failed to 22 state any cognizable claims. (ECF No. 13). The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to either: “a. 23 File a First Amended Complaint; or b. Notify the Court in writing that he wants to stand on his 24 complaint.” (Id. at 13). 25 On January 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 20). The 26 Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, and for the reasons described in this 27 order will recommend that this action be dismissed. 28 Plaintiff has twenty-one days from the date of service of these findings and 1 recommendations to file his objections. 2 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 4 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 5 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 6 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 7 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 12), the Court may 9 also screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 10 portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 11 determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 12 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 13 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 14 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 15 not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 16 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 17 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 18 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 19 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 20 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts 21 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 22 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a 23 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 24 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 25 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 26 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 27 \\\ 28 \\\ 1 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff alleges as follows in his First Amended Complaint: 3 On February 27, 2019, Plaintiff was in serious medical need of treatment at Pleasant 4 Valley State Prison. While experiencing severe pain in his back, his spine, and right leg, 5 Plaintiff called for help from prison officers. Plaintiff was escorted to the Clinical Treatment 6 Center. While there, Plaintiff asked defendant Fortune to make an MRI specialist appointment 7 because Plaintiff knew that something was seriously medically wrong with him. Defendant and 8 officers laughed at Plaintiff and said physical therapy for eight weeks was the only thing 9 needed for the pain Plaintiff was feeling. 10 Defendants failed to treat Plaintiff’s condition, which resulted in further significant 11 injury and wanton infliction of pain. Plaintiff’s chronic and serious condition significantly 12 affects daily activities. Once Plaintiff completed eight weeks of physical therapy, the pain 13 became so much worse that doctors even noticed Plaintiff’s serious medical need and rushed an 14 MRI screening. 15 With the results from the MRI screening, Defendants admitted Plaintiff to Mercy 16 Hospital Unit on March 25, 2019. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a Valley Fever infection in his 17 spine and “deteriation” in his neck. He now has to walk with a cane and take medication for 18 the rest of his life. 19 Plaintiff fears death as his condition continually gets worse. 20 Plaintiff is now high risk medical, and COVID-19 has entered the prison. 21 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 22 A. Section 1983 23 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 24 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 25 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 26 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 27 action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 28 1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 2 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 3 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see 4 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los 5 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 6 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 7 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 8 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 9 Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 10 2006); see also Marsh v.
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 ANGEL RUIZ, Case No. 1:20-cv-01100-EPG (PC) 11 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 12 RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION v. 13 BE DISMISSED JUNIOR FORTUNE, et al., 14 (ECF No. 20) Defendants. 15 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 16 TWENTY-ONE DAYS
17 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 Angel Ruiz (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 20 this action. Plaintiff filed the complaint commencing this action on July 27, 2020. (ECF No. 21 1). On October 7, 2020, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it failed to 22 state any cognizable claims. (ECF No. 13). The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to either: “a. 23 File a First Amended Complaint; or b. Notify the Court in writing that he wants to stand on his 24 complaint.” (Id. at 13). 25 On January 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 20). The 26 Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, and for the reasons described in this 27 order will recommend that this action be dismissed. 28 Plaintiff has twenty-one days from the date of service of these findings and 1 recommendations to file his objections. 2 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 4 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 5 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 6 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 7 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 12), the Court may 9 also screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 10 portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 11 determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 12 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 13 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 14 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 15 not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 16 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 17 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 18 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 19 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 20 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts 21 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 22 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a 23 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 24 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 25 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 26 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 27 \\\ 28 \\\ 1 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff alleges as follows in his First Amended Complaint: 3 On February 27, 2019, Plaintiff was in serious medical need of treatment at Pleasant 4 Valley State Prison. While experiencing severe pain in his back, his spine, and right leg, 5 Plaintiff called for help from prison officers. Plaintiff was escorted to the Clinical Treatment 6 Center. While there, Plaintiff asked defendant Fortune to make an MRI specialist appointment 7 because Plaintiff knew that something was seriously medically wrong with him. Defendant and 8 officers laughed at Plaintiff and said physical therapy for eight weeks was the only thing 9 needed for the pain Plaintiff was feeling. 10 Defendants failed to treat Plaintiff’s condition, which resulted in further significant 11 injury and wanton infliction of pain. Plaintiff’s chronic and serious condition significantly 12 affects daily activities. Once Plaintiff completed eight weeks of physical therapy, the pain 13 became so much worse that doctors even noticed Plaintiff’s serious medical need and rushed an 14 MRI screening. 15 With the results from the MRI screening, Defendants admitted Plaintiff to Mercy 16 Hospital Unit on March 25, 2019. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a Valley Fever infection in his 17 spine and “deteriation” in his neck. He now has to walk with a cane and take medication for 18 the rest of his life. 19 Plaintiff fears death as his condition continually gets worse. 20 Plaintiff is now high risk medical, and COVID-19 has entered the prison. 21 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 22 A. Section 1983 23 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 24 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 25 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 26 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 27 action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 28 1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 2 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 3 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see 4 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los 5 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 6 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 7 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 8 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 9 Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 10 2006); see also Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 11 “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 12 meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or 13 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 14 complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 15 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite 16 causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others 17 which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional 18 harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 19 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 20 Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 21 of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 22 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 23 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual 24 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have 25 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 26 658, 691, 695 (1978). 27 Supervisory personnel are not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their 28 employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 1 holds a supervisory position, the causal link between the supervisory defendant and the claimed 2 constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Fayle v. 3 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 4 1978). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, 5 a plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants 6 either: were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, Hansen v. 7 Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); “knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent 8 them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); or promulgated or “implement[ed] 9 a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the 10 moving force of the constitutional violation,” Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646 (citations and internal 11 quotation marks omitted). 12 For instance, a supervisor may be liable for his or her “own culpable action or inaction 13 in the training, supervision, or control of his [or her] subordinates,” “his [or her] acquiescence 14 in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made,” or “conduct that showed a 15 reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 16 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 17 B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs in Violation of the 18 Eighth Amendment 19 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 20 inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 21 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires 22 Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a 23 prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 24 infliction of pain,’” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 25 indifferent.” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)) 26 (citation and internal quotations marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by WMX 27 Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 28 Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of 1 and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 2 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 3 Deliberate indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to 4 respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” 5 Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). Civil recklessness (failure “to act in the face of an 6 unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known”) is 7 insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 8 836-37 & n.5 (1994) (citations omitted). 9 A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel—or between 10 medical professionals—regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to 11 establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); 12 Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, “a complaint that a 13 physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid 14 claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not 15 become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 16 106. To establish a difference of opinion rising to the level of deliberate indifference, a 17 “plaintiff must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable 18 under the circumstances.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 19 Once again, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he has a serious medical condition, but 20 the allegations in the complaint, even if true, do not sufficiently show that any defendant was 21 deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s condition under the legal standards above. 22 Plaintiff has alleged that he was provided with treatment for his back, spine, and leg 23 pain. After complaining about the pain Plaintiff received physical therapy, and when that did 24 not work, an MRI was approved. Immediately following the MRI results, Plaintiff was 25 admitted to Mercy Hospital Unit. As the Court informed Plaintiff previously, “[w]hile Plaintiff 26 believes he should have received the MRI earlier, and while Plaintiff may in the end have been 27 correct, a difference of opinion regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not 28 enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim.” (ECF No. 13, p. 9). Plaintiff’s allegations 1 that he asked for an MRI and that Defendants laughed at him when he was seen on February 2 27, 2019, does not change this analysis. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that any defendant 3 knew he needed an MRI earlier or that the treatment any defendant chose was medically 4 unacceptable under the circumstances. 5 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment 6 claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 7 C. State Law Claims 8 It is not clear if Plaintiff is attempting to assert any state law claims. To the extent that 9 he is, because the Court has found that Plaintiff failed to state any cognizable federal claims, 10 the Court finds that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims is 11 not appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 12 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The Supreme Court has stated, and we have often repeated, that ‘in the usual 13 case in which all federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors ... will 14 point towards declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims’”) 15 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 16 IV. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ORDER 17 The Court recommends that this action be dismissed without granting Plaintiff further 18 leave to amend. In the Court’s prior screening order, the Court identified the deficiencies in 19 Plaintiff’s complaint, provided Plaintiff with relevant legal standards, and provided Plaintiff 20 with an opportunity to amend his complaint. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint with 21 the benefit of the Court’s screening order, but failed to cure the deficiencies identified in the 22 screening order. Thus, it appears that further leave to amend would be futile. 23 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 24 1. Plaintiff’s federal claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 25 relief may be granted; 26 2. Plaintiff’s state law claims be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing 27 the claims in state court; and 28 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. 1 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district 2 || judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 3 || twenty-one (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff 4 || may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 5 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 6 || objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 7 || Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 8 || (9th Cir. 1991)). 9 Additionally, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district 10 || judge to this case. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ January 29, 2021 □□□ hey 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28